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Content
2023, Volume 141, Issue C
- 156-181 Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles
by Altuntaş, Açelya & Phan, William & Tamura, Yuki
- 182-195 Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing
by Aycinena, Diego & Elbittar, Alexander & Gomberg, Andrei & Rentschler, Lucas
- 196-222 Beyond uncertainty aversion
by Hill, Brian
- 223-260 Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms
by Jalota, Devansh & Pavone, Marco & Qi, Qi & Ye, Yinyu
- 261-285 Increasing the external validity of social preference games by reducing measurement error
by Wang, Xinghua & Navarro-Martinez, Daniel
- 286-302 On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
by Kivinen, Steven
- 303-320 Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
by Aradhye, Aditya & Flesch, János & Staudigl, Mathias & Vermeulen, Dries
- 321-336 Fairness for multi-self agents
by Bade, Sophie & Segal-Halevi, Erel
- 337-363 Stable sharing
by Nicolò, Antonio & Salmaso, Pietro & Sen, Arunava & Yadav, Sonal
- 364-379 A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
by Noda, Shunya
- 380-402 Targeting in social networks with anonymized information
by Bloch, Francis & Shabayek, Shaden
- 403-427 Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints
by Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan
- 428-443 Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments
by Echenique, Federico & Miralles, Antonio & Zhang, Jun
- 444-471 Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games
by Pahl, Lucas
- 472-483 Attacking a nuclear facility: The impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality
by Ma, Siyu & Biran, Dov
- 484-502 Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence
by Dickinson, David L. & Masclet, David
- 503-514 Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
by Asheim, Geir B. & Brunnschweiler, Thomas
- 515-528 The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
by Ortega, Josué & Klein, Thilo
- 529-547 Unique stable matchings
by Gutin, Gregory Z. & Neary, Philip R. & Yeo, Anders
- 548-580 Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales
by Uyanik, Metin & Yengin, Duygu
2023, Volume 140, Issue C
- 1-32 Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring?
by Ackfeld, Viola & Güth, Werner
- 33-49 An analytically solvable principal-agent model
by Mattsson, Lars-Göran & Weibull, Jörgen W.
- 50-72 Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information
by Masiliūnas, Aidas
- 73-87 The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games
by Karakostas, Alexandros & Kocher, Martin G. & Matzat, Dominik & Rau, Holger A. & Riewe, Gerhard
- 88-98 Weighted average-convexity and Shapley values
by Skoda, Alexandre & Venel, Xavier
- 99-114 Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information
by Minchuk, Yizhaq & Sela, Aner
- 115-131 A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time
by Leng, Ailin
- 132-153 Competitive information disclosure in random search markets
by He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao
- 154-172 Targeting in networks under costly agreements
by Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric & Safi, Shahir
- 173-180 Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design
by McClellan, Andrew
- 181-196 Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
by Tamura, Yuki
- 197-209 Mechanism design with informational punishment
by Balzer, Benjamin & Schneider, Johannes
- 210-228 Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples
by Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro
- 229-252 Scheduling games with rank-based utilities
by Rosner, Shaul & Tamir, Tami
- 253-271 Price competition with capacity uncertainty - feasting on leftovers
by Somogyi, Robert & Vergote, Wouter & Virag, Gabor
- 272-295 Temptation and guilt
by Noor, Jawwad & Ren, Linxia
- 296-315 Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
by Li, Anqi & Hu, Lin
- 316-340 Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding
by Feldman, Michal & Shabtai, Galia
- 341-347 Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information
by Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori
- 348-362 On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
by Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C.
- 363-379 Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: A volunteer's dilemma experiment
by Wang, Tse-Min & Heine, Florian & van Witteloostuijn, Arjen
- 380-400 Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives
by Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd
- 401-409 Stability of alliance networks
by Cai, Xinyue & Kimya, Mert
- 410-430 Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution
by Cui, Zhiwei
- 431-455 Choice structures in games
by Galeazzi, Paolo & Marti, Johannes
- 456-480 Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing
by Altınok, Ahmet
- 481-501 Continuous level-k mechanism design
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto
- 502-528 Competition with list prices
by Haan, Marco A. & Heijnen, Pim & Obradovits, Martin
- 529-555 Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games
by Yousefimanesh, Niloofar & Bos, Iwan & Vermeulen, Dries
- 556-574 Designing weighted and directed networks under complementarities
by Li, Xueheng
- 575-584 The non-dismal science of intergenerational affective interactions
by Heifetz, Aviad
2023, Volume 139, Issue C
- 1-14 Equitable rent division on a soft budget
by Velez, Rodrigo A.
- 15-25 Honesty in the city
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Feldman, Paul & Servátka, Maroš & Tarrasó, Jorge & Vadovič, Radovan
- 26-55 Screening while controlling an externality
by Ostrizek, Franz & Sartori, Elia
- 56-87 Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence
by Song, Yangwei
- 88-116 God games: An experimental study of uncertainty, superstition, and cooperation
by Hajikhameneh, Aidin & Iannaccone, Laurence R.
- 117-132 Competition and cooperation in linear production and sequencing processes
by van Beek, Andries & Malmberg, Benjamin & Borm, Peter & Quant, Marieke & Schouten, Jop
- 133-160 The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: A deterministic approximation approach
by Lahkar, Ratul & Mukherjee, Sayan & Roy, Souvik
- 161-179 Public goods games in directed networks
by Papadimitriou, Christos & Peng, Binghui
- 180-199 On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests
by Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan
- 200-215 Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources
by Deligkas, Argyrios & Filos-Ratsikas, Aris & Voudouris, Alexandros A.
2023, Volume 138, Issue C
- 1-21 Strategic investment with positive externalities
by Steg, Jan-Henrik & Thijssen, Jacco J.J.
- 22-41 On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets
by de Pinto, Marco & Goerke, Laszlo & Palermo, Alberto
- 42-71 Feigning ignorance for long-term gains
by Lee, Natalie
- 72-89 Competition in persuasion: An experiment
by Wu, Wenhao & Ye, Bohan
- 90-111 Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information
by Wasser, Cédric & Zhang, Mengxi
- 112-125 Second-best probability weighting
by Herold, Florian & Netzer, Nick
- 126-142 Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
by Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R.
- 143-160 The limits to moral erosion in markets: Social norms and the replacement excuse
by Bartling, Björn & Özdemir, Yagiz
- 161-170 Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival
by Garrett, Daniel F.
- 171-196 Classical and belief-based gift exchange models: Theory and evidence
by Dhami, Sanjit & Wei, Mengxing & al-Nowaihi, Ali
- 197-213 The social construction of ignorance: Experimental evidence
by Soraperra, Ivan & van der Weele, Joël & Villeval, Marie Claire & Shalvi, Shaul
- 214-237 Consumer loss aversion and scale-dependent psychological switching costs
by Karle, Heiko & Schumacher, Heiner & Vølund, Rune
- 238-253 Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers
by Carroni, Elias & Mantovani, Andrea & Minniti, Antonio
- 254-280 Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences
by Lee, Yong-Ju & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhao, Chen
- 281-298 Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
by Hagen, Martin
- 299-310 Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
by Antić, Nemanja & Persico, Nicola
- 311-320 Binary single-crossing random utility models
by Petri, Henrik
- 321-354 It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply: Conditional norm-following and belief distortion
by Bicchieri, Cristina & Dimant, Eugen & Sonderegger, Silvia
- 355-372 What makes an opinion leader: Expertise vs popularity
by Rapanos, Theodoros
- 373-386 Uniform, efficient and independent Ramsey taxes across markets
by Amir, Rabah & Jin, Jim Y. & Lasselle, Laurence
- 387-406 Informational feedback between voting and speculative trading
by Wang, Bo & Zhou, Zhen
2023, Volume 137, Issue C
- 1-22 The option value of record-based sanctions
by Leshem, Shmuel & Tabbach, Avraham
- 23-49 Coordination via delay: Theory and experiment
by Jin, Ye & Zhou, Zhen & Brandenburger, Adam
- 50-67 Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
by Zhang, Jun
- 68-90 Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms
by Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M.
- 91-115 Multi-activity influence and intervention
by Kor, Ryan & Zhou, Junjie
- 116-151 Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
by Louis, Philippos & Núñez, Matías & Xefteris, Dimitrios
- 152-174 False information from near and far
by Bravard, Christophe & Durieu, Jacques & Sarangi, Sudipta & Sémirat, Stéphan
- 175-210 Large elections and interim turnout
by Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol
- 211-227 A theory of progressive lending
by Dasgupta, Dyotona & Mookherjee, Dilip
- 228-269 A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia
- 270-293 Coordination under loss contracts
by Ahrens, Steffen & Bitter, Lea & Bosch-Rosa, Ciril
- 294-316 Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics
by Sawa, Ryoji & Wu, Jiabin
- 317-341 School choice with preference rank classes
by Ayoade, Nickesha & Pápai, Szilvia
2022, Volume 136, Issue C
- 1-30 Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
by Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco
- 31-62 The sophistication of conditional cooperators: Evidence from public goods games
by Fallucchi, Francesco & Luccasen, R. Andrew & Turocy, Theodore L.
- 63-91 Strategic incentives undermine gaze as a signal of prosocial motives
by Fischbacher, Urs & Hausfeld, Jan & Renerte, Baiba
- 92-116 Preferences vs. strategic thinking: An investigation of the causes of overcommunication
by Lafky, Jonathan & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung
- 117-141 The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: An experiment
by Pevnitskaya, Svetlana & Ryvkin, Dmitry
- 142-152 The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
by Norman, Thomas W.L.
- 153-176 Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
by Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol
- 177-196 Public communication with externalities
by Lukyanov, Georgy & Shamruk, Konstantin & Su, Tong & Wakrim, Ahmed
- 197-225 Issue selection, media competition, and polarization of salience
by Yamaguchi, Yohei
- 226-248 Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
by Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin
- 249-254 The bargaining trap
by Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
- 255-273 Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect
by Babaioff, Moshe & Dobzinski, Shahar & Oren, Sigal
- 274-298 On reward sharing in blockchain mining pools
by Can, Burak & Leth Hougaard, Jens & Pourpouneh, Mohsen
- 299-324 Reciprocity with uncertainty about others
by Sohn, Jin-yeong & Wu, Wenhao
- 325-339 Cost heterogeneity and the persistence of bilingualism
by Naono, Miharu
- 340-359 Link investment substitutability: A factor influencing network formation
by Ding, Sihua
- 360-378 Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis
by Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T. & Riener, Gerhard
- 379-388 The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise
by Silva, Francisco
- 389-402 Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
by Matsushima, Hitoshi
- 403-427 Leading to efficient coordination: Individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game
by Feri, Francesco & Gantner, Anita & Moffatt, Peter G. & Erharter, Dominik
- 428-453 Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market
by Biró, Péter & Klijn, Flip & Pápai, Szilvia
- 454-468 The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
by Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Våge Knutsen, Magnus
- 469-484 Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market
by Domènech, Gerard & Núñez, Marina
- 485-504 Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
by Chen, Yi-Chun & Takahashi, Satoru & Xiong, Siyang
- 505-523 Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation
by Rojo Arjona, David & Sitzia, Stefania & Zheng, Jiwei
- 524-541 Probabilistic Owen-Shapley spatial power indices
by Albizuri, M.J. & Goikoetxea, A.
- 542-558 The broken chain: Evidence against emotionally driven upstream indirect reciprocity
by Schnedler, Wendelin
- 559-585 Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
by Guarino, Pierfrancesco & Ziegler, Gabriel
2022, Volume 135, Issue C
- 1-15 Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
by Hillas, John & Samet, Dov
- 16-40 Issue linkage
by Currarini, S. & Marchiori, C.
- 41-59 Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation
by Awaya, Yu & Do, Jihwan
- 60-73 Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition
by Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Morton, Rebecca
- 74-78 On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games
by Steg, Jan-Henrik
- 79-85 Information design in sequential procurement
by Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin
- 86-95 Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
by Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane
- 96-109 The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies
by Pérez-Castrillo, David & Sun, Chaoran
- 110-131 Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games
by Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone & Maccheroni, Fabio & Schmeidler, David
- 132-143 Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency
by Merzoni, Guido & Trombetta, Federico
- 144-167 Present bias in the labor market – when it pays to be naive
by Fahn, Matthias & Seibel, Regina
- 168-187 The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
by Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian
- 188-200 The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Guiñazú, Nadia & Juarez, Noelia & Neme, Pablo & Oviedo, Jorge
- 201-219 Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games
by Barthel, Anne-Christine & Hoffmann, Eric & Sabarwal, Tarun
- 220-240 Kuhn's equivalence theorem for games in product form
by Heymann, Benjamin & De Lara, Michel & Chancelier, Jean-Philippe
- 241-270 The asymmetric effect of narratives on prosocial behavior
by Hillenbrand, Adrian & Verrina, Eugenio
- 271-296 Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform
by Aoyagi, Masaki & Yoo, Seung Han
- 297-326 Monitoring innovation
by Rodivilov, Alexander
- 327-337 Equilibrium non-existence in generalized games
by Tóbiás, Áron
- 338-355 Preferences and perceptions in Provision and Maintenance public goods
by Gächter, Simon & Kölle, Felix & Quercia, Simone
- 356-367 Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results
by Ramezanian, Rasoul & Feizi, Mehdi
- 368-393 Projection bias in effort choices
by Kaufmann, Marc
- 394-410 Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation
by Ke, Changxia & Morath, Florian & Newell, Anthony & Page, Lionel
- 411-433 The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
by Bó, Inácio & Hakimov, Rustamdjan
2022, Volume 134, Issue C
- 1-19 Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
by Dilmé, Francesc
- 20-36 When are groups less moral than individuals?
by Campos-Mercade, Pol
- 37-51 Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation
by Cui, Zhiwei & Shi, Fei
- 52-74 Control, cost, and confidence: Perseverance and procrastination in the face of failure
by Deimen, Inga & Wirtz, Julia
- 75-103 Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks
by Gallo, Edoardo & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan & Teh, Tat-How
- 104-116 Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing
by Chawla, Shuchi & Teng, Yifeng & Tzamos, Christos
- 117-126 Dynamic semi-consistency
by Bade, Sophie
- 127-150 A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games
by Cao, Yiyin & Dang, Chuangyin
- 151-168 Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation
by Saur, Marc P. & Schlatterer, Markus G. & Schmitt, Stefanie Y.
- 169-198 Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes
by Takeuchi, Ai & Veszteg, Róbert F. & Kamijo, Yoshio & Funaki, Yukihiko
- 199-228 The secretary recommendation problem
by Hahn, Niklas & Hoefer, Martin & Smorodinsky, Rann
- 229-241 Two-sided strategic information transmission
by Chiba, Saori & Hori, Kazumi
- 242-263 Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case
by Sémirat, Stéphan & Forges, Françoise
- 264-280 Simple equilibria in general contests
by Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver
- 281-307 The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation
by Babaioff, Moshe & Gonczarowski, Yannai A. & Nisan, Noam
- 308-343 Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy
by Daskalakis, Constantinos & Syrgkanis, Vasilis
- 344-360 Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values
by Chawla, Shuchi & Devanur, Nikhil R. & Karlin, Anna R. & Sivan, Balasubramanian
- 361-375 Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets
by Dvijotham, Krishnamurthy & Rabani, Yuval & Schulman, Leonard J.
- 376-398 Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
by Babichenko, Yakov & Rubinstein, Aviad
- 399-427 On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design
by Papadimitriou, Christos & Pierrakos, George & Psomas, Alexandros & Rubinstein, Aviad
- 428-448 Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding
by Dütting, Paul & Kesselheim, Thomas
2022, Volume 133, Issue C
- 1-27 Expectations-based loss aversion in contests
by Fu, Qiang & Lyu, Youji & Wu, Zenan & Zhang, Yuanjie
- 28-49 Fair cake-cutting in practice
by Kyropoulou, Maria & Ortega, Josué & Segal-Halevi, Erel
- 50-57 The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition
by Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo
- 58-76 Varieties of risk preference elicitation
by Friedman, Daniel & Habib, Sameh & James, Duncan & Williams, Brett
- 77-84 Strategic transfers between cooperative games
by Berden, Caroline & Peters, Hans & Robles, Laura & Vermeulen, Dries
- 85-108 Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
by Pahlke, Marieke
- 109-114 Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value
by Besner, Manfred
- 115-125 Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
by Noda, Shunya
- 126-137 Communication and cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games
by Bahel, Eric & Ball, Sheryl & Sarangi, Sudipta
- 138-149 Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
by Basile, Achille & Rao, Surekha & Bhaskara Rao, K.P.S.
- 150-161 Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
by McMurray, Joseph
- 162-169 The influence of self and social image concerns on lying
by Bašić, Zvonimir & Quercia, Simone
- 170-180 Optimal attention management: A tractable framework
by Lipnowski, Elliot & Mathevet, Laurent & Wei, Dong
- 181-201 Parallel markets in school choice
by Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Evdokimov, Piotr & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Turhan, Bertan
- 202-229 Prize-linked savings games: Theory and experiment
by Jindapon, Paan & Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut & Viriyavipart, Ajalavat
- 230-247 Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks
by Safi, Shahir
- 248-255 A characterization of proportionally representative committees
by Aziz, Haris & Lee, Barton E.
- 256-281 Auctions with flexible information acquisition
by Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo
- 282-299 Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: The role of loss aversion and changing reference points
by Kleinberg, Jon & Kleinberg, Robert & Oren, Sigal
- 300-330 Search equilibrium with unobservable investment
by Rao, Neel
- 331-351 Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D.
2022, Volume 132, Issue C
- 1-21 Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games
by Pangallo, Marco & Sanders, James B.T. & Galla, Tobias & Farmer, J. Doyne
- 22-40 Do people maximize quantiles?
by de Castro, Luciano & Galvao, Antonio F. & Noussair, Charles N. & Qiao, Liang
- 41-58 Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab
by Dianat, Ahrash & Echenique, Federico & Yariv, Leeat
- 59-72 Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance
by Bicchieri, Cristina & Dimant, Eugen & Gächter, Simon & Nosenzo, Daniele
- 73-89 Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
by Harless, Patrick & Phan, William
- 90-105 Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining
by Hyndman, Kyle & Walker, Matthew J.
- 106-132 Market screening with limited records
by Kaya, Ayça & Roy, Santanu
- 133-165 A dynamic theory of spatial externalities
by Boucekkine, Raouf & Fabbri, Giorgio & Federico, Salvatore & Gozzi, Fausto
- 166-188 Limited Foresight Equilibrium
by Rampal, Jeevant
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