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Reselling information

Author

Listed:
  • Nageeb Ali, S.
  • Chen-Zion, Ayal
  • Lillethun, Erik

Abstract

Information can be simultaneously consumed, replicated, and sold to others. We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. Even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures non-trivial rents from at most a single buyer in any Markovian equilibrium: in the frequent-offer limit, her payoffs converge to 0 once a single buyer buys information. By contrast, there exists a non-Markovian “prepay equilibrium” where payment is extracted from most buyers before information is sold. This prepay equilibrium exploits buyers' ability to resell information and results in the seller achieving (approximately) the same payoff that she would were resale prohibited.

Suggested Citation

  • Nageeb Ali, S. & Chen-Zion, Ayal & Lillethun, Erik, 2024. "Reselling information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 23-43.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:148:y:2024:i:c:p:23-43
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.015
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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