Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.006
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More about this item
Keywords
Switching costs; Repeated games; Folk theorem; Stochastic games; Non-zero-sum games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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