Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.003
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More about this item
Keywords
Anonymous two-sided economies; Pairwise stable matchings; Efficiency; Maximality; Structural conditions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
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