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Clubs and networks

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  • Ding, Sihua
  • Dziubiński, Marcin
  • Goyal, Sanjeev

Abstract

A recurring theme in the study of society is the concentration of influence and power that is driven through unequal membership of groups and associations. In some instances, these bodies constitute a small world while in others they are fragmented into distinct cliques. This paper presents a new model of clubs and networks to understand the sources of individual marginalization and the origins of small and large worlds.

Suggested Citation

  • Ding, Sihua & Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2024. "Clubs and networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 52-73.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:147:y:2024:i:c:p:52-73
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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