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Content
May 1994, Volume 6, Issue 3
March 1994, Volume 6, Issue 2
January 1994, Volume 6, Issue 1
October 1993, Volume 5, Issue 4
- 509-513 Adaptive Dynamics, Part II
by Crawford Vincent P.
- 514-531 Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
by Farrell Joseph
- 532-546 Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability
by Warneryd Karl
- 547-575 Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication
by Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel
- 576-603 On the Relationship between Mutation Rates and Growth Rates in a Changing Environment
by Ben-Porath Elchanan & Dekel Eddie & Rustichini Aldo
- 604-617 Evolution of Smartn Players
by Stahl Dale O.
- 618-631 Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example
by Vega-Redondo Fernando
- 632-646 Rationalizability, Strong Rationality, and Expectational Stability
by Evans George W. & Guesnerie Roger
- 647-651 The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, By Brian Skyrms, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. 199 pp., $32.50
by Bicchieri Cristina
July 1993, Volume 5, Issue 3
April 1993, Volume 5, Issue 2
January 1993, Volume 5, Issue 1
October 1992, Volume 4, Issue 4
- 493-510 It takes two to tango: Equilibria in a model of sales
by Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G.
- 511-527 Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers
by Kaneko, Mamoru & Kimura, Toshiyuki
- 528-552 The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
by Koller, Daphne & Megiddo, Nimrod
- 553-564 The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria
by Mertens, Jean-Francois
- 565-581 Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games
by Moldovanu, Benny
- 582-587 The multilinear extension and the coalition structure value
by Owen, Guillermo & Winter, Eyal
- 588-605 The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games
by Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmuller, Joachim
- 606-626 Credible assignments in coordination games
by Van Huyck, John B. & Gillette, Ann B. & Battalio, Raymond C.
- 627-649 Optimal pricing against a simple learning rule
by von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
July 1992, Volume 4, Issue 3
- 327-346 Simultaneous signaling through investment in an R& D game with private information
by Aoki, Reiko & Reitman, David
- 347-372 A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Calvert, Randall L.
- 373-401 Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem
by Moulin, Herve
- 402-421 Coalition formation under limited communication
by Rosenthal, Edward C.
- 422-425 Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
by Seidmann, Daniel J.
- 426-449 Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
by Smith, Lones
- 450-462 On self-enforcement in extensive-form games
by Weibull, Jorgen W.
- 463-483 Continuous implementation in economics with incomplete information
by Wettstein, David
- 484-492 On nash implementation of social choice correspondences
by Yamato, Takehiko
April 1992, Volume 4, Issue 2
- 169-181 A unique solution to n-person sequential bargaining
by Asheim, Geir B.
- 182-201 Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
by Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie & Geanakoplos, John
- 202-217 The exponential convergence of Bayesian learning in normal form games
by Jordan, J. S.
- 218-231 Equilibrium refinement in psychological games
by Kolpin, Van
- 232-251 Short-rune stable matchings between bees and flowers
by Peleg, B. & Shmida, A.
- 252-260 Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
by Peters, Hans
- 261-283 Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis
by Rapoport, Amnon & Boebel, Richard B.
- 284-313 Dominated strategies and common knowledge
by Samuelson, Larry
- 314-317 Game theory : By Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 608 pp., $35.00
by Wilson, Charles A.
January 1992, Volume 4, Issue 1
- 1-17 On being honest and behaving honestly
by Adler, Moshe
- 18-36 Imperfect equilibrium
by Beja, Avraham
- 37-57 Risk sharing with competition
by Biglaiser, Gary
- 58-71 Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game
by Borm, P. E. M. & Tijs, S. H.
- 72-100 Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games
by DeMarzo, Peter M.
- 101-121 The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games
by Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip
- 122-131 On platers with a bounded number of states
by Papadimitriou, Christos H.
- 132-144 The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
by Winter, Eyal
- 145-160 The hybrid solutions of an N-person game
by Zhao, Jingang
- 161-165 Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis : By Alvin E. Roth and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor, Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. 265 + xiii pp., $54.50 (hardback)
by Rothblum, Uriel G.
November 1991, Volume 3, Issue 4
- 393-402 Uniqueness of equilibrium for smooth multistage concave games
by Brown, Murray & Chiang, Shin-Hwan & Yamamoto, Kenji
- 403-422 Constrained egalitarian allocations
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj
- 423-437 Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility
by Fershtman, Chaim & Safra, Zvi & Vincent, Daniel
- 438-452 Discriminatory von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions
by Heijmans, Johannes G. C.
- 453-466 Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers
by Hendon, Ebbs & Tranaes, Torben
- 467-486 Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
by Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter
- 487-503 The core of an m-sided assignment game
by Quint, Thomas
August 1991, Volume 3, Issue 3
- 267-277 Maxmin and minmax for coalitional game forms
by Abdou, Joseph
- 278-294 Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
by Asheim, Geir B.
- 295-322 Do people exploit their bargaining power? An experimental study
by Binmore, Ken & Morgan, Peter & Snaked, Avner & Sutton, John
- 323-338 Competitively cost advantageous mergers and monopolization
by Kamien, Morton I. & Zang, Israel
- 339-349 Stable payoffs in resale-proof trades of information
by Nakayama, Mikio & Quintas, Luis
- 350-355 The positive value of information
by Neyman, Abraham
- 356-367 Pure-strategy [epsiv]-Nash equilibrium in two-person non-zero-sum games
by Radzik, Tadeusz
- 368-384 The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
by Stahl, Dale II
- 385-387 Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable number of agents : By W. Thomson and T. Lensberg, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989. 230 pp., $39.50
by Moulin, Herve
- 387-391 Game theory: Analysis of conflict : By Roger B. Myerson, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 568 pp., $45.00
by Kalai, Ehud
May 1991, Volume 3, Issue 2
- 157-162 A note on equalization in extensive form games
by Bergantino, Gustavo & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio
- 163-182 The Pareto set of the partition bargaining problem
by Granot, Daniel & Rothblum, Uriel G.
- 183-220 Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard
- 221-236 Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing
by Ponssard, Jean-Pierre
- 237-243 A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
by Rosenthal, Robert W.
- 244-259 A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players
by Salant, David J.
- 260-264 Bargaining and markets : By Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, Academic Press, San Diego, 1990. ISBN 0-12-528631-7, xi + 216 pp., $14.95 Paper, $34.50 hardbound
by Binmore, Ken
February 1991, Volume 3, Issue 1
- 3-24 Evolution, learning, and economic behavior
by Selten, Reinhard
- 25-59 An "evolutionary" interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
by Crawford, Vincent P.
- 60-81 Bayesian learning in normal form games
by Jordan, J. S.
- 82-100 Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John
- 101-109 Viscous population equilibria
by Myerson, Roger B. & Pollock, Gregory B. & Swinkels, Jeroen M.
- 110-128 Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games
by Samuelson, Larry
- 129-144 Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games
by Stanford, William
- 145-156 Cooperation in the long-run
by Peyton Young, H. & Foster, Dean
December 1990, Volume 2, Issue 4
September 1990, Volume 2, Issue 3
- 203-212 The core of the matching game
by Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David
- 213-223 Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points
by Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William
- 224-238 The importance of the agenda in bargaining
by Fershtman, Chaim
- 239-246 On the existence of equilibrium points in a class of asymmetric market entry games
by Gary-Bobo, Robert J.
- 247-272 Competition on many fronts: A stackelberg signaling equilibrium
by Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques
- 273-290 Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games
by Lipman, Barton L. & Srivastava, Sanjay
- 291-297 Bargaining without commitment
by Muthoo, Abhinay
June 1990, Volume 2, Issue 2
- 97-117 Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K.
- 118-128 Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria
by Glazer, Jacob & Weiss, Andrew
- 129-153 On the value of information in a strategic conflict
by Kamien, Morton I. & Tauman, Yair & Zamir, Shmuel
- 154-172 Computation as a correlation device
by Lipman, Barton L. & Srivastava, Sanjay
- 173-187 Bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing
by Stahl, Dale II
- 188-201 Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
by Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal
March 1990, Volume 2, Issue 1
December 1989, Volume 1, Issue 4
September 1989, Volume 1, Issue 3
- 213-221 Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Samet, Dov
- 222-233 Efficient allocation of a "prize"-King Solomon's dilemma
by Glazer, Jacob & Ma, Ching-To Albert
- 234-249 Weighted coalition structure values
by Levy, Anat & Mclean, Richard P.
- 250-274 Monotonic surplus sharing: Characterization results
by Moulin, Herve
- 275-293 Clan games
by Potters, Jos & Poos, Rene & Tijs, Stef & Muto, Shigeo
June 1989, Volume 1, Issue 2
March 1989, Volume 1, Issue 1
- 1-4 Games and economic behavior
by Kalai, Ehud
- 5-39 Cooperation and bounded recall
by Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain
- 40-59 Equilibrium exit in stochastically declining industries
by Fine, Charles H. & Li, Lode
- 60-79 Psychological games and sequential rationality
by Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio
- 80-93 Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Zemel, Eitan
- 94-115 Information leakage forces cooperation
by Matsui, Akihiko
- 116-118 Uniqueness of the Shapley value
by Neyman, Abraham
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