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Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis

Author

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  • Freer, Mikhail
  • Surana, Khushboo

Abstract

We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the characterization for identifying intrahousehold consumption patterns. We demonstrate that without price variation for private goods among potential couples, intrahousehold resource allocations can only be identified for non-committed couples. We conduct simulations using Dutch household data to support our theoretical findings. Our results show that with price variation, the empirical implications of marital stability allow for the identification of household consumption allocations for both committed and non-committed couples.

Suggested Citation

  • Freer, Mikhail & Surana, Khushboo, 2025. "Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 131-159.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:131-159
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.018
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    Keywords

    Household consumption; Marital stability; Commitment; Revealed preferences; Intrahousehold allocation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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