Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.013
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More about this item
Keywords
Multi-period matching; Matching with contracts; Temporal stability; Ordered substitutability;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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