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Content
2024, Volume 147, Issue C
- 1-18 Asymmetric auctions: Perturbations, ε- equilibrium, and equilibrium
by Dharanan, G.V.A. & Ellis, Alex
- 19-37 Bicriteria Nash flows over time
by Oosterwijk, Tim & Schmand, Daniel & Schröder, Marc
- 38-51 The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma
by Gusev, Vasily & Nesterov, Alexander & Reshetov, Mikhail & Suzdaltsev, Alex
- 52-73 Clubs and networks
by Ding, Sihua & Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev
- 74-87 Peace in an unequal world? Experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality and conflict in a guns-vs-butter setting
by Baier, Alexandra & Seelos, Sophia & Rittmannsberger, Thomas
- 88-106 Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities
by Casajus, André & Funaki, Yukihiko & Huettner, Frank
- 107-127 Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
by Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Gallo, Oihane & Vorsatz, Marc
- 128-147 Reputation-based persuasion platforms
by Arieli, Itai & Madmon, Omer & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 148-169 Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities
by Haucap, Justus & Heldman, Christina & Rau, Holger A.
- 170-205 School choice with independent versus consolidated districts
by Klein, Thilo & Aue, Robert & Ortega, Josué
- 206-220 An observability paradox in linked enforcement
by Wen, Quan & Zheng, Bingyong
- 221-241 Group bargaining: A model of international treaty ratification
by Sethi, Ravideep & Yoo, WonSeok
- 242-267 Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution
by Mankat, Fabian
- 268-287 Fair division with two-sided preferences
by Igarashi, Ayumi & Kawase, Yasushi & Suksompong, Warut & Sumita, Hanna
- 288-304 Revealed preference domains from random choice
by Valkanova, Kremena
- 305-337 Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?
by Rohde, Linnéa Marie
- 338-376 Signaling motives in lying games
by Fries, Tilman
- 377-387 Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information
by Arieli, Itai & Arigapudi, Srinivas
- 388-406 Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions
by Diekert, Florian & Eymess, Tillmann
- 407-428 Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems
by Bérczi, Kristóf & Csáji, Gergely & Király, Tamás
- 429-448 To Catch a Stag: Identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games
by Jagau, Stephan
- 449-459 Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity
by Ishida, Junichiro & Suen, Wing
- 460-484 Skewness preferences: Evidence from online poker
by Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Kasinger, Johannes & Schneider, Dmitrij
- 485-516 Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems
by Gallo, Oihane & Klaus, Bettina
- 517-532 Measuring socially appropriate social preferences
by Carpenter, Jeffrey & Robbett, Andrea
- 533-553 Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets
by Bando, Keisuke & Kawasaki, Ryo
- 554-562 A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs
by Stoetzer, Lasse S. & Zimmermann, Florian
2024, Volume 146, Issue C
- 1-34 Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting
by Durand, François & Macé, Antonin & Núñez, Matías
- 35-50 The Texas Shoot-Out under Knightian uncertainty
by Bauch, Gerrit & Riedel, Frank
- 51-58 Not all is lost: Sorting and self-stabilizing sets
by Peralta, Esteban
- 59-76 Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses
by Kim, Duk Gyoo & Lim, Wooyoung
- 77-90 Aggregating inconclusive data sets
by Gayer, Gabrielle & Lehrer, Ehud & Persitz, Dotan
- 91-104 On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation
by Thomson, William
- 105-120 Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements
by Chatterjee, Kalyan & Chaturvedi, Rakesh
- 121-136 Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market
by Bester, Helmut
- 137-159 Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs
by Tsodikovich, Yevgeny & Venel, Xavier & Zseleva, Anna
- 160-183 Belief formation under signal correlation
by Hossain, Tanjim & Okui, Ryo
- 184-195 Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies
by Afodjo, Nabil & Pongou, Roland
- 196-221 Differentiating roles of the reference alternative
by Qin, Dan
- 222-233 Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types
by Haimanko, Ori
- 234-254 Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
by Feng, Di & Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip
- 255-276 How alliances form and conflict ensues
by Dong, Lu & Huang, Lingbo & Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie
- 277-291 Capacity design in school choice
by Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut & Van der Linden, Martin
- 292-307 Social learning with partial and aggregate information: Experimental evidence
by Cavatorta, Elisa & Guarino, Antonio & Huck, Steffen
- 308-326 Posted offers with charitable promises: True preferences and strategic behavior
by Schwirplies, Claudia & Lange, Andreas
2024, Volume 145, Issue C
- 1-18 Two experiments on trading information goods in a network
by Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Kayaba, Yutaka & Maekawa, Jun & Matsushima, Hitoshi
- 19-26 An undecidable statement regarding zero-sum games
by Fey, Mark
- 27-53 Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital
by Leduc, Mathieu V.
- 54-65 Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition
by Chen, Yanlin & Hu, Audrey & Zhang, Jun
- 66-83 Efficiency wages with motivated agents
by Armouti-Hansen, Jesper & Cassar, Lea & Deréky, Anna & Engl, Florian
- 84-101 Equilibrium information in credence goods
by Liu, Ting & Ma, Ching-to Albert
- 102-116 Bayesian stable states
by Chen, Yi-Chun & Hu, Gaoji
- 117-136 Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks
by Collins, Sean M. & James, Duncan
- 137-156 On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality
by Werner, Peter
- 157-196 Entry under placement uncertainty
by Roy, Sunanda & Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn
- 197-207 Efficient matching under general constraints
by Imamura, Kenzo & Kawase, Yasushi
- 208-216 Voting to persuade
by Wong, Tsz-Ning & Yang, Lily Ling & Zhao, Xin
- 217-238 Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains
by Biró, Péter & Csáji, Gergely
- 239-262 Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs
by Mimun, Hlafo Alfie & Quattropani, Matteo & Scarsini, Marco
- 263-284 Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
by Guo, Huiyi
- 285-311 Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks
by Sun, Yang & Zhao, Wei
- 312-338 Experimental evidence on the relationship between perceived ambiguity and likelihood insensitivity
by Henkel, Luca
- 339-355 Information avoidance in school choice
by Moscariello, Paola
- 356-376 Information flows and memory in games
by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Generoso, Nicolò
- 377-412 Myopic oligopoly pricing
by Bos, Iwan & Marini, Marco A. & Saulle, Riccardo D.
- 413-425 Auction design with heterogeneous priors
by Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro
- 426-450 Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report
by Puppe, Clemens & Slinko, Arkadii
- 451-466 Who's the deceiver? Identifying deceptive intentions in communication
by Blazquiz-Pulido, Juan Francisco & Polonio, Luca & Bilancini, Ennio
- 467-492 Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment
by Bhattacharya, Puja & Rampal, Jeevant
- 493-509 Identity change and economic mobility: Experimental evidence
by Muñoz, Manuel
- 510-525 Oddness of the number of Nash equilibria: The case of polynomial payoff functions
by Bich, Philippe & Fixary, Julien
- 526-556 Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests
by Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco
2024, Volume 144, Issue C
- 1-12 Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games
by Argenton, Cédric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland
- 13-28 A stranger in a strange land: Promises and identity
by Charness, Gary & Bartolomeo, Giovanni Di & Papa, Stefano
- 29-48 Imposing commitment to rein in overconfidence in learning
by Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel & Mayskaya, Tatiana & Nikandrova, Arina
- 49-70 A fair and truthful mechanism with limited subsidy
by Goko, Hiromichi & Igarashi, Ayumi & Kawase, Yasushi & Makino, Kazuhisa & Sumita, Hanna & Tamura, Akihisa & Yokoi, Yu & Yokoo, Makoto
- 71-83 Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores
by Rheingans-Yoo, Ross
- 84-103 Reinforcement learning in a prisoner's dilemma
by Dolgopolov, Arthur
- 104-125 Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines
by Atay, Ata & Trudeau, Christian
- 126-140 Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values
by De Magistris, Enrico
- 141-166 Dynamic coordination with payoff and informational externalities
by Zhou, Beixi
- 167-182 Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity
by Shorrer, Ran I. & Sóvágó, Sándor
- 183-202 Partnerships based on Joint Ownership
by Blonski, Matthias & Herbold, Daniel
- 203-224 Impartial selection with additive guarantees via iterated deletion
by Cembrano, Javier & Fischer, Felix & Hannon, David & Klimm, Max
- 225-249 Learning in networks with idiosyncratic agents
by Khandelwal, Vatsal
- 250-283 Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality
by Barigozzi, Francesca & Cremer, Helmuth
- 284-299 Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: An experimental investigation
by Du, Ninghua & Shahriar, Quazi
- 300-328 Popular matchings with weighted voters
by Heeger, Klaus & Cseh, Ágnes
- 329-354 The impact of fraud on reputation systems
by Krügel, Jan Philipp & Paetzel, Fabian
- 355-377 Multi-dimensional reasoning in competitive resource allocation games: Evidence from intra-team communication
by Arad, Ayala & Penczynski, Stefan P.
- 378-394 Beyond dominance and Nash: Ranking equilibria by critical mass
by Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud
2024, Volume 143, Issue C
- 1-11 Buying winners
by Louis-Sidois, Charles
- 12-24 Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
by Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Bonifacio, Agustín G.
- 25-50 Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange
by Blom, Danny & Smeulders, Bart & Spieksma, Frits
- 51-76 Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
by Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph
- 77-102 Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities
by Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Saulle, Riccardo D.
- 103-124 School choice with transferable student characteristics
by Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo & Romero-Medina, Antonio
- 125-151 Social roles and competitiveness: My willingness to compete depends on who I am (supposed to be)
by Zhang, Peilu & Zhang, Yinjunjie & Palma, Marco A.
- 152-160 Order independence for rationalizability
by Manili, Julien
- 161-178 Auction timing and market thickness
by Chaves, Isaías N. & Ichihashi, Shota
- 179-190 Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments
by Cagala, Tobias & Glogowsky, Ulrich & Rincke, Johannes & Schudy, Simeon
- 191-203 The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
by Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene) & Lee, Joosung
- 204-222 Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
by Chen, Bo & Chen, Bo
- 223-247 Believe it or not: Experimental evidence on sunspot equilibria with social networks
by Battiston, Pietro & Harrison, Sharon G.
- 248-268 School choice with costly information acquisition
by Maxey, Tyler
- 269-286 Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
by Kasajima, Yoichi & Toda, Manabu
- 287-299 Reallocation with priorities
by Combe, Julien & Schlegel, Jan Christoph
- 300-320 The n-player Hirshleifer contest
by Ewerhart, Christian & Sun, Guang-Zhen
- 321-339 Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
by Piazza, Adriana & Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo
- 340-356 Independent versus collective expertise
by Catonini, Emiliano & Kurbatov, Andrey & Stepanov, Sergey
- 357-369 Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market
by Bester, Helmut & Sákovics, József
2023, Volume 142, Issue C
- 1-16 The in-group egalitarian Owen values
by Abe, Takaaki & Nakada, Satoshi
- 17-32 Location games with references
by Fournier, Gaëtan & Francou, Amaury
- 33-45 Coordinated democracy
by Xefteris, Dimitrios
- 46-72 Lying for votes
by Dugar, Subhasish & Shahriar, Quazi
- 73-100 Screening for experiments
by Min, Daehong
- 101-112 Submission costs in risk-taking contests
by Whitmeyer, Mark
- 113-149 Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment
by Burdea, Valeria & Montero, Maria & Sefton, Martin
- 150-178 Bad reputation with simple rating systems
by Lorecchio, Caio & Monte, Daniel
- 179-192 Leadership ability and agenda choice
by Hwang, Ilwoo & Krasa, Stefan
- 193-208 Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner
by Gershkov, Alex & Kleiner, Andreas & Moldovanu, Benny & Shi, Xianwen
- 209-225 Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort
by Guha, Brishti
- 226-242 Losing money to make money: The benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports
by Vohra, Akhil
- 243-265 Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms
by Manea, Mihai & Maskin, Eric
- 266-291 Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
by Brandt, Felix & Lederer, Patrick & Suksompong, Warut
- 292-314 Markovian persuasion with two states
by Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Hernández, Penélope & Neeman, Zvika & Solan, Eilon
- 315-338 A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence
by Ba, Cuimin & Gindin, Alice
- 339-356 Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior
by Berkemer, Rainer & Starke, Jens & Kawamoto, Atsushi
- 357-367 Revealed deliberate preference change
by Boissonnet, Niels & Ghersengorin, Alexis & Gleyze, Simon
- 368-380 An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation
by Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele & Müller, Christoph
- 381-410 Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections
by Meyer, Jacob & Rentschler, Lucas
- 411-422 Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: District-based versus school-based admissions
by Ehlers, Lars
- 423-439 Robust equilibria in tournaments
by Han, Lining & Juarez, Ruben & Vargas, Miguel
- 440-453 Ex-post implementation with interdependent values
by Goyal, Saurav & Narayanan, Aroon
- 454-479 Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game
by He, Simin & Zhu, Xun
- 480-507 Paying for what kind of performance? Performance pay, multitasking, and sorting in mission-oriented jobs
by Jones, Daniel B. & Tonin, Mirco & Vlassopoulos, Michael & Winichakul, K. Pun
- 508-526 Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: Approvals can be harder than strict preferences
by Bentert, Matthias & Boehmer, Niclas & Heeger, Klaus & Koana, Tomohiro
- 527-551 Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games
by Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Manili, J.
- 552-569 Preventive wars
by Abbink, Klaus & Dong, Lu & Huang, Lingbo
- 570-612 Evolution and the ultimatum game
by Akdeniz, Aslıhan & van Veelen, Matthijs
- 613-622 Communication between unbiased agents
by Dilmé, Francesc
- 623-644 Policy experimentation with repeated elections
by Hwang, Ilwoo
- 645-665 Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints
by Lu, Feifei & Shi, Fei
- 666-689 Sharing cost of network among users with differentiated willingness to pay
by Panova, Elena
- 690-717 Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?
by Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire
- 718-729 Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown
by Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander
- 730-742 Bargaining: Nash, Consensus, or Compromise?
by Li, Xiangliang
- 743-764 Fairly taking turns
by Mackenzie, Andrew & Komornik, Vilmos
- 765-793 On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust
by Della Lena, Sebastiano & Manzoni, Elena & Panebianco, Fabrizio
- 794-811 Stable constitutions
by Jeong, Daeyoung & Kim, Semin
- 812-832 The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study
by Kloosterman, Andrew & Mago, Shakun
- 833-850 Influencing a polarized and connected legislature
by Das Chaudhury, Ratul & Leister, C. Matthew & Rai, Birendra
- 851-865 Stochastic replicator dynamics: A theoretical analysis and an experimental assessment
by Choudhury, Kangkan Dev & Aydinyan, Tigran
- 866-878 The development gap in economic rationality of future elites
by Cappelen, Alexander W. & Kariv, Shachar & Sørensen, Erik Ø. & Tungodden, Bertil
- 879-895 Influence relation in two-output multichoice voting games
by Siani, Joseph & Tedjeugang, Narcisse & Tchantcho, Bertrand
- 896-930 Signal-jamming in the frequency domain
by Taub, B.
- 931-940 Predictably competitive? What faces can tell us about competitive behavior
by Balafoutas, Loukas & Fornwagner, Helena & Grosskopf, Brit
- 941-954 Strategic default in financial networks
by Allouch, Nizar & Jalloul, Maya & Duncan, Alfred
- 955-977 Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment
by Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu & Yamamori, Tetsuo
- 978-991 Effort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks
by Sun, Xiang & Xu, Jin & Zhou, Junjie
- 992-1011 Constrained contests with a continuum of battles
by Hwang, Sung-Ha & Koh, Youngwoo & Lu, Jingfeng
- 1012-1017 Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result
by Cho, Wonki Jo & Thomson, William
- 1018-1042 Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies
by Schmitt, Stefanie Y. & Bruckner, Dominik
2023, Volume 141, Issue C
- 1-20 On self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge
by Ünveren, Burak & Donduran, Murat & Barokas, Guy
- 21-29 Learning through period and physical time
by Backhaus, Teresa & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes & Oprea, Ryan
- 30-51 Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence
by Lauber, Arne & March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco
- 52-69 Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods
by Kandul, Serhiy & Lanz, Bruno & Reins, Evert
- 70-87 Trustworthy by design
by Geng, Sen & Guan, Menglong
- 88-104 An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
by Chessa, Michela & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Lardon, Aymeric & Yamada, Takashi
- 105-132 Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
by Chakraborty, Anujit
- 133-155 Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment
by Casella, Alessandra & Guo, Jeffrey Da-Ren & Jiang, Michelle
- 156-181 Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles
by Altuntaş, Açelya & Phan, William & Tamura, Yuki
- 182-195 Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing
by Aycinena, Diego & Elbittar, Alexander & Gomberg, Andrei & Rentschler, Lucas
- 196-222 Beyond uncertainty aversion
by Hill, Brian
- 223-260 Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms
by Jalota, Devansh & Pavone, Marco & Qi, Qi & Ye, Yinyu
- 261-285 Increasing the external validity of social preference games by reducing measurement error
by Wang, Xinghua & Navarro-Martinez, Daniel
- 286-302 On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
by Kivinen, Steven
- 303-320 Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
by Aradhye, Aditya & Flesch, János & Staudigl, Mathias & Vermeulen, Dries
- 321-336 Fairness for multi-self agents
by Bade, Sophie & Segal-Halevi, Erel
- 337-363 Stable sharing
by Nicolò, Antonio & Salmaso, Pietro & Sen, Arunava & Yadav, Sonal
- 364-379 A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
by Noda, Shunya
- 380-402 Targeting in social networks with anonymized information
by Bloch, Francis & Shabayek, Shaden
- 403-427 Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints
by Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan
- 428-443 Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments
by Echenique, Federico & Miralles, Antonio & Zhang, Jun
- 444-471 Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games
by Pahl, Lucas
- 472-483 Attacking a nuclear facility: The impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality
by Ma, Siyu & Biran, Dov
- 484-502 Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence
by Dickinson, David L. & Masclet, David
- 503-514 Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
by Asheim, Geir B. & Brunnschweiler, Thomas
- 515-528 The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
by Ortega, Josué & Klein, Thilo
- 529-547 Unique stable matchings
by Gutin, Gregory Z. & Neary, Philip R. & Yeo, Anders
- 548-580 Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales
by Uyanik, Metin & Yengin, Duygu
2023, Volume 140, Issue C
- 1-32 Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring?
by Ackfeld, Viola & Güth, Werner
- 33-49 An analytically solvable principal-agent model
by Mattsson, Lars-Göran & Weibull, Jörgen W.
- 50-72 Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information
by Masiliūnas, Aidas
- 73-87 The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games
by Karakostas, Alexandros & Kocher, Martin G. & Matzat, Dominik & Rau, Holger A. & Riewe, Gerhard
- 88-98 Weighted average-convexity and Shapley values
by Skoda, Alexandre & Venel, Xavier
- 99-114 Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information
by Minchuk, Yizhaq & Sela, Aner
- 115-131 A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time
by Leng, Ailin
- 132-153 Competitive information disclosure in random search markets
by He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao
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