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Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort

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  • Guha, Brishti

Abstract

This is the first paper to study accomplice plea bargains when motivated jurors incur an effort cost. I find that a prosecutor who wishes to ensure punishment for the guilty, and acquittal for the innocent, induces a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium which is fully separating, simultaneously minimizing court costs as well as jurors' cognitive efforts. In this equilibrium, a very harsh plea bargain (with negligible plea discounting) is offered, and is accepted by all guilty defendants, and rejected by all innocent ones. Though the prosecutor has the ability to induce semi-separating equilibria, he will prefer the fully separating one. We can use the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion to show that a pooling equilibrium does not exist. My results contrast sharply with the plea bargaining literature which finds a tradeoff between sorting efficiency and the harshness of punishments meted out to the guilty and which does not support a fully separating equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Guha, Brishti, 2023. "Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 209-225.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:209-225
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2009. "Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(3), pages 263-276, April.
    2. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1988. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 713-728, September.
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    4. SangMok Lee, 2014. "Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 59-88, September.
    5. Guha, Brishti, 2018. "Secret ballots and costly information gathering: The jury size problem revisited," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 58-67.
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    7. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2010. "Credible plea bargaining," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 279-293, June.
    8. David Bjerk, 2007. "Guilt Shall Not Escape or Innocence Suffer? The Limits of Plea Bargaining When Defendant Guilt is Uncertain," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 9(2), pages 305-329.
    9. David Bjerk, 2021. "Socially Optimal Plea Bargaining With Costly Trials And Bayesian Juries," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 263-279, January.
    10. Guha, Brishti, 2022. "Ambiguity aversion, group size, and deliberation: Costly information and decision accuracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 201(C), pages 115-133.
    11. Grossman, Gene M & Katz, Michael L, 1983. "Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 749-757, September.
    12. Berg, Nathan & Kim, Jeong-Yoo, 2018. "Plea bargaining with multiple defendants and its deterrence effect," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 58-70.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brishti Guha, 2024. "Plea bargaining when juror effort is costly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(3), pages 945-977, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Accomplice plea bargaining; Costly effort; Jury; Free riding; Separating equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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