Contact information of Elsevier
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help
correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
Content
2022, Volume 132, Issue C
- 189-203 Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions
by Rosa, Benjamin V.
- 204-220 On incentive-compatible estimators
by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
- 221-233 Social learning in nonatomic routing games
by Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan
- 234-239 Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices
by Kirkegaard, René
- 240-254 Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring
by Azrieli, Yaron
- 255-273 Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
by Juárez, Noelia & Neme, Pablo & Oviedo, Jorge
- 274-287 Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles
by Konishi, Hideo & Pan, Chen-Yu & Simeonov, Dimitar
- 288-304 Cheap talk with private signal structures
by Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex
- 305-315 On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games
by Wu, Bin
- 316-327 Local public goods with weighted link formation
by Kinateder, Markus & Merlino, Luca Paolo
- 328-336 The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs
by D'Agostino, Elena & Seidmann, Daniel J.
- 337-352 Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests
by Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, Yuanzhu & Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue
- 353-367 Stable cores in information graph games
by Núñez, Marina & Vidal-Puga, Juan
- 368-379 Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
by Iwase, Yusuke & Tsuruta, Shoya & Yoshimura, Akina
- 380-389 Voting on tricky questions
by Tajika, Tomoya
- 390-399 The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle
by Samet, Dov
- 400-420 College admissions with tuition transfers
by Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz
- 421-447 Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets
by Shuai, Jie & Yang, Huanxing & Zhang, Lan
- 448-462 Invariant equilibria and classes of equivalent games
by Allison, Blake A. & Bagh, Adib & Lepore, Jason J.
- 463-477 Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation
by Gomes, Armando
- 478-486 The general graph matching game: Approximate core
by Vazirani, Vijay V.
- 487-509 Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
by Grant, Simon & Stauber, Ronald
- 510-533 Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity
by Guha, Brishti & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
- 534-552 Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
by Bhattacharjee, Swagata
- 553-575 Robust coalitional implementation
by Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C.
- 576-591 Inductive inference with incompleteness
by Alon, Shiri & Bavly, Gilad & Gayer, Gabrielle
- 592-597 Informational robustness of common belief in rationality
by Ziegler, Gabriel
2022, Volume 131, Issue C
- 1-28 Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo
- 29-50 Idiosyncratic preferences in games on networks
by Orlova, Olena
- 51-56 The Trembling Chairman Paradox
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
- 57-83 Price discovery using a double auction
by Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E.
- 84-120 Dynamic mechanism design on social networks
by Meng, Dawen & Sun, Lei & Tian, Guoqiang
- 121-140 Social norms and preferences for generosity are domain dependent
by Erkut, Hande
- 141-170 Best response dynamics on random graphs
by Chellig, Jordan & Durbac, Calina & Fountoulakis, Nikolaos
- 171-185 The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information
by Georgiadis, George & Kim, Youngsoo & Kwon, H. Dharma
- 186-196 The welfare costs of informationally efficient prices
by Koren, Moran & Mueller-Frank, Manuel
- 197-221 Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles
by Bilò, Vittorio & Caragiannis, Ioannis & Flammini, Michele & Igarashi, Ayumi & Monaco, Gianpiero & Peters, Dominik & Vinci, Cosimo & Zwicker, William S.
- 222-244 How to add apples and oranges: Aggregating performances of different nature
by Cho, Wonki Jo
- 245-263 Information manipulation and competition
by Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias
- 264-274 A note on topological aspects in dynamic games of resource extraction and economic growth theory
by Jaśkiewicz, Anna & Nowak, Andrzej S.
- 275-291 Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing
by Bergemann, Dirk & Castro, Francisco & Weintraub, Gabriel
2021, Volume 130, Issue C
- 1-24 Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives
by Jehiel, Philippe & Singh, Juni
- 25-43 Designing practical and fair sequential team contests: The case of penalty shootouts
by Anbarcı, Nejat & Sun, Ching-Jen & Ünver, M. Utku
- 44-61 Noisy persuasion
by Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas
- 62-84 Nonlinear pricing with finite information
by Bergemann, Dirk & Yeh, Edmund & Zhang, Jinkun
- 85-108 Brexit: A comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
by Moldovanu, Benny & Rosar, Frank
- 109-130 Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection
by Dariel, Aurelie & Riedl, Arno & Siegenthaler, Simon
- 131-147 Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups
by Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela & Lergetporer, Philipp & Sutter, Matthias
- 148-178 Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo
by Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Syropoulos, Constantinos
- 179-195 Pledge-and-review in the laboratory
by Lippert, Steffen & Tremewan, James
- 196-210 Division of labor and the organization of knowledge in production: A laboratory experiment
by Klockmann, Victor & von Schenk, Alicia & von Siemens, Ferdinand A.
- 211-223 Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
by Bando, Keisuke & Kawasaki, Ryo
- 224-239 Co-worker altruism and unemployment
by Vásquez, Jorge & Weretka, Marek
- 240-257 Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams
by Schram, Peter
- 258-275 Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism
by Kartal, Melis & Müller, Wieland & Tremewan, James
- 276-298 Observation delays in teams and effort cycles
by Gordon, Sidartha & Marlats, Chantal & Ménager, Lucie
- 299-308 Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions
by Kumar, Ujjwal & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava & Yadav, Sonal & Zeng, Huaxia
- 309-330 Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment
by Puppe, Clemens & Rollmann, Jana
- 331-351 Round-robin political tournaments: Abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
by Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand
- 352-368 The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games
by Dal Bó, Pedro & Fréchette, Guillaume R. & Kim, Jeongbin
- 369-383 (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
by Blumrosen, Liad & Dobzinski, Shahar
- 384-399 The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: Implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action
by Kamali Shahdadi, Behrang
- 400-408 Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration
by Felgenhauer, Mike
- 409-424 Full farsighted rationality
by Karos, Dominik & Robles, Laura
- 425-442 Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy
by Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le
- 443-451 A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem
by Edelman, Paul H. & Por, Attila
- 452-464 De-biasing strategic communication
by Gesche, Tobias
- 465-473 Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels
by Sano, Ryuji
- 474-498 Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem
by Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke & Tomoeda, Kentaro
- 499-520 Consumers' privacy choices in the era of big data
by Dengler, Sebastian & Prüfer, Jens
- 521-542 Monotone persuasion
by Mensch, Jeffrey
- 543-568 Value-free reductions
by Pérez-Castrillo, David & Sun, Chaoran
- 569-590 Games with second-order expected utility
by Beggs, Alan
- 591-601 Contract design with socially attentive preferences
by Koch, Simon & Weinschenk, Philipp
- 602-615 Are non-contingent incentives more effective in motivating new behavior? Evidence from the field
by Córdova, Angélica & Imas, Alex & Schwartz, Daniel
- 616-635 Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction
by Kirchkamp, Oliver & Mill, Wladislaw
- 636-662 General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis
by Frongillo, Rafael M. & Kash, Ian A.
- 663-683 Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
by Bloch, Francis & van den Nouweland, Anne
- 684-689 Corrigendum to "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness" [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219–238]
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi
2021, Volume 129, Issue C
- 1-14 Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
by Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, Zongwei & Riis, Christian
- 15-31 The multiplayer Colonel Blotto game
by Boix-Adserà, Enric & Edelman, Benjamin L. & Jayanti, Siddhartha
- 32-54 Cognitively-constrained learning from neighbors
by Li, Wei & Tan, Xu
- 55-77 An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches
by Saraiva, Gustavo
- 78-95 Early refund bonuses increase successful crowdfunding
by Cason, Timothy N. & Tabarrok, Alex & Zubrickas, Robertas
- 96-113 Regime change games with an active defender
by Jann, Ole & Schottmüller, Christoph
- 114-143 Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
by Cerrone, Claudia & Hermstrüwer, Yoan & Robalo, Pedro
- 144-157 Persuading a pessimist: Simplicity and robustness
by Nikzad, Afshin
- 158-180 Disclosure of information under competition: An experimental study
by Sheth, Jesal D.
- 181-197 Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
by Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang
- 198-237 How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field
by Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea
- 238-269 A model of gradual information disclosure
by Xu, Haibo
- 270-293 Model-based evaluation of cooling-off policies
by Michel, Christian & Stenzel, André
- 294-309 Preemption with a second-mover advantage
by Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew
- 310-328 Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist
by Correia-da-Silva, João
- 329-349 Gender stereotypes in deliberation and team decisions
by Coffman, Katherine & Flikkema, Clio Bryant & Shurchkov, Olga
- 350-369 Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
by Gori, Michele
- 370-399 Rollover risk and stress test credibility
by Pereira, Ana Elisa
- 400-420 Screening by mode of trade
by Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc
- 421-448 Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes
by Laica, Christoph & Lauber, Arne & Sahm, Marco
- 449-475 Optimal delay in committees
by Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing
- 476-491 Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints
by Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang
- 492-502 Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information
by Shi, Fanqi
- 503-512 Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
by Bando, Keisuke & Hirai, Toshiyuki & Zhang, Jun
- 513-535 Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players
by Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan
- 536-548 Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
by Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan
- 549-569 Pricing with bargain hunting consumers
by Gentry, Matthew & Pesendorfer, Martin
- 570-589 A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
by Sawa, Ryoji
2021, Volume 128, Issue C
- 1-17 Level-k reasoning in school choice
by Zhang, Jun
- 18-38 Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory
by Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios
- 39-57 Valence, complementarities, and political polarization
by Denter, Philipp
- 58-72 Do people intervene to make others behave prosocially?
by Ackfeld, Viola & Ockenfels, Axel
- 73-103 Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
by Castro-Pires, Henrique & Moreira, Humberto
- 104-124 Social conformity under evolving private preferences
by Duffy, John & Lafky, Jonathan
- 125-159 Games in context: Equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions
by Dominiak, Adam & Eichberger, Jürgen
- 160-181 Bargains, price signaling, and efficiency in markets with asymmetric information
by Schneider, Mark & Stephenson, Daniel Graydon
- 182-192 An experiment on network density and sequential learning
by Dasaratha, Krishna & He, Kevin
- 193-201 Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
by Okada, Akira
- 202-212 Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
by Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu
- 213-230 Absorbing games with a clock and two bits of memory
by Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt & Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus & Neyman, Abraham
- 231-255 Distributional preferences explain individual behavior across games and time
by Hedegaard, Morten & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Müller, Daniel & Tyran, Jean-Robert
- 256-270 Auctions with speculators: An experimental study
by Garratt, Rodney & Georganas, Sotiris
2021, Volume 127, Issue C
- 1-27 Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
by Name Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin
- 28-46 Dynamic decision making under ambiguity: An experimental investigation
by Georgalos, Konstantinos
- 47-66 Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
by Jain, Ritesh
- 67-79 The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy, László Á.
- 80-101 Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading
by Crawford, Vincent P.
- 102-112 Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
by Vida, Péter & Honryo, Takakazu
- 113-154 Buying supermajorities in the lab
by Fehrler, Sebastian & Schneider, Maik T.
- 155-178 Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
by Boulatov, Alexei & Severinov, Sergei
- 179-193 Position auctions with multi-unit demands
by Yan, Haomin
- 194-205 Monotonicity and egalitarianism
by Dietzenbacher, Bas
- 206-226 Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods
by Cheikbossian, Guillaume
- 227-246 On the value of repetition for communication games
by Meng, Delong
2021, Volume 126, Issue C
- 1-32 Signaling valence in primary elections
by Andreottola, Giovanni
- 33-74 Luce arbitrates: Stochastic resolution of inner conflicts
by Heydari, Pedram
- 75-93 Simultaneous auctions with budgets: Equilibrium existence and characterization
by Ghosh, Gagan
- 94-99 Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences
by Bahel, Eric & Sprumont, Yves
- 100-135 Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
by Huang, Xuesong
- 136-162 Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
by Ahmad, Ghufran
- 163-185 Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets
by Alexander, Dan
- 186-230 Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: Theory and experiments
by Nunnari, Salvatore
- 231-250 Learning from like-minded people
by Meng, Delong
- 251-277 The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity
by Gaudeul, Alexia & Keser, Claudia & Müller, Stephan
- 278-287 Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – evidence from a natural field experiment
by Kassis, Mark & Schmidt, Sascha L. & Schreyer, Dominik & Sutter, Matthias
- 288-304 Who benefits from corporate social responsibility? Reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection
by Briscese, Guglielmo & Feltovich, Nick & Slonim, Robert L.
- 305-334 Regularity of dynamic opinion games
by Venel, Xavier
- 335-354 Bargaining with a residual claimant: An experimental study
by Embrey, Matthew & Hyndman, Kyle & Riedl, Arno
- 355-373 Positive feedback in coordination games: Stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
by Hwang, Sung-Ha & Rey-Bellet, Luc
- 374-386 Moral hazard with limited liability: Random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
by Wang, Wenbin & Hu, Shanshan
- 387-401 Economic polarization and antisocial behavior: An experiment
by Bigoni, Maria & Bortolotti, Stefania & Nas Özen, Efşan
- 402-427 Consumer search with blind buying
by Chen, Yanbin & Li, Sanxi & Lin, Kai & Yu, Jun
- 428-442 The value of network information: Assortative mixing makes the difference
by Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric
- 443-452 Odds supermodularity and the Luce rule
by Doğan, Serhat & Yıldız, Kemal
- 453-459 On sequences of iterations of increasing and continuous mappings on complete lattices
by Olszewski, Wojciech
2021, Volume 125, Issue C
- 1-26 Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study
by Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R.
- 27-47 Dynamic expert incentives in teams
by Wong, Tsz-Ning & Yang, Lily Ling
- 48-61 Young children use commodities as an indirect medium of exchange
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D.
- 62-78 The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets
by Leshno, Jacob D. & Pradelski, Bary S.R.
- 79-93 Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël
- 94-106 Attainment of equilibrium via Marshallian path adjustment: Queueing and buyer determinism
by Collins, Sean M. & James, Duncan & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan
- 107-140 The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an n-player extensive form game
by Etessami, Kousha
- 141-158 Elections under biased candidate endorsements — an experimental study
by Sun, Junze & Schram, Arthur & Sloof, Randolph
2020, Volume 124, Issue C
- 1-16 Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates
by Karakas, Leyla D. & Mitra, Devashish
- 17-42 A gift with thoughtfulness: A field experiment on work incentives
by Cao, Cangjian & Li, Sherry Xin & Liu, Tracy Xiao
- 43-61 Undiscounted bandit games
by Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven
- 62-81 Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
by Schlegel, Jan Christoph & Mamageishvili, Akaki
- 82-104 Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison
by García-Pola, Bernardo
- 105-121 Cheap talk with coarse understanding
by Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric
- 122-139 Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs
by Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno
- 140-168 On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets
by Levy, Yehuda John & Veiga, Andre
- 169-182 Equivalence of canonical matching models
by Kennes, John & le Maire, Daniel & Roelsgaard, Sebastian T.
- 183-206 Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty
by Shneyerov, Artyom & Wong, Adam C.L.
- 207-218 Backward induction in games without perfect recall
by Hillas, John & Kvasov, Dmitriy
- 219-238 On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi
- 239-253 Pathways of persuasion
by Coffman, Lucas & Niehaus, Paul
- 254-280 The timing of discretionary bonuses – effort, signals, and reciprocity
by Boosey, Luke & Goerg, Sebastian
- 281-287 Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets
by Shafer, Rachel C.
- 288-304 Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments
by d'Adda, Giovanna & Dufwenberg, Martin & Passarelli, Francesco & Tabellini, Guido
- 305-318 The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
by Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao & Tang, Rui
- 319-353 Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network
by Ferrali, Romain
- 354-368 Can intermediaries assure contracts? Experimental evidence
by Mitzkewitz, Michael & Neugebauer, Tibor
- 369-385 When consumers do not make an active decision: Dynamic default rules and their equilibrium effects
by Ericson, Keith M. Marzilli
- 386-405 Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
by Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Mu'alem, Ahuva
- 406-431 Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
by Donna, Javier D. & Schenone, Pablo & Veramendi, Gregory F.
- 432-453 Regular potential games
by Swenson, Brian & Murray, Ryan & Kar, Soummya
- 454-477 Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information
by Abraham, Ittai & Athey, Susan & Babaioff, Moshe & Grubb, Michael D.
- 478-490 The capacity constrained facility location problem
by Aziz, Haris & Chan, Hau & Lee, Barton E. & Parkes, David C.
- 491-511 Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
by Sperisen, Benjamin & Wiseman, Thomas
- 512-533 A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
by Mackenzie, Andrew
- 534-553 Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
by Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel
- 554-568 The rationale of in-group favoritism: An experimental test of three explanations
by Ciccarone, Giuseppe & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Papa, Stefano
- 569-578 Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?
by Boonmanunt, Suparee & Kajackaite, Agne & Meier, Stephan
- 579-587 Entering classes in the college admissions model
by Wu, Qingyun
- 588-603 Never underestimate your opponent: Hindsight bias causes overplacement and overentry into competition
by Danz, David
- 604-619 Framing and repeated competition
by Masiliūnas, Aidas & Nax, Heinrich H.
- 620-643 Endogenous quantal response equilibrium
by Friedman, Evan
- 644-658 Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
by Sundararajan, Mukund & Yan, Qiqi
- 659-670 An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium
by Chen, Yin & Dang, Chuangyin
2020, Volume 123, Issue C
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/gamebe3.html
