IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v148y2024icp517-534.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Partial credence goods on review platforms

Author

Listed:
  • Gradwohl, Ronen
  • Jelnov, Artyom

Abstract

We study a repeated credence goods market in which experts provide treatment to customers. We assume that the history of transactions is recorded on a review platform that contains information only about treatments, and not about non-treatments. We also introduce the notion of a partial credence good, where treated customers receive a noisy, ex post signal about the necessity of treatment. Absent such signals, there is a breakdown of the market. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the signals that guarantees the existence of any non-trivial equilibrium, as well as an efficient one.

Suggested Citation

  • Gradwohl, Ronen & Jelnov, Artyom, 2024. "Partial credence goods on review platforms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 517-534.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:148:y:2024:i:c:p:517-534
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982562400160X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credence goods; Evidence; Review platform; Efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:148:y:2024:i:c:p:517-534. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.