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Impartial selection with additive guarantees via iterated deletion

Author

Listed:
  • Cembrano, Javier
  • Fischer, Felix
  • Hannon, David
  • Klimm, Max

Abstract

Impartial selection is the selection of an individual from a group based on nominations by other members of the group, in such a way that individuals cannot influence their own chance of selection. For this problem, we give a deterministic mechanism with an additive performance guarantee of O(n(1+κ)/2) in a setting with n individuals where each individual casts O(nκ) nominations, where κ∈[0,1]. This bound is O(n) for κ=0 and O(n) for κ=1. The latter is trivial, as even a mechanism that never selects provides an additive guarantee of n−1. We show, however, that it is also best possible: for every deterministic impartial mechanism there exists a situation in which some individual is nominated by every other individual and the mechanism either does not select or selects an individual not nominated by anyone.

Suggested Citation

  • Cembrano, Javier & Fischer, Felix & Hannon, David & Klimm, Max, 2024. "Impartial selection with additive guarantees via iterated deletion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 203-224.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:144:y:2024:i:c:p:203-224
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Moulin, Herve & Tideman, Nicolaus, 2008. "Impartial division of a dollar," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 176-191, March.
    2. Shohei Tamura & Shinji Ohseto, 2014. "Impartial nomination correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 47-54, June.
    3. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2015. "Symmetry and impartial lotteries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 15-28.
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    6. Ron Holzman & Hervé Moulin, 2013. "Impartial Nominations for a Prize," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 173-196, January.
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