Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.005
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More about this item
Keywords
Costly voting; Costly information acquisition; Mandatory voting; Compulsory voting;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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