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Reallocation with priorities

Author

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  • Combe, Julien
  • Schlegel, Jan Christoph

Abstract

We consider a reallocation problem with priorities where each agent is initially endowed with a house and is willing to exchange it but each house has a priority ordering over the agents of the market. In this setting, it is well known that there is no individually rational and stable mechanism. As a result, the literature has introduced a modified stability notion called μ0-stability. In contrast to college admission problems, in which priorities are present but there is no initial endowment, we show that the ownership-adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism identified in the literature is not the only individually rational, strategy-proof and μ0-stable mechanism. By introducing a new axiom called the independence of irrelevant agents and using the standard axiom of unanimity, we show that the ownership-adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism is the unique mechanism that is individually rational, strategy-proof, μ0-stable, unanimous and independent of irrelevant agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Combe, Julien & Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2024. "Reallocation with priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 287-299.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:143:y:2024:i:c:p:287-299
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Housing market; Reallocation; Stability; Priorities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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