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Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection

Author

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  • Morita, Kimiyuki
  • Muramoto, Akitoshi
  • Sogo, Takeharu

Abstract

We study a moral hazard model where multiple agents exhibit interpersonal projection bias, perceiving their peers' production states as similar to their own. Each agent's production state is private information. We characterize optimal contracts with limited liability that induce effort from agents in a production state better than a given cutoff. When the cutoff is sufficiently low (high), relative (resp. joint) performance evaluation is optimal if individual outcomes are contractible despite the absence of common shocks and informational or technological externalities. By exploiting agents' biases, the principal reduces expected wages. However, if only joint outcomes are contractible, optimal wages may increase with the degree of projection bias.

Suggested Citation

  • Morita, Kimiyuki & Muramoto, Akitoshi & Sogo, Takeharu, 2025. "Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 356-364.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:356-364
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.009
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Relative performance evaluation; Joint performance evaluation; Projection bias; Interpersonal projection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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