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A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices

Author

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  • Wakabayashi, Yuya
  • Sakai, Ryosuke
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro

Abstract

We consider economies consisting of arbitrary numbers of agents and objects, and study the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers. Each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand), and has non-quasi-linear preferences, which accommodate income effects or nonlinear borrowing costs. The seller may derive benefit from objects. We show that on the non-quasi-linear domain, the minimum price Walrasian rule in which reserve prices are equal to the benefit the seller derives is the only rule satisfying four desirable properties; efficiency, individual rationality for the buyers, no-subsidy, and strategy-proofness. Moreover, we characterize the minimum price Walrasian rule by efficiency, overall individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.

Suggested Citation

  • Wakabayashi, Yuya & Sakai, Ryosuke & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2025. "A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 1-26.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:1-26
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-object allocation problem; Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Minimum price Walrasian rule; Non-quasi-linear preference; Heterogeneous objects; Reserve prices;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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