IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v148y2024icp367-384.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Ambiguity and informativeness of (non-)trading

Author

Listed:
  • Chu, Yinxiao

Abstract

We study a sequential trading mechanism with ambiguity-averse agents modeled by multiple prior preferences. Informed traders generally mix between trading and non-trading, and their trading probability decreases with ambiguity. If agents are sufficiently ambiguous, informed traders do not trade, and only noise traders place orders; trading becomes uninformative. When signal accuracy is ambiguous, trading can make public beliefs more ambiguous over time, which leads to social learning failures in the long run. Moreover, since informed traders may not trade, no-trade can also be informative when signal accuracy is asymmetric. Even with continuous action spaces, sufficiently high ambiguity stops social learning.

Suggested Citation

  • Chu, Yinxiao, 2024. "Ambiguity and informativeness of (non-)trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 367-384.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:148:y:2024:i:c:p:367-384
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001489
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ambiguity aversion; Sequential trading; Adverse selection; Informational cascade;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:148:y:2024:i:c:p:367-384. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.