IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v147y2024icp170-205.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

School choice with independent versus consolidated districts

Author

Listed:
  • Klein, Thilo
  • Aue, Robert
  • Ortega, Josué

Abstract

This paper studies the welfare effects of school district consolidation. Using incomplete rank-ordered lists (ROLs) submitted for admission to the Hungarian secondary school system, we estimate complete ROLs assuming that parents do not use dominated strategies and that the matching outcome is stable. These estimates aid in constructing a counterfactual district-based assignment and discerning the factors driving parents' preferences over schools. We find that district consolidation leads to large welfare gains in Budapest, equivalent to students attending a school five kilometres closer to their residences. These gains offset the additional travel distances incurred in the consolidated assignment. 73% of matched students benefit from district consolidation, while fewer than 3% are assigned to a less preferred school. Students from smaller and less under-demanded districts benefit relatively more, as well as those with high academic ability. Using reported preferences instead of estimated ones also yields large gains from district consolidation.

Suggested Citation

  • Klein, Thilo & Aue, Robert & Ortega, Josué, 2024. "School choice with independent versus consolidated districts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 170-205.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:147:y:2024:i:c:p:170-205
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000976
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    District consolidation; School choice;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:147:y:2024:i:c:p:170-205. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.