Hitoshi Matsushima
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Auctions with Ethical Concerns,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-515, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Assignments with Ethical Concerns," CARF F-Series CARF-F-514, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022.
"Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-548, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022. "Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information," CARF F-Series CARF-F-549, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Assignments with Ethical Concerns,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-514, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Auctions with Ethical Concerns," CARF F-Series CARF-F-515, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020.
"Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-500, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Savva, Foivos, 2021. "Motives and implementation with rights structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020.
"Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-474, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1145, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," DSSR Discussion Papers 111, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," KIER Working Papers 1027, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2022. "Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: Comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Unique Information Elicitation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-496, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2019.
"Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments (Revised version of F415 ),"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-464, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Noda, Shunya, 2022. "Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 115-125.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019.
"Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-459, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance," KIER Working Papers 1017, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019.
"Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries,"
KIER Working Papers
1018, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CARF F-Series CARF-F-462, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1121, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019.
"Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics),"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-452, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CARF F-Series CARF-F-433, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-466, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019.
"Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1116, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2019.
"Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1124, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi & Noda, Shunya, 2023. "Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
Cited by:
- Noda, Shunya, 2022. "Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 115-125.
- Guoxi Zhang & Jiuding Duan, 2024. "VickreyFeedback: Cost-efficient Data Construction for Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback," Papers 2409.18417, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019.
"Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1115, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-11, January.
Cited by:
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CARF F-Series CARF-F-433, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yao, Zhouzhou & Wu, Xianyu & Yang, Yang & Li, Ning, 2024. "A digital decision approach for indirect-reciprocity based cooperative lane-changing," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 633(C).
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-466, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019.
"Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433),"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-466, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020.
"Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-11, January.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1115, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-452, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020.
"Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-11, January.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018.
"Psychological Aspect of Monitoring Accuracy in Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-432, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CARF F-Series CARF-F-433, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018.
"Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-433, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020. "Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Evans, Alecia & Sesmero, Juan, 2022. "Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with Correlated Noisy Payoffs: Theory and Experimental Evidence," 2021 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Austin, Texas 322804, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020.
"Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-11, January.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1115, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Edoardo Gallo & Yohanes E. Riyanto & Nilanjan Roy & Tat-How Teh, 2022. "Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic networks," Papers 2203.04001, arXiv.org.
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CARF F-Series CARF-F-433, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Gallo, Edoardo & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan & Teh, Tat-How, 2022. "Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 75-103.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-452, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Xu, Xue & Zheng, Kun, 2024. "Private monitoring revisited: When does a shared history matter?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
- Sawa, Ryoji, 2021. "A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 570-589.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-466, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018.
"Implementation without Expected Utility: Ex-Post Verifiability,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-443, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(4), pages 575-585, December.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1116, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2019. "Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms: Complete information," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
- Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele, 2022. "Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-453, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge," CARF F-Series CARF-F-500, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Unique Information Elicitation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-496, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018.
"Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1088, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020. "Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, January.
Cited by:
- Awaya, Yu & Iwasaki, Kohei & Watanabe, Makoto, 2022. "Rational bubbles and middlemen," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017.
"Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-416, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017. "Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1058, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017.
"Framing Game Theory,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1072, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Framing Game Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1076, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Framing Game Theory," CARF F-Series CARF-F-428, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017. "Framing Game Theory," CARF F-Series CARF-F-425, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018.
"Implementation without Expected Utility: Ex-Post Verifiability,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-443, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(4), pages 575-585, December.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1116, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-453, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016.
"Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-381, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1056, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- KAYABA, Yutaka & 萱場, 豊 & MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi & TOYAMA, Tomohisa, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-23, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1004, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Gallo, Edoardo & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan & Teh, Tat-How, 2019. "Cooperation in an Uncertain and Dynamic World," MPRA Paper 97878, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2016.
"Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-386, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2016. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1015, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2019.
"Efficient investments in the implementation problem,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 247-278.
- Kentaro Tomoeda, 2018. "Efficient Investments in the Implementation Problem," Working Paper Series 54, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013.
"Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-875, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2014. "Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 116-121, March.
Cited by:
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016.
"Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-381, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1056, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- KAYABA, Yutaka & 萱場, 豊 & MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi & TOYAMA, Tomohisa, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-23, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1004, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020.
"Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-11, January.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1115, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CARF F-Series CARF-F-433, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (Revised version of F-381)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-414, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Obayashi Shinya & Inagaki Yusuke & Takikawa Hiroki, 2016. "The Condition for Generous Trust," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(11), pages 1-16, November.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama, 2013.
"Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-879, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama, 2013. "Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CARF F-Series CARF-F-309, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-452, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2011. "Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Theory and Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-795, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-466, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama, 2013.
"Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-309, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama, 2013. "Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-879, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016.
"Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-381, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1056, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- KAYABA, Yutaka & 萱場, 豊 & MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi & TOYAMA, Tomohisa, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-23, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1004, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2018.
"Observations on Cooperation,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2253-2282.
- Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2020. "Observations on Cooperation," Papers 2006.15310, arXiv.org.
- Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2017. "Observations on Cooperation," Working Papers 2017-12, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CARF F-Series CARF-F-433, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (Revised version of F-381)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-414, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Heller, Yuval, 2017.
"Instability of belief-free equilibria,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 261-286.
- Yuval Heller, 2017. "Instability of Belief-free Equilibria," Working Papers 2017-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Kono, Hisaki, 2014. "Microcredit games with noisy signals: Contagion and free-riding," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 96-113.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-466, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013.
"Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-306, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-876, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013.
"Role of Credit Default Swap in Bubbles and Crashes,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-905, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Role of Credit Default Swap in Bubbles and Crashes," CARF F-Series CARF-F-331, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012.
"Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design with Single-Dimensionality,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-292, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-955, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings (Published in the Japanese Economic Review 69 (4), 2018.)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-357, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018.
"Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type‐Independent Preference Orderings,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 363-373, December.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 363-373, December.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012.
""4G Spectrum Auction in Japan: Japanese Package Auction (JPA)" (in Japanese),"
CIRJE J-Series
CIRJE-J-240, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Teytelboym, Alexander, 2014. "Gross substitutes and complements: A simple generalization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 135-138.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012.
"Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-279, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-853, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-955, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings (Published in the Japanese Economic Review 69 (4), 2018.)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-357, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018.
"Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type‐Independent Preference Orderings,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 363-373, December.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 363-373, December.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011.
"Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges with Opt-Out Types (Revised version of CARF-F-258)(Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 19 (1), 2019.),"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-294, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Aug 2012.
Cited by:
- Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2013.
"First Price Package Auction with Many Traders,"
ビジネス創造センターディスカッション・ペーパー (Discussion papers of the Center for Business Creation)
10252/5134, Otaru University of Commerce.
- Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2017. "First price package auction with many traders," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 71-83.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design with Single-Dimensionality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-292, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.
- Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2013.
"First Price Package Auction with Many Traders,"
ビジネス創造センターディスカッション・ペーパー (Discussion papers of the Center for Business Creation)
10252/5134, Otaru University of Commerce.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011.
"Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-261, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-806, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015.
"Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer's Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-960, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 2018. "Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-16, January.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretionin VCG Combinatorial Auction (Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 18 (1), 2018.)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-359, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-293, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2011.
"Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Theory and Experiments,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-795, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016.
"Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-381, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1056, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- KAYABA, Yutaka & 萱場, 豊 & MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi & TOYAMA, Tomohisa, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-23, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1004, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CARF F-Series CARF-F-433, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (Revised version of F-381)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-414, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Masaki Aoyagi & V. Bhaskar & Guillaume R. Fréchette, 2019.
"The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 1-43, February.
- Masaki Aoyagi & V. Bhaskar & Guillaume R. Frechette, 2015. "The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private," ISER Discussion Paper 0942, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-466, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016.
"Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-381, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-208, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma With Small Fines: The Penance Contract," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 333-347, September.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-720, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Malcolm Kass & Enrique Fatas & Catherine Eckel & Daniel Arce, 2015. "The UN in the lab," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(3), pages 625-651, October.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations,"
KIER Working Papers
742, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-776, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011.
"Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-806, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations," CARF F-Series CARF-F-261, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-293, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010.
"Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-209, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi & Miyazaki, Koichi & Yagi, Nobuyuki, 2010. "Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2241-2259, November.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-721, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-401, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011.
"Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000270, David K. Levine.
- David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1823, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2012.
- Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2013.
"Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments,"
HEC Research Papers Series
1015, HEC Paris.
- Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2015. "Approximate implementation in Markovian environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 401-442.
- Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," Working Papers hal-02058241, HAL.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-213, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-727, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December.
- Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006.
"Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CARF F-Series CARF-F-067, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Xiao Lin & Ce Liu, 2022. "Credible Persuasion," Papers 2205.03495, arXiv.org.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Financing Harmful Bubbles,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-227, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Financing Harmful Bubbles," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-756, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Financing Harmful Bubbles," KIER Working Papers 711, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013.
"Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-876, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity," CARF F-Series CARF-F-306, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009.
"Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-144, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes," CARF F-Series CARF-F-285, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009. "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-606, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2013. "Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 858-870.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-857, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012.
"Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-288, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-859, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009.
"Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-144, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2013. "Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 858-870.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes," CARF F-Series CARF-F-285, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009. "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-606, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-857, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1099, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Qin, Jie, 2015. "A model of regret, investor behavior, and market turbulence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 150-174.
- Lin, Edward M.H. & Sun, Edward W. & Yu, Min-Teh, 2020. "Behavioral data-driven analysis with Bayesian method for risk management of financial services," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020.
"Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1088, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020.
"Recurrent Preemption Games,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1143, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Recurrent Preemption Games," DSSR Discussion Papers 110, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Recurrent Preemption Games," CARF F-Series CARF-F-472, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Recurrent Preemption Games," KIER Working Papers 1020, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Eizo Akiyama & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2014.
"How do experienced traders respond to inflows of inexperienced traders? An experimental analysis,"
Post-Print
hal-01463903, HAL.
- Eizo Akiyama & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2013. "How Do Experienced Traders Respond to Inflows of Inexperienced Traders? An Experimental Analysis," AMSE Working Papers 1359, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 18 Dec 2013.
- Akiyama, Eizo & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Ishikawa, Ryuichiro, 2014. "How do experienced traders respond to inflows of inexperienced traders? An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-18.
- Eizo Akiyama & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2013. "How Do Experienced Traders Respond to Inflows of Inexperienced Traders? An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers halshs-00920413, HAL.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013.
"Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-876, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity," CARF F-Series CARF-F-306, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Xu Guo & Michael McAleer & Wing-Keung Wong & Lixing Zhu, 2016.
"A Bayesian Approach to Excess Volatility, Short-term Underreaction and Long-term Overreaction During Financial Crises,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
16-003/III, Tinbergen Institute.
- Guo, X. & McAleer, M.J. & Wong, W.-K. & Zhu, L., 2016. "A Bayesian Approach to Excess Volatility, Short-term Underreaction and Long-term Overreaction during Financial Crises," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI2016-01, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
- Guo, Xu & McAleer, Michael & Wong, Wing-Keung & Zhu, Lixing, 2017. "A Bayesian approach to excess volatility, short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction during financial crises," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 346-358.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Financing Harmful Bubbles,"
KIER Working Papers
711, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Financing Harmful Bubbles," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-756, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Financing Harmful Bubbles," CARF F-Series CARF-F-227, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012.
"Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-288, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Role of Leverage in Bubbles and Crashes," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-859, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Berger, David & Turtle, Harry J., 2015. "Sentiment bubbles," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 59-74.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims (Revised version of CARF-F-306)(Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-439, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CARF F-Series CARF-F-447, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Fotini Economou & Konstantinos Gavriilidis & Bartosz Gebka & Vasileios Kallinterakis, 2022. "Feedback trading: a review of theory and empirical evidence," Review of Behavioral Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 15(4), pages 429-476, February.
- Awaya, Yu & Iwasaki, Kohei & Watanabe, Makoto, 2022. "Rational bubbles and middlemen," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008.
"Effects of Reputation in Bubbles and Crashes,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-560, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Mei Li & Frank Milne, 2010. "A Large Trader in Bubbles and Crashes: an Application to Currency Attacks," Working Papers 1004, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008.
"Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-301, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Jul 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Process manipulation in unique implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 883-893, October.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-870, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1099, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022.
"Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-548, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022. "Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information," CARF F-Series CARF-F-549, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge," CARF F-Series CARF-F-500, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CARF F-Series CARF-F-447, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-523, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
Cited by:
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018.
"Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization,"
Discussion Paper Series
682, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Partially-honest Nash implementation : a full characterization," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2017-15, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2018. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Working Papers SDES-2018-13, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2018.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2017. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Discussion Paper Series 662, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Working Papers SDES-2017-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2020. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 871-904, October.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," MPRA Paper 48234, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Jul 2013.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series 590, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization," CCES Discussion Paper Series 49, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards," Discussion Paper Series 633, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1099, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009.
"Implementation and Mind Control,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-174, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009. "Implementation and Mind Control," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-673, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017.
"Framing Game Theory,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1072, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Framing Game Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1076, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Framing Game Theory," CARF F-Series CARF-F-428, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017. "Framing Game Theory," CARF F-Series CARF-F-425, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017.
"Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies,"
UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers
2017-05, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," Working Papers SDES-2017-11, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
- LOMBARDI, Michele & YOSHIHARA, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2016. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-48, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1015-1036, November.
- Ronen Gradwohl, 2018. "Privacy in implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(3), pages 547-580, March.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013.
"Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents in Economic Environments,"
Discussion Paper Series
592, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments," MPRA Paper 48294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2016. "Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 21-23.
- Ville Korpela, 2014. "Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 647-658, October.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Implementation, Verification, and Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-991, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1116, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ville Korpela, 2017.
"All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(2), pages 376-393, June.
- Ville Korpela, 2014. "All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying," Discussion Papers 95, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014.
"Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Post-Print halshs-00943301, HAL.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00943301, HAL.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009.
"Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
920, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009. "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," Economic Research Papers 271188, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Makoto Hagiwara & Hirofumi Yamamura & Takehiko Yamato, 2018. "Implementation with socially responsible agents," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(1), pages 55-62, April.
- Ville Korpela, 2012. "Implementation without rationality assumptions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 189-203, February.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez & Carlos Pimienta, 2015. "Reaching Consensus Through Simultaneous Bargaining," Discussion Papers 2015-08, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008.
"Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-301, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Jul 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Process manipulation in unique implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 883-893, October.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-870, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2014.
"Natural Implementation with Partially-honest Agents in Economic Environments with Free-disposal,"
Discussion Paper Series
616, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2015. "Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal," Working Papers SDES-2015-1, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jan 2015.
- Michele Lombardi & Yoshihara Naoki, 2014. "Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2014-09, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012.
"Mechanism Design and Intentions,"
Working Paper Series in Economics
53, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 21 Aug 2012.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2016. "Mechanism Design and Intentions," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism design and intentions," ECON - Working Papers 066, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Apr 2014.
- Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 557-603.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017.
"Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1058, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017. "Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection," CARF F-Series CARF-F-416, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Treading a Â…fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Working Papers SDES-2017-14, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2015.
"Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems,"
Post-Print
halshs-01116843, HAL.
- Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
- Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N., 2018.
"Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 203-216.
- Michele Lombardi & Naomi Yoshihara, 2017. "Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2017-07, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2016. "Treading a Fine Line : (Im)possibilities for Nash Implementation with Partially-honest Individuals," Discussion Paper Series 651, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- LOMBARDI, Michele & YOSHIHARA, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2017. "Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-47, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
- Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(1), pages 1-12, January.
- Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017.
"Reaching consensus through approval bargaining,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 241-251.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & Carlos Pimienta, 2017. "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," Post-Print halshs-01630037, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & Carlos Pimienta, 2017. "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01630037, HAL.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022.
"Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-548, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022. "Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information," CARF F-Series CARF-F-549, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008.
"Implementation and Social Influence,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-140, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008. "Implementation and Social Influence," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-598, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ortner, Juan, 2015.
"Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
- Juan M. Ortner, 2010. "Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals," Working Papers 1289, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-453, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge," CARF F-Series CARF-F-500, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CARF F-Series CARF-F-447, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
- George F. N. Shoukry, 2019. "Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(3), pages 497-526, March.
- Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve, 2017.
"Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 613-631.
- MUKHERJEE Saptarshi & MUTO Nozomu & RAMAEKERS Eve, 2017. "Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2017011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Unique Information Elicitation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-496, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Midjord, Rune, 2013. "Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 261-263.
- Doghmi, Ahmed, 2011. "A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation," MPRA Paper 67231, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Oct 2015.
- Ronen Gradwohl, 2013. "Privacy in Implementation," Discussion Papers 1561, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-519, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 134-151, July.
Cited by:
- Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2016.
"Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency,"
TSE Working Papers
16-677, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2017. "Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
- Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014.
"Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Post-Print halshs-00943301, HAL.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00943301, HAL.
- Crawford, Vincent P., 2021.
"Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 80-101.
- Crawford, Vincent P, 2021. "Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4748b7r2, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Jon X. Eguia & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2018.
"Implementation by vote-buying mechanisms,"
University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics
04-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Jon X. Eguia & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Implementation by Vote-Buying Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(9), pages 2811-2828, September.
- Kneeland, Terri, 2022. "Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
- Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2018. "The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 708-733.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-293, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006.
"Role of Honesty in Full Implementation,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-518, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018.
"Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization,"
Discussion Paper Series
682, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Partially-honest Nash implementation : a full characterization," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2017-15, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2018. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Working Papers SDES-2018-13, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2018.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2017. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Discussion Paper Series 662, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Working Papers SDES-2017-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2020. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 871-904, October.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," MPRA Paper 48234, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Jul 2013.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series 590, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization," CCES Discussion Paper Series 49, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Johannes Abeler & Armin Falk & Fabian Kosse, 2021.
"Malleability of Preferences for Honesty,"
Working Papers
2021-021, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Falk, Armin & Abeler, Johannes & Kosse, Fabian, 2021. "Malleability of preferences for honesty," CEPR Discussion Papers 16164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Abeler, Johannes & Falk, Armin & Kosse, Fabian, 2021. "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 296, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Abeler, Johannes & Falk, Armin & Kosse, Fabian, 2021. "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 282, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Abeler, Johannes & Falk, Armin & Kosse, Fabian, 2021. "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," IZA Discussion Papers 14304, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Johannes Abeler & Armin Falk & Fabian Kosse, 2021. "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," CESifo Working Paper Series 9033, CESifo.
- Kene Boun My & Julien Jacob & Mathieu Lefebvre, 2024. "AI devices and liability," Working Papers of BETA 2024-24, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards," Discussion Paper Series 633, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1099, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021.
"A solution to the two-person implementation problem,"
Post-Print
hal-03498370, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03342559, HAL.
- Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Remzi Sanver, M., 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M Remzi Sanver, 2020. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," PSE Working Papers halshs-02173504, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Post-Print halshs-03342559, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M Remzi Sanver, 2020. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Working Papers halshs-02173504, HAL.
- Lombardi, Michele, 2010. "Two-agent Nash implementation with partially-honest agents: Almost Full Characterizations," MPRA Paper 27834, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015.
"Bargaining through Approval,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Post-Print halshs-01310223, HAL.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," PSE Working Papers halshs-01168675, HAL.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Working Papers halshs-01168675, HAL.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-Francois Laslier, 2014. "Bargaining through Approval," THEMA Working Papers 2014-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009.
"Implementation and Mind Control,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-174, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009. "Implementation and Mind Control," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-673, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017.
"Framing Game Theory,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1072, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Framing Game Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1076, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Framing Game Theory," CARF F-Series CARF-F-428, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017. "Framing Game Theory," CARF F-Series CARF-F-425, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017.
"Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies,"
UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers
2017-05, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," Working Papers SDES-2017-11, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
- LOMBARDI, Michele & YOSHIHARA, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2016. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-48, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1015-1036, November.
- Abeler, Johannes & Nosenzo, Daniele & Raymond, Collin, 2016.
"Preferences for Truth-Telling,"
IZA Discussion Papers
10188, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2016. "Preferences for truth-telling," Discussion Papers 2016-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2019. "Preferences for Truth‐Telling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(4), pages 1115-1153, July.
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2016. "Preferences for Truth-Telling," CESifo Working Paper Series 6087, CESifo.
- Ronen Gradwohl, 2018. "Privacy in implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(3), pages 547-580, March.
- Barabino, Benedetto & Salis, Sara & Useli, Bruno, 2015. "What are the determinants in making people free riders in proof-of-payment transit systems? Evidence from Italy," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 184-196.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013.
"Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents in Economic Environments,"
Discussion Paper Series
592, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments," MPRA Paper 48294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2016. "Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 21-23.
- Pablo Amorós, 2015.
"Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms,"
Working Papers
2015-04, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- Amorós, Pablo, 2016. "Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 44-57.
- Lee, Jihong & Sabourian, Hamid, 2015. "Complexity and repeated implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 259-292.
- Ville Korpela, 2014. "Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 647-658, October.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Implementation, Verification, and Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-991, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1116, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ville Korpela, 2017.
"All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(2), pages 376-393, June.
- Ville Korpela, 2014. "All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying," Discussion Papers 95, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014.
"Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Post-Print halshs-00943301, HAL.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00943301, HAL.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009.
"Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
920, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009. "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," Economic Research Papers 271188, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- T. Hayashi & R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023.
"Behavioral strong implementation,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1257-1287, November.
- T Hayashi & R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2020. "Behavioral Strong Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 20-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Takashi Hayashi & Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2021. "Behavioral Strong Implementation," Discussion Papers 141, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Alejandro Saporiti, 2014.
"Securely Implementable Social Choice Rules with Partially Honest Agents,"
Economics Discussion Paper Series
1402, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Saporiti, Alejandro, 2014. "Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 216-228.
- Ville Korpela, 2012. "Implementation without rationality assumptions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 189-203, February.
- Martin Brown & Jan Schmitz & Christian Zehnder, 2018. "Communication, Credit Provision and Loan Repayment: Evidence from a Person-to-Person Lending Experiment," Working Papers on Finance 1819, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Aug 2020.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez & Carlos Pimienta, 2015. "Reaching Consensus Through Simultaneous Bargaining," Discussion Papers 2015-08, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Savva, Foivos, 2021. "Motives and implementation with rights structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008.
"Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-301, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Jul 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Process manipulation in unique implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 883-893, October.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-870, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2014.
"Natural Implementation with Partially-honest Agents in Economic Environments with Free-disposal,"
Discussion Paper Series
616, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2015. "Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal," Working Papers SDES-2015-1, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jan 2015.
- Michele Lombardi & Yoshihara Naoki, 2014. "Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2014-09, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2011.
"Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results,"
CCES Discussion Paper Series
43, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," Discussion Paper Series 555, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ascensión Andina Díaz & José A. García-Martínez, 2015. "A theory of media self-silence," Working Papers 2015-05, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012.
"Mechanism Design and Intentions,"
Working Paper Series in Economics
53, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 21 Aug 2012.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2016. "Mechanism Design and Intentions," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism design and intentions," ECON - Working Papers 066, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Apr 2014.
- Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 557-603.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane ZIAD, 2012. "On Partial Honesty Nash Implementation," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201201, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017.
"Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1058, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017. "Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection," CARF F-Series CARF-F-416, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Yadav, Sonal, 2016. "Selecting winners with partially honest jurors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 35-43.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory ( The further revision was subsequently published in "Economics Letters". )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-112, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Pablo Amorós, 2014. "Conditions on the jury for the natural implementation of the deserving winner of a contest," Working Papers 2014-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Treading a Â…fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Working Papers SDES-2017-14, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
- Benedetto Barabino & Sara Salis, 2023. "Segmenting fare-evaders by tandem clustering and logistic regression models," Public Transport, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 61-96, March.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2015.
"Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems,"
Post-Print
halshs-01116843, HAL.
- Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
- Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N., 2018.
"Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 203-216.
- Michele Lombardi & Naomi Yoshihara, 2017. "Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2017-07, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2016. "Treading a Fine Line : (Im)possibilities for Nash Implementation with Partially-honest Individuals," Discussion Paper Series 651, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- LOMBARDI, Michele & YOSHIHARA, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2017. "Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-47, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
- Lepp l , Samuli, 2013. "Arrow's paradox and markets for nonproprietary information," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2013/2, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-523, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
- Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(1), pages 1-12, January.
- Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017.
"Reaching consensus through approval bargaining,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 241-251.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & Carlos Pimienta, 2017. "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," Post-Print halshs-01630037, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & Carlos Pimienta, 2017. "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01630037, HAL.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022.
"Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-548, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022. "Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information," CARF F-Series CARF-F-549, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve & Sen, Arunava, 2019. "Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 229-243.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2010.
"A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction,"
Discussion Paper Series
a538, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2011. "A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction," Discussion Paper Series a548, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2013. "A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(1), pages 131-151, September.
- Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N., 2010. "A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction," Research Memorandum 023, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
- Amorós, Pablo, 2011.
"A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 241-244, March.
- Pablo Amorós, 2010. "A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants," Working Papers 2010-07, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- Martin Brown & Jan Schmitz & Christian Zehnder, 2023.
"Communication and Hidden Action: A Credit Market Experiment,"
Working Papers
23.02, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
- Brown, Martin & Schmitz, Jan & Zehnder, Christian, 2024. "Communication and hidden action: A credit market experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 423-455.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008.
"Implementation and Social Influence,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-140, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008. "Implementation and Social Influence," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-598, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Bernabe, Angelique & Hossain, Tanjim & Yu, Haomiao, 2021. "Truth, Honesty, and Strategic Interactions," MPRA Paper 109968, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mukherjee, Saptarshi, 2018. "Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: Some results on compromise alternatives," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 384-391.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-519, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 134-151, July.
- Ortner, Juan, 2015.
"Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
- Juan M. Ortner, 2010. "Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals," Working Papers 1289, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dugar, Subhasish & Shahriar, Quazi, 2023. "Lying for votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 46-72.
- Cardinaels, Eddy, 2016. "Earnings benchmarks, information systems, and their impact on the degree of honesty in managerial reporting," Other publications TiSEM 5918f2bd-a456-4e49-989f-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Barron, Kai & Nurminen, Tuomas, 2018. "Nudging cooperation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2018-305, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-453, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge," CARF F-Series CARF-F-500, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CARF F-Series CARF-F-447, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Moreno, Ignacio & Vázquez, Francisco J. & Watt, Richard, 2017. "Rationality and honesty of consumers in insurance decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 36-46.
- Sanjiv Erat & Uri Gneezy, 2012. "White Lies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(4), pages 723-733, April.
- Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies ( Revised version of CARF-F-007(2004) and CARF-F-062(2005); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal ," CARF F-Series CARF-F-110, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Botond Köszegi, 2014. "Behavioral Contract Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1075-1118, December.
- Velez, Rodrigo A., 2015. "Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1114-1129.
- Amorós, Pablo, 2019. "Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: Conditions based on the jury," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 26-38.
- Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve, 2017.
"Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 613-631.
- MUKHERJEE Saptarshi & MUTO Nozomu & RAMAEKERS Eve, 2017. "Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2017011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Heller, Yuval & Sturrock, David, 2020. "Promises and endogenous reneging costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
- Doğan, Battal, 2017. "Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 103-110.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Unique Information Elicitation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-496, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Abeler, Johannes & Becker, Anke & Falk, Armin, 2014. "Representative evidence on lying costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 96-104.
- Cardinaels, Eddy, 2016. "Earnings benchmarks, information systems, and their impact on the degree of honesty in managerial reporting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 50-62.
- Heller, Yuval & Sturrock, David, 2017. "Promises and Endogenous Reneging Costs," MPRA Paper 78803, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Savva, Foivos, 2018. "Strong implementation with partially honest individuals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 27-34.
- Midjord, Rune, 2013. "Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 261-263.
- Doghmi, Ahmed, 2011. "A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation," MPRA Paper 67231, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Oct 2015.
- Ronen Gradwohl, 2013. "Privacy in Implementation," Discussion Papers 1561, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006.
"Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-067, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Alessio D’Amato & Laurent Franckx, 2010. "Nonpoint pollution regulation targeted on emission proxies: the role of yardstick schemes," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 12(4), pages 201-218, December.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-213, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-727, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-304, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007.
"Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-050, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007.
"Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"Large Auction Design in Dominance,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-007, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Large Auction Design in Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-282, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-010, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-010, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012.
"Mechanism Design and Intentions,"
Working Paper Series in Economics
53, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 21 Aug 2012.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2016. "Mechanism Design and Intentions," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism design and intentions," ECON - Working Papers 066, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Apr 2014.
- Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 557-603.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-293, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems ( Revised as CARF-F-062(2006) ),"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-015, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007.
"Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-050, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007.
"Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003.
"Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-242, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 823-852, May.
Cited by:
- Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016.
"Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-381, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1056, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- KAYABA, Yutaka & 萱場, 豊 & MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi & TOYAMA, Tomohisa, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-23, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1004, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2007.
"The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs,"
2007 Meeting Papers
751, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
- Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," KIER Working Papers 597, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2023.
"The analogical foundations of cooperation,"
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
halshs-04331552, HAL.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Samuelson, Larry, 2023. "The analogical foundations of cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2022. "The Analogical Foundations of Cooperation," PSE Working Papers halshs-03754101, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2023. "The analogical foundations of cooperation," Post-Print halshs-04331552, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2022. "The Analogical Foundations of Cooperation," Working Papers halshs-03754101, HAL.
- , H. & ,, 2016. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020.
"Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-11, January.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1115, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Seung Han Yoo, 2014.
"Learning a Population Distribution,"
Discussion Paper Series
1401, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Yoo, Seung Han, 2014. "Learning a population distribution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 188-201.
- Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M., 2007.
"Bidder collusion,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 374-402, March.
- Leslie M. Marx & Robert C. Marshall, 2004. "Bidder Collusion," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 108, Econometric Society.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics.
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2005.
- Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- , J. & ,, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CARF F-Series CARF-F-433, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (Revised version of F-381)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-414, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Olszewski, Wojciech & Wiseman, Thomas, 2022.
"Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
17312, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bhaskar, V. & Olszewski, Wojciech & Wiseman, Thomas, 2024. "Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
- Lucas Maestri, 2012. "Bonus Payments versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 34-56, August.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004.
"Endogeous Monitoring,"
2004 Meeting Papers
752, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Endogenous Monitoring," UCLA Economics Online Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2007.
"Folk Theorem with Communication,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Obara, Ichiro, 2009. "Folk theorem with communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 120-134, January.
- Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Heller, Yuval, 2015. "Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring," MPRA Paper 64468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama, 2013.
"Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-879, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama, 2013. "Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CARF F-Series CARF-F-309, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Joyee Deb & Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 917-964, May.
- Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2016.
"Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 971-984, November.
- Juan I Block & David K Levine, 2012. "Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000480, David K. Levine.
- Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2012. "Codes of conduct, private information, and repeated games," Working Papers 2012-031, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi, 2011.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
Working Papers
1325, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013. "Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1891-1928.
- Maestri, Lucas, 2014. "The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 412-418.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-452, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Ota, Tomohiro, 2011. "Intraday two-part tariff in payment systems," Bank of England working papers 428, Bank of England.
- Michihiro Kandori, 2007.
"Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Michihiro Kandori, 2011. "Weakly Belief‐Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 877-892, May.
- Wojciech Olszewski, 2007. "A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(58), pages 1-16.
- Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2012. "Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1998-2027.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013.
"Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-875, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2014. "Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 116-121, March.
- Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Carmona, Guilherme & Laohakunakorn, Krittanai, 2023. "The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2007. "Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 382-413, July.
- Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
- Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 10 Feb 2011.
- Anton M Unakafov & Thomas Schultze & Alexander Gail & Sebastian Moeller & Igor Kagan & Stephan Eule & Fred Wolf, 2020. "Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(1), pages 1-32, January.
- Fong, Kyna & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2007. "Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vz4q9tr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
- David Rahman, 2014. "The Power of Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3737-3751, November.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-005, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Heller, Yuval, 2017.
"Instability of belief-free equilibria,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 261-286.
- Yuval Heller, 2017. "Instability of Belief-free Equilibria," Working Papers 2017-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Xu, Xue & Zheng, Kun, 2024. "Private monitoring revisited: When does a shared history matter?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
- Daniel Monte & Ideen Riahi & Nikolaus Robalino, 2019. "Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 23(3), pages 91-111, December.
- Wojciech Olszewski & Johannes Horner, 2008. "How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect," 2008 Meeting Papers 895, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games," 2007 Meeting Papers 253, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Tomohiro Ota, 2016. "Sequential payments and optimal pricing in payment systems," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 441-463, December.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Takizawa, Shinichiro, 2010. "Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 337-340, September.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2011. "Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Theory and Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-795, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-466, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Johannes Hörner & Julian Jamison, 2007. "Collusion with (almost) no information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 804-822, September.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003.
"Multi-Group Incentives,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-201, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006.
"Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CARF F-Series CARF-F-067, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006.
"Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003.
"Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-254, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-010, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002.
"Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-147, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Honesty-Proof Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-178, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-149, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-148, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002.
"Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007. "Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Crawford, Vincent P., 2021.
"Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 80-101.
- Crawford, Vincent P, 2021. "Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4748b7r2, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi & Miyazaki, Koichi & Yagi, Nobuyuki, 2010.
"Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2241-2259, November.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CARF F-Series CARF-F-209, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-721, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-401, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Kneeland, Terri, 2022. "Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
- Kosenok, Grigory & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 126-161, May.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-519, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 134-151, July.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Noga Alon & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Dominance Solvability in Random Games," Working Papers 2021-84, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies ( Revised version of CARF-F-007(2004) and CARF-F-062(2005); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal ," CARF F-Series CARF-F-110, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Guo, Huiyi, 2019. "Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: An analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 76-105.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Unique Information Elicitation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-496, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information ( Revised as CARF-F-209(2010) )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-059, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002.
"Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-148, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-149, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002.
"Honesty-Proof Implementation,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-178, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007.
"Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 859-870, May.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 5747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005.
"Reserve prices in auctions as reference points,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
24/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(520), pages 637-653, April.
- S. Rosenkranz & P. Schmitz, 2005. "Reserve prices in auctions as reference points," Working Papers 05-14, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points," CEPR Discussion Papers 4264, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007.
"Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 859-870, May.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001.
"Stable Implementation,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-128, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-147, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001.
"The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Gintis, Herbert, 2004. "Modeling cooperation among self-interested agents: a critique," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 695-714, December.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 299-321, August.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Kim-Sau Chung, 2002. "Optimal Repeated Auction with Tacit Collusion (joint with Atila Abdulkadiroglu)," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000093, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000.
"The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-84, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Gintis, Herbert, 2004. "Modeling cooperation among self-interested agents: a critique," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 695-714, December.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 299-321, August.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000.
"Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-179, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998.
"Learning about Stochastic Payoff Structures,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-7, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2000.
"Can You Guess the Game You're Playing?,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
11/2000, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Oechssler, Jorg & Schipper, Burkhard, 2003. "Can you guess the game you are playing?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 137-152, April.
- Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2000.
"Can You Guess the Game You're Playing?,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
11/2000, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998.
"Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
Cited by:
- Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2020.
"Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization,"
Working Papers
2017, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2020. "Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization," TEPP Working Paper 2020-05, TEPP.
- Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2020. "Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization," Working Papers halshs-02613352, HAL.
- Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Gil-Molto, Maria Jose & Orts, Vicente, 2006. "Game-theoretic aspects of international mergers: Theory and case studies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 395-409, September.
- Yassine Lefouili & Catherine Roux, 2008.
"Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation,"
Post-Print
hal-00318178, HAL.
- Yassine Lefouili & Catherine Roux, 2008. "Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00318314, HAL.
- Yassine Lefouili & Catherine Roux, 2008. "Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation," Post-Print hal-00318314, HAL.
- Yassine LEFOUILI & Catherine ROUX, 2008. "Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 08.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- LEFOUILI, Yassine & ROUX, Catherine, 2010. "Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2010021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Yassine Lefouili & Catherine Roux, 2008. "Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00318178, HAL.
- Lefouili, Yassine & Roux, Catherine, 2012. "Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 624-640.
- Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori, 2008. "Multimarket contact in continuous-time games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 4-5, October.
- Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay, 2019. "Communication and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
- Volker Nocke & Roland Strausz, 2021.
"Collective Brand Reputation,"
CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series
crctr224_2021_281, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Nocke, Volker & Strausz, Roland, 2021. "Collective Brand Reputation," CEPR Discussion Papers 15732, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nocke, Volker & Strausz, Roland, 2022. "Collective Brand Reputation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 324, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Volker Nocke & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Collective Brand Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(1), pages 1-58.
- Cai, Hongbin, 2004.
"Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration,"
Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt6rk9f1fm, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2008. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002038, David K. Levine.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2009. "Firm reputation and horizontal integration," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 340-363, June.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-213, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-727, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December.
- Thomas, Charles J. & Willig, Robert D., 2006. "The risk of contagion from multimarket contact," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1157-1184, November.
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"Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy,"
Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(2), pages 153-176, March.
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- Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2013. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firms' organization and antitrust policy," Post-Print halshs-00861216, HAL.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013.
"Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-876, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity," CARF F-Series CARF-F-306, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Iftekhar Hasan & Matej Marinč, 2016.
"Should competition policy in banking be amended during crises? Lessons from the EU,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 295-324, October.
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- Saak, Alexander, 2011.
"Collective reputation, social norms, and participation:,"
IFPRI discussion papers
1107, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Alexander E. Saak, 2012. "Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(3), pages 763-785.
- Pham, Tho & Talavera, Oleksandr & Yang, Junhong, 2016.
"Multimarket Competition and Profitability: Evidence from Ukrainian banking,"
MPRA Paper
78763, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Apr 2017.
- Tho Pham & Oleksandr Talavera & Junhong Yang, 2018. "Multimarket Competition and Profitability: Evidence from Ukrainian banking," Working Papers 2018-02, Swansea University, School of Management.
- Pham, Tho & Talavera, Oleksandr & Yang, Junhong, 2016. "Multimarket Competition and Profitability: Evidence from Ukrainian banking," MPRA Paper 72376, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi & Miyazaki, Koichi & Yagi, Nobuyuki, 2010.
"Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2241-2259, November.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CARF F-Series CARF-F-209, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-721, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-401, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Arie, Guy & Markovich, Sarit & Varela, Mauricio, 2017. "On the competitive effects of multimarket contact," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 116-142.
- Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006.
"Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CARF F-Series CARF-F-067, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Jin, Tuofu & Eapen, Alex, 2022. "‘Delayed Forbearance’: Multipoint contact and mutual forbearance in inaugural and subsequent competitive actions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 938-953.
- Timothy L. Sorenson, 2007. "Credible collusion in multimarket oligopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(2), pages 115-128.
- Javier Coronado & Sergi Jiménez-Martín & Pedro L. Marín, 2007.
"Multimarket contact in pharmaceutical markets,"
Economics Working Papers
1033, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2007.
- Javier Coronado & Sergi Jiménez-Martín & Pedro L. Marín, 2007. "Multimarket Contact in Pharmaceutical Markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 698.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 18 Jul 2007.
- Javier Coronado & Sergi Jiménez Martín & Pedro L. Marín, 2008. "Multimarket Contact in Pharmaceutical Markets," Working Papers 2008-20, FEDEA.
- Javier Coronado & Sergi Jiménez-MartÃn, 2015. "Multimarket Contact in Pharmaceutical Markets," Working Papers 303, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Lucio Fuentelsaz & Jaime Gómez, "undated". "Multipoint Competition, Mutual Forbearance and Entry into Geographic Markets," Studies on the Spanish Economy 127, FEDEA.
- Lippert, Steffen & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2004.
"Networks of Relations,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
28, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Giancarlo Spagnolo & Steffen Lippert, 2004. "Networks of Relations," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 496, Econometric Society.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Lippert, Steffen, 2004. "Networks of Relations," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 570, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 04 Jun 2010.
- Charlotte R. Ren & Ye Hu & Yu (Jeffrey) Hu & Jerry Hausman, 2011. "Managing Product Variety and Collocation in a Competitive Environment: An Empirical Investigation of Consumer Electronics Retailing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(6), pages 1009-1024, June.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Multi-Group Incentives," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-201, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori, 2012. "Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 636-647.
- Armel Jacques, 2024. "Increased fines for repeat offenders and conglomerate dynamics," TEPP Working Paper 2024-06, TEPP.
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"Multimarket Contact in Health Insurance: Evidence from Medicare Advantage,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 212-255, March.
- Haizhen Lin & Ian M. McCarthy, 2018. "Multimarket Contact in Health Insurance: Evidence from Medicare Advantage," NBER Working Papers 24486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Javier Coronado & Sergi Jiménez-Martín & Pedro Marín, 2014. "An empirical analysis of the multimarket contact theory in pharmaceutical markets," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 15(6), pages 623-643, July.
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"Global Cartels, Leniency Programs and International Antitrust Cooperation,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3005, CESifo.
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- Quan, Ji & Chen, Xinyue & Wang, Xianjia, 2024. "Repeated prisoner's dilemma games in multi-player structured populations with crosstalk," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 473(C).
- David Rahman, 2014. "The Power of Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3737-3751, November.
- Snyder, Christopher M. & Vonortas, Nicholas S., 2005. "Multiproject contact in research joint ventures: evidence and theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 459-486, December.
- Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2015. "Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 1033-1048, November.
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- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Lippert, Steffen, 2005.
"Networks of Relations and Social Capital,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5078, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Lippert, Steffen, 2004. "Networks of Relations," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 570, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 04 Jun 2010.
- Lippert, Steffen & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2011. "Networks of relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 202-217, May.
- Shingo Ishiguro, 2004. "Information Aggregation and Efficiency in Agency Contracts with Endogenous Externality," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 60, Econometric Society.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-84, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information ( Revised as CARF-F-209(2010) )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-059, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000285, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2008. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002038, David K. Levine.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2009. "Firm reputation and horizontal integration," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 340-363, June.
- Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 318, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Coccorese, Paolo & Pellecchia, Alfonso, 2013. "Multimarket contact, competition and pricing in banking," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 187-214.
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- Saadet Kasman & Adnan Kasman, 2016. "Multimarket contact, market power and financial stability in the Turkish banking industry," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 361-382, March.
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998.
"Towards a Theory of Subjective Games,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-9, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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"Can You Guess the Game You're Playing?,"
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- Oechssler, Jorg & Schipper, Burkhard, 2003. "Can you guess the game you are playing?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 137-152, April.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2004.
"Learning to play Bayesian games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 282-303, February.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2000. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 1322, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jul 2001.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2004. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Scholarly Articles 3200612, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2002. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000151, David K. Levine.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2001. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1926, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2000.
"Can You Guess the Game You're Playing?,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
11/2000, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997.
"Private observation and Communication and Collusion,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
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"Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0566, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2007. "Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 61-92, May.
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"Antitrust,"
Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series
qt9pt7p9bm, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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"On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games,"
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- Johannes H�rner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Working Papers 1397, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
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"Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-15, January.
- Michihiro Kandori, 2001. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-114, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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"Moral hazard and private monitoring,"
Other publications TiSEM
fcc97407-becb-465c-9856-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January.
- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM 432fc615-feb9-4c90-8a14-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Discussion Paper 1997-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2007.
"The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs,"
2007 Meeting Papers
751, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
- Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," KIER Working Papers 597, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2002.
"Credible Communication in Dynastic Government,"
Game Theory and Information
0203003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(4), pages 1.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Wallis Working Papers WP34, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 59-86, January.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004.
"The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000030, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1961, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2007. "The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Scholarly Articles 3203772, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 15, pages 331-343, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January.
- Verboven, F.L., 1995.
"Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior,"
Other publications TiSEM
ebedb917-23d1-4b26-9ac0-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Verboven, F.L., 1995. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior," Discussion Paper 1995-49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Verboven, Frank, 1998. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation, and Collusive Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, May.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011.
"The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring,"
Scholarly Articles
8896226, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1664-1683, July.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics.
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2005.
- Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- , J. & ,, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Heidhues, Paul & Rady, Sven & Strack, Philipp, 2012.
"Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
387, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Heidhues, Paul & Rady, Sven & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Strategic experimentation with private payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 531-551.
- Rady, Sven & Heidhues, Paul & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs," CEPR Discussion Papers 10634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 1998.
"Collusion and Price Rigidity,"
Working papers
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- Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000081, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 317-349.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011.
"Learning from private information in noisy repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014.
"Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags,"
Scholarly Articles
11880354, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
- Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000390, David K. Levine.
- Ichiro Obara, 2007.
"Folk Theorem with Communication,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Obara, Ichiro, 2009. "Folk theorem with communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 120-134, January.
- Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001.
"Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002.
"Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 469-482, August.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1237, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
- Fong, Kyna & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2007. "Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vz4q9tr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-005, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Frank Verboben, 1997. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-03, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Elisabetta Iossa & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2009.
"Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B,"
CEIS Research Paper
147, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 30 Sep 2009.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2011. "Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B," CEPR Discussion Papers 8195, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Elisabetta Iossa & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2008. "Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B," EIEF Working Papers Series 1022, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Dec 2010.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, 2012. "Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Working Paper Archive 587, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Masaki Aoyagi, 2002.
"Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0566, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1997.
"Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View,"
CIRJE F-Series
97-F-10, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 293-306, September.
Cited by:
- Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "Low Information Games - Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining," Experimental 9905001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997.
"Procedural Rationality and Inductive Learning I: Towards a Theory of Subjective Games,"
CIRJE F-Series
97-F-21, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Cited by:
- Sarin, Rajiv, 2000. "Decision Rules with Bounded Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 151-160, January.
- Patrick Legros & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1991.
"Efficiency in partnerships,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/7044, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Legros, Patrick & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Efficiency in partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 296-322, December.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2019. "Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments (Revised version of F415 )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-464, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege, 1998.
"Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents With Moral Hazard,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(2), pages 422-450, June.
- Hege, U. & Feess, E., 1998. "Efficient liability rules for multi-party accidents with moral hazard," Other publications TiSEM e216300c-126c-4e48-ad1f-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess, 1998. "Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard," Post-Print hal-00759758, HAL.
- David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011.
"Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000270, David K. Levine.
- David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1823, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2012.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 399, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018.
"Overburdened judges,"
Working Papers
halshs-01936006, HAL.
- Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018. "Overburdened judges," CEE-M Working Papers halshs-01936006, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
- Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018. "Overburdened judges," Post-Print hal-02621924, HAL.
- Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018. "Overburdened judges," Working Papers hal-02791013, HAL.
- Roussey, Ludivine & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2018. "Overburdened judges," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 21-32.
- Patrick Legros & Steven Matthews, 1993.
"Efficient and nearly efficient partnerships,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/7040, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1992. "Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships," Discussion Papers 991R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 599-611.
- David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019.
"Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-459, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance," KIER Working Papers 1017, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-213, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-727, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December.
- Falconieri, S. & Palomino, F.A. & Sakovics, J., 2002.
"Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports,"
Discussion Paper
2002-106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Sonia Falconieri & Frederic Palomino & Jozsef Sakovics, 2002. "Collective vs. Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 85, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Falconieri, S. & Palomino, F.A. & Sakovics, J., 2002. "Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports," Other publications TiSEM 922950b4-a0c9-4c2f-9cc8-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1999. "Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 275-294, November.
- Battaglini, Marco, 2006.
"Joint production in teams,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September.
- Battaglini, Marco, 2004. "Joint Production in Teams," CEPR Discussion Papers 4702, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dunia López-Pintado & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2011. "On the optimal management of teams under budget constraints," Working Papers 11.11, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2016.
"Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-386, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2016. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1015, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
- Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2016. "Teams in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016/23, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-179, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006.
"Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CARF F-Series CARF-F-067, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Incentives in Hedge Funds,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-205, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Incentives in Hedge Funds," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-714, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
- Ozdenoren, Emre & Rubanov, Oleg, 2017.
"Profit Sharing and Incentives,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
12355, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ozdenoren, Emre & Rubanov, Oleg, 2022. "Profit Sharing and Incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
- HEGE, Ulrich & VIALA, Pascale, 1997.
"Contentious Contracts,"
Cahiers de recherche
9711, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Hege, U. & Viala, P., 1997. "Contentious Contracts," Discussion Paper 1997-109, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Ulrich Hege & Pascale Viala, 2012. "Contentious Contracts," Working Papers hal-00759794, HAL.
- Hege, U. & Viala, P., 1997. "Contentious Contracts," Other publications TiSEM 6f3c7c98-ae1f-4113-a230-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Hege, Ulrich & Viala, Pascale, 1998. "Contentious Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1910, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007.
"Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 922-935, July.
- Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007. "Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects," Post-Print halshs-00160753, HAL.
- Nandeibam, Shasikanta, 2002. "Sharing Rules in Teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 407-420, December.
- Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006. "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2017. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1057, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019.
"Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries,"
KIER Working Papers
1018, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CARF F-Series CARF-F-462, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1121, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Michael T. Rauh, 2014.
"Incentives, wages, employment, and the division of labor in teams,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 533-552, September.
- Michael T. Rauh, 2013. "Incentives, Wages, Employment, and the Division of Labor in Teams," Working Papers 2013-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2019.
"Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1124, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi & Noda, Shunya, 2023. "Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
- Mauricio S. Bugarin, 2015. "Efficiency in a Monotonic Partnership with Investment: An Endogenous Implementation of Holmstrom’s Principal," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 4(3), pages 127-135, September.
- Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2016.
"Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 311-323.
- Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, David K. Levine.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Multi-Group Incentives," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-201, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Verbeck, Matthias, 2015. "Contracting with Researchers," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112963, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2017. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG (Revised version of F-386)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-415, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998.
"Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 311-336, November.
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1998. "Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: an overview," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ishiguro, Shingo & Yasuda, Yosuke, 2023. "Moral hazard and subjective evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
- Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
- Matsuzawa, Satoshi, 2024. "Optimal incentive power for inter-team competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
- De Marco, Giuseppe & Immordino, Giovanni, 2013.
"Partnership, reciprocity and team design,"
Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 39-58.
- Giuseppe De Marco & Giovanni Immordino, 2010. "Partnership, Reciprocity and Team Design," CSEF Working Papers 257, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 24 Mar 2011.
- Madanmohan Ghosh & Carlo Perroni & John Whalley, 1999. "The Value of MFN Treatment to Developing Countries," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 9916, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Zhao, Rui R., 2007.
"Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 601-640, September.
- Rui Zhao, 2001. "Repeated Two-Sided Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 01-07, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
- Michael D. Ryall & Rachelle C. Sampson, 2017. "Contract Structure for Joint Production: Risk and Ambiguity Under Compensatory Damages," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1232-1253, April.
- Jungho Lee, 2020. "Estimating the benefits and costs of forming business partnerships," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 531-562, June.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 1997. "Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 174-195, May.
- Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 227-250, December.
- Corts, Kenneth S., 2006. "The interaction of task and asset allocation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 887-906, September.
- Miller, Nolan H., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299, December.
- Kenneth S. Corts, 2007. "Teams versus individual accountability: solving multitask problems through job design," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 467-479, June.
- O'Brien, Daniel P., 2017. "All-units discounts and double moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 1-28.
- Matthias Verbeck & Elisabeth Schulte, 2016. "Contracting with Researchers," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201620, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
Articles
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022.
"Epistemological implementation of social choice functions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1116, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020.
"Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, January.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1088, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020.
"Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-11, January.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1115, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CARF F-Series CARF-F-433, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019.
"Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(4), pages 575-585, December.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Implementation without Expected Utility: Ex-Post Verifiability," CARF F-Series CARF-F-443, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2014.
"Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 116-121, March.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-875, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2013.
"Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 858-870.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes," CARF F-Series CARF-F-285, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009. "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes," CARF F-Series CARF-F-144, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009. "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-606, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-857, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013.
"Process manipulation in unique implementation,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 883-893, October.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-870, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008. "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-301, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Jul 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012.
"Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma With Small Fines: The Penance Contract,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 333-347, September.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract," CARF F-Series CARF-F-208, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-720, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi & Miyazaki, Koichi & Yagi, Nobuyuki, 2010.
"Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2241-2259, November.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CARF F-Series CARF-F-209, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-721, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-401, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008.
"Role of honesty in full implementation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-518, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008.
"Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 134-151, July.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-519, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008.
"Behavioral aspects of implementation theory,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-523, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007.
"Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005.
"On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, March.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-010, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 823-852, May.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-242, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001.
"Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998.
"Private Observation, Communication and Collusion,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
Cited by:
- Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2016. "On Communication and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 285-315, February.
- Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Masaki Aoyagi, 2002.
"Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0566, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2007. "Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 61-92, May.
- Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007.
"Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories,"
NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
843644000000000079, www.najecon.org.
- Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004.
"Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Scholarly Articles 3196336, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2008. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 16, pages 345-367, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2051, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007.
"Antitrust,"
Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series
qt9pt7p9bm, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
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CIRJE F-Series
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0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Saran, Rene, 2016. "Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 517-564.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-523, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
"Implementation theory,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288,
Elsevier.
- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Bochet, O.L.A., 2005.
"Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms,"
Research Memorandum
038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 111-125, January.
- BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Full implementation in backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-76.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008.
"Implementation and Social Influence,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-140, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008. "Implementation and Social Influence," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-598, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-519, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 134-151, July.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-015(2004) )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-062, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994.
"Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism," Working Papers 754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele, 2022. "Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Role of Honesty in Full Implementation,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-518, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-453, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen & Yifei Sun, 2021. "Direct Implementation with Evidence," Papers 2105.12298, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
- Gavan, Malachy James & Penta, Antonio, 2022. "Safe Implementation," TSE Working Papers 22-1369, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies ( Revised version of CARF-F-007(2004) and CARF-F-062(2005); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal ," CARF F-Series CARF-F-110, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2021.
"Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 181-197.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2020. "Rationalizable Implementation in Finite Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 5-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
- Malachy James Gavan & Antonio Penta, 2022. "Safe Implementation," Working Papers 1363, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Arya, Anil & Glover, Jonathan & Hughes, John S., 1997.
"Implementing Coordinated Team Play,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 218-232, May.
- Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & John S. Hughes, "undated". "Implementing Coordinated Team Play," Corporate Finance & Organizations _006, Ohio State University.
- Helena Hye-Young Kim & Frans Spinnewyn & Luc Lauwers, 2007. "Gradual Revelation Mechanism with Two-Sided Screening," Discussion Paper Series 0710, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Mario Gilli, 2002. "Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory," Working Papers 47, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-062(2006); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal of Economic Theory" as a short article. )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-109, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009.
"Rationalizable Implementation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 1993.
"Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-121, February.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Honesty-Proof Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-178, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-010, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Chung, Kim-Sau, 1999. "A Note on Matsushima's Regularity Condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 429-433, August.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Implementation and Preference for Honesty," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-244, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Decisiveness and the Viability of the State," Working Papers 2000-03, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Rene Saran & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2015. "Implementation by Sortition in Nonexclusive Information Economies," Economics Working Papers 2015-13, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Ville Korpela, 2014. "Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 647-658, October.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009.
"Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: a Unified Approach ot Exact and Approximate Implementation,"
Working Papers
2009-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation," Working Papers 2009-08, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: A Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation," Working Papers wp2009_0908, CEMFI.
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2010. "Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 775-785, September.
- John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002.
"Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September.
- Joanne Roberts, 1999. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," Working Papers jorob-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Type Diversity and Virtual Bayesian Implementation Creation-Date: 2000," Working Papers 2000-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005.
"Aggregation of Expert Opinions,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
05-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2009. "Aggregation of expert opinions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 339-371, March.
- Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Aggregation of Expert Opinions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1503, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ville Korpela, 2017.
"All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(2), pages 376-393, June.
- Ville Korpela, 2014. "All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying," Discussion Papers 95, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005.
"A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 312-331, February.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0028, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Working Papers 2002-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle," MPRA Paper 30653, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Claude d'Aspremont & Jacques Crémer & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2003.
"Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 281-310, October.
- d ASPREMONT, Claude & CRÉMER, Jacques & GÉRARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007.
"Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003.
"The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules,"
Economics Working Papers
0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
"Implementation theory,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288,
Elsevier.
- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 1997. "Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 313-339, October.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-519, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 134-151, July.
- Bong-Ju Kim, 2013. "A Sufficient Condition for Bayesian Implementation with Side Payments," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 29, pages 429-445.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-254, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-050, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-015(2004) )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-062, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems ( Revised as CARF-F-062(2006) )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-015, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Guoqiang Tian, 1999. "Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(1), pages 99-119.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Role of Honesty in Full Implementation,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-518, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies ( Revised version of CARF-F-007(2004) and CARF-F-062(2005); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal ," CARF F-Series CARF-F-110, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Mikhail Safronov, 2016. "A Coasian Approach to Efficient Mechanism Design," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1619, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-304, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Unique Information Elicitation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-496, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-062(2006); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal of Economic Theory" as a short article. )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-109, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes," Working Papers 2014-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Safronov, Mikhail, 2018. "Coalition-proof full efficient implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 659-677.
- Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992.
"A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information],"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-1442, November.
Cited by:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009.
"Rationalizable Implementation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Rationalizable Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 11, pages 375-404, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2011. "Rationalizable Implementation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00654687, HAL.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2010. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1697R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2011. "Rationalizable Implementation," Post-Print halshs-00654687, HAL.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Tercieux, Olivier, 2011. "Rationalizable implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 1253-1274, May.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2010. "Rationalizable Implementation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000022, David K. Levine.
- Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009.
"Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
902, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/10, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Jan 2010.
- Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2357-2375.
- Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2012. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1146, The University of Melbourne.
- Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Economic Research Papers 271298, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020.
"Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement,"
KIER Working Papers
1027, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1145, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," DSSR Discussion Papers 111, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," CARF F-Series CARF-F-474, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-010, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 360-374.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009.
"Implementation and Mind Control,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-174, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009. "Implementation and Mind Control," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-673, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ritesh Jain, 2019.
"Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences,"
IEAS Working Paper : academic research
19-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Jain, Ritesh, 2021. "Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 47-66.
- James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018.
"Implementation without Expected Utility: Ex-Post Verifiability,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-443, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(4), pages 575-585, December.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2010.
"Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000017, David K. Levine.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2011. "Robust implementation in general mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-281, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1666, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 5, pages 195-239, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002286, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1666R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2010.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010.
"Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1772, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Takahashi, Satoru, 2017. "Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 329-371.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1772RR, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2014.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000273, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1772R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2016.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000054, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Working Papers 1267, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Working Papers 1302, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1772R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2011.
- Fumiya Inoue & Hirofumi Yamamura, 2023. "Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 647-669, May.
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2020.
"Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies,"
Economics and Statistics Working Papers
4-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Victor H. Aguiar & Per Hjertstrand & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-213, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-727, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December.
- Lee, Jihong & Sabourian, Hamid, 2015. "Complexity and repeated implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 259-292.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1561R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2009.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000109, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 4, pages 153-194, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1175-1204.
- Alexander Elbittar & Sonia B. Di Giannatale, 2010. "King Solomon's Dilemma: An Experimental Study on Implementation," Working Papers DTE 477, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009.
"Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: a Unified Approach ot Exact and Approximate Implementation,"
Working Papers
2009-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation," Working Papers 2009-08, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: A Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation," Working Papers wp2009_0908, CEMFI.
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2010. "Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 775-785, September.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Khanman, M. & Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1996.
"An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism : Imperfect Information without Common Priors,"
Other publications TiSEM
30a3eb2c-fb2f-4ed7-8aa4-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Khanman, M. & Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1996. "An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism : Imperfect Information without Common Priors," Discussion Paper 1996-24, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Eric Friedman & Scott Shenker, 1998. "Learning and Implementation on the Internet," Departmental Working Papers 199821, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Xiong, Siyang, 2021. "Designing referenda: An economist's pessimistic perspective," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1116, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2018.
"On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms,"
Economics and Statistics Working Papers
21-2018, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2021. "On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 431-468, August.
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005.
"A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 312-331, February.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0028, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Working Papers 2002-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014.
"Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Post-Print halshs-00943301, HAL.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00943301, HAL.
- Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio, 2015. "Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 77-102.
- Brusco, Sandro, 1997.
"Unique implementation of action profiles: necessary and sufficient conditions,"
DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB
7024, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa de la Empresa.
- Sandro Brusco, 2002. "Unique Implementation of Action Profiles: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 509-532, May.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010.
"A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies,"
Working Papers
2010-2, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Working Papers 2010-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.
- Marcus Pivato, 2016.
"Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 431-458, August.
- Marcus Pivato, 2014. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules," THEMA Working Papers 2014-16, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rule," Post-Print hal-02980107, HAL.
- Roberto Serrano, 1996.
"A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation,"
Economics Working Papers
161, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
- Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Splitting The Baby In Two: How To Solve Solomon'S Dilemma When Agents Are Boundedly Rational," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary & Corchon, Luis C., 2003.
"An experiment on Nash implementation,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 161-193, June.
- Charness, Gary B & Cabrales, Antonio & Corchon, Luis C, 2001. "An Experiment on Nash Implementation," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt8275577k, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Luis Corchón, 1998. "An experiment on Nash implementation," Economics Working Papers 300, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-147, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022.
"Free-Rider Problem And Sovereignty Protection,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-531, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Apr 2022.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022. "Free-Rider Problem and Sovereignty Protection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022. "Free-Rider Problem and Sovereignty Protection," TUPD Discussion Papers 20, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
- Antonio Cabrales, "undated".
"Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information,"
ELSE working papers
009, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Cabrales, Antonio, 1999. "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 159-184, June.
- Antonio Cabrales, 1996. "Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information," Economics Working Papers 179, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Yi-Chun Chen & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Siyang Xiong, 2021.
"Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima,"
Papers
2110.06551, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2022. "Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
- Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008.
"Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-301, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Jul 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Process manipulation in unique implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 883-893, October.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-870, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Bergin, James & Sen, Arunava, 1998.
"Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 222-256, June.
- Bergin, James & Sen, Arunava, 1997. "Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 273386, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
- Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015.
"Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
- Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012.
"Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1846, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," Working Papers 1378, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 319-324, May.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000427, David K. Levine.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005.
"Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions,"
Working Papers
2005-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," Working Papers 2007-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2005. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we057238, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Robedrto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Discussion Papers 05-18, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Harry Pei & Bruno Strulovici, 2021. "Robust Implementation with Costly Information," Papers 2112.06032, arXiv.org.
- Tianjiao Dai & Juuso Toikka, 2022. "Robust Incentives for Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1583-1613, July.
- Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2019. "Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms: Complete information," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory ( The further revision was subsequently published in "Economics Letters". )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-112, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Mathevet, Laurent & Taneva, Ina, 2013. "Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 327-349.
- Dunia López-Pintado & Giovanni Ponti, 2003.
"Solomon'S Dilemma: An Experimental Study On Dynamic Implementation,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
2003-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Giovanni Ponti & Anita Gantner & Dunia López-Pintado & Robert Montgomery, 2003. "Solomon's Dilemma: An experimental study on dynamic implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(2), pages 217-239, October.
- Samuel Kapon & Lucia Del Carpio & Sylvain Chassang, 2024. "Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve Tax Collection," Working Papers 335, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007.
"Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2018.
"Strictly strategy-proof auctions,"
Papers
1807.11864, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
- Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2020. "Strictly strategy-proof auctions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 13-16.
- Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Sen, Arunava, 2024. "Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998.
"Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games,"
Economic theory and game theory
006, Nir Dagan.
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1997. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Working Papers 217, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January.
- Rosemarie Nagel & Christoph Bühren & Björn Frank, 2016.
"Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game,"
Economics Working Papers
1539, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2016.
- Nagel, Rosemarie & Bühren, Christoph & Frank, Björn, 2017. "Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 191-207.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-208, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma With Small Fines: The Penance Contract," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 333-347, September.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-720, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Sylvain Chassang & Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon, 2022. "Using Divide and Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Theory and Laboratory Evidence," Working Papers 299, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Matías Núñez & Marcus Pivato, 2016.
"Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ,"
Working Papers
hal-01340317, HAL.
- Núñez, Matías & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 285-305.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003.
"The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules,"
Economics Working Papers
0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Jean-François Laslier & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013.
"An incentive-compatible Condorcet jury theorem,"
Post-Print
hal-04302528, HAL.
- Jean‐François Laslier & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "An Incentive‐Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(1), pages 84-108, January.
- Saran, Rene, 2016. "Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 517-564.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012.
"Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations,"
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
hal-00812781, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Post-Print hal-00812781, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
- Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Marcelo Caffera & Juan Dubra & Nicolás Figueroa, 2016.
"Mechanism Design when players´ preferences and information coincide,"
Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers
1603, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
- Dubra, Juan & Caffera, Marcelo & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2016. "Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide," MPRA Paper 75721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Caffera, Marcelo & Dubra, Juan & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2018. "Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 56-61.
- Sylvain Chassang & Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon, 2020. "Making the Most of Limited Government Capacity: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 2020-7, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-523, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
- Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022.
"Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation,"
CSEF Working Papers
660, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," Working Papers 202317, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
- R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2022. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," Working Papers 202228, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
"Implementation theory,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288,
Elsevier.
- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Bochet, O.L.A., 2005.
"Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms,"
Research Memorandum
038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 111-125, January.
- BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011.
"Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1818, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 1, pages 1-48, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000187, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Working Papers 1332, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Burkart, Olivier, 1993. "Renegotiation -and coalition- proof virtual Nash implementation," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9322, CEPREMAP.
- Jonathan Hamilton & Steven Slutsky, 2003.
"Nonlinear Price Discrimination with a Finite Number of Consumers and Constrained Recontracting,"
Levine's Bibliography
234936000000000074, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Hamilton, Jonathan & Slutsky, Steven, 2004. "Nonlinear price discrimination with a finite number of consumers and constrained recontracting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 737-757, June.
- Ghosh, Sambuddha & Han, Seungjin, 2012.
"Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets,"
Microeconomics.ca working papers
seungjin_han-2012-12, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 May 2013.
- Sambuddha Ghosh & Seungjin Han, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-03, McMaster University, revised May 2013.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Full implementation in backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-76.
- Marcus Pivato, 2014.
"Statistical utilitarianism,"
THEMA Working Papers
2014-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Statistical Utilitarianism," Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 187-204, Springer.
- Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Statistical utilitarianism," Post-Print hal-02980108, HAL.
- Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Statistical utilitarianism," MPRA Paper 49561, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kunimoto, Takashi, 2020. "Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 62-73.
- Ortner, Juan, 2015.
"Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
- Juan M. Ortner, 2010. "Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals," Working Papers 1289, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-149, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Katok, Elena & Sefton, Martin & Yavas, Abdullah, 2002. "Implementation by Iterative Dominance and Backward Induction: An Experimental Comparison," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 89-103, May.
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2020.
"Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions,"
Economics and Statistics Working Papers
21-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Working Papers 2020-23, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Bond, Philip & Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Coordinating development: Can income-based incentive schemes eliminate Pareto inferior equilibria?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 368-391, July.
- Crawford, Vincent P., 2002. "Introduction to Experimental Game Theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 1-15, May.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012.
"Implementation with partial provability,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
- Barton L. Lipman & Elchanan Ben-Porath, 2010. "Implementation with Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-018, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio, 2012. "Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1300-1312.
- Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele, 2022. "Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019.
"Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions?,"
MPRA Paper
91474, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2020. "Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
- Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1998. "Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 194-218, November.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Role of Honesty in Full Implementation,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-518, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-453, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge," CARF F-Series CARF-F-500, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
- Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- , J. & ,, 2012. "Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2021.
"Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 181-197.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2020. "Rationalizable Implementation in Finite Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 5-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
- George F. N. Shoukry, 2019. "Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(3), pages 497-526, March.
- Yavas, Abdullah, 2002. "Endogenous outside options in coordination games: experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 221-236, February.
- Clark, Kenneth & Sefton, Martin, 2001. "Repetition and signalling: experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 357-362, March.
- Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022. "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "Constrained implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 546-567.
- Coggins, Jay S., 1994. "Implementing Agricultural Policy Virtually: The Case of Set-Aside," Staff Papers 200579, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
- Arya, Anil & Glover, Jonathan & Hughes, John S., 1997.
"Implementing Coordinated Team Play,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 218-232, May.
- Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & John S. Hughes, "undated". "Implementing Coordinated Team Play," Corporate Finance & Organizations _006, Ohio State University.
- Yi-Chun Chen & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Tom Wilkening, 2023. "Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(2), pages 285-387.
- Baliga, Sandeep, 1999. "Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 173-183, May.
- Arya, Anil & Glover, Jonathan & Rajan, Uday, 2000.
"Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 87-109, July.
- Arya, A. & Glover, J. & Rajan, U., 1999. "Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection," GSIA Working Papers 1999-8, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Schummer, James, 2004. "Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 154-170, July.
- Jing Chen & Silvio Micali, 2016. "Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-19, October.
- Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen, 2022. "Implementation with Uncertain Evidence," Papers 2209.10741, arXiv.org.
- Yamashita, Takuro, 2014. "Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation," TSE Working Papers 14-514, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Michele Lombardi & Foivos Savva & Nikolas Zivanas, 2023. "Implementation in strong core by codes of rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 503-515, April.
- Koray, Semih & Yildiz, Kemal, 2018. "Implementation via rights structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 479-502.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-148, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hirofumi Yamamura & Ryo Kawasaki, 2013. "Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 815-832, March.
- Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
- Michele Lombardi & Ritesh Jain & Antonio Penta, 2024. "Strategically Robust Implementation," Working Papers 1461, Barcelona School of Economics.
- R Jain & M Lombardi, 2022.
"Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization,"
IEAS Working Paper : academic research
22-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Ritesh Jain and & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization," CSEF Working Papers 645, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009.
"Rationalizable Implementation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992.
"Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
Cited by:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009.
"Rationalizable Implementation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Rationalizable Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 11, pages 375-404, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2011. "Rationalizable Implementation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00654687, HAL.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2010. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1697R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2011. "Rationalizable Implementation," Post-Print halshs-00654687, HAL.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Tercieux, Olivier, 2011. "Rationalizable implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 1253-1274, May.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2010. "Rationalizable Implementation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000022, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001194, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2007.
- Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022.
"An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation,"
CSEF Working Papers
640, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2021. "An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 21-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009.
"Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
902, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/10, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Jan 2010.
- Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2357-2375.
- Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2012. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1146, The University of Melbourne.
- Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Economic Research Papers 271298, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020.
"Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement,"
KIER Working Papers
1027, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1145, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," DSSR Discussion Papers 111, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," CARF F-Series CARF-F-474, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-010, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 360-374.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009.
"Implementation and Mind Control,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-174, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009. "Implementation and Mind Control," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-673, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ritesh Jain, 2019.
"Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences,"
IEAS Working Paper : academic research
19-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Jain, Ritesh, 2021. "Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 47-66.
- James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018.
"Implementation without Expected Utility: Ex-Post Verifiability,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-443, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(4), pages 575-585, December.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2010.
"Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000017, David K. Levine.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2011. "Robust implementation in general mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-281, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1666, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 5, pages 195-239, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002286, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1666R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2010.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010.
"Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1772, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Takahashi, Satoru, 2017. "Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 329-371.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1772RR, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2014.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000273, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1772R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2016.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000054, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Working Papers 1267, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Working Papers 1302, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1772R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2011.
- Fumiya Inoue & Hirofumi Yamamura, 2023. "Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 647-669, May.
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2020.
"Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies,"
Economics and Statistics Working Papers
4-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Victor H. Aguiar & Per Hjertstrand & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Decisiveness and the Viability of the State," Working Papers 2000-03, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-213, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-727, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December.
- Lee, Jihong & Sabourian, Hamid, 2015. "Complexity and repeated implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 259-292.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1561R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2009.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000109, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 4, pages 153-194, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1175-1204.
- Alexander Elbittar & Sonia B. Di Giannatale, 2010. "King Solomon's Dilemma: An Experimental Study on Implementation," Working Papers DTE 477, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009.
"Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: a Unified Approach ot Exact and Approximate Implementation,"
Working Papers
2009-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation," Working Papers 2009-08, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: A Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation," Working Papers wp2009_0908, CEMFI.
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2010. "Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 775-785, September.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Khanman, M. & Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1996.
"An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism : Imperfect Information without Common Priors,"
Other publications TiSEM
30a3eb2c-fb2f-4ed7-8aa4-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Khanman, M. & Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1996. "An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism : Imperfect Information without Common Priors," Discussion Paper 1996-24, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Eric Friedman & Scott Shenker, 1998. "Learning and Implementation on the Internet," Departmental Working Papers 199821, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Xiong, Siyang, 2021. "Designing referenda: An economist's pessimistic perspective," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
- Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007.
"Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine,"
Working Papers
2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1116, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Type Diversity and Virtual Bayesian Implementation Creation-Date: 2000," Working Papers 2000-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005.
"Aggregation of Expert Opinions,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
05-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2009. "Aggregation of expert opinions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 339-371, March.
- Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Aggregation of Expert Opinions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1503, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012.
"Robust Mechanism Design,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 2, pages 49-96,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2004.
- Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2018.
"On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms,"
Economics and Statistics Working Papers
21-2018, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2021. "On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 431-468, August.
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005.
"A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 312-331, February.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0028, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Working Papers 2002-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014.
"Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Post-Print halshs-00943301, HAL.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00943301, HAL.
- Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio, 2015. "Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 77-102.
- Brusco, Sandro, 1997.
"Unique implementation of action profiles: necessary and sufficient conditions,"
DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB
7024, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa de la Empresa.
- Sandro Brusco, 2002. "Unique Implementation of Action Profiles: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 509-532, May.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010.
"A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies,"
Working Papers
2010-2, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Working Papers 2010-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.
- Marcus Pivato, 2016.
"Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 431-458, August.
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- Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rule," Post-Print hal-02980107, HAL.
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"A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation,"
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- Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Splitting The Baby In Two: How To Solve Solomon'S Dilemma When Agents Are Boundedly Rational," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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"An experiment on Nash implementation,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 161-193, June.
- Charness, Gary B & Cabrales, Antonio & Corchon, Luis C, 2001. "An Experiment on Nash Implementation," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt8275577k, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Luis Corchón, 1998. "An experiment on Nash implementation," Economics Working Papers 300, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-147, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022.
"Free-Rider Problem And Sovereignty Protection,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-531, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Apr 2022.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022. "Free-Rider Problem and Sovereignty Protection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022. "Free-Rider Problem and Sovereignty Protection," TUPD Discussion Papers 20, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
- Antonio Cabrales, "undated".
"Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information,"
ELSE working papers
009, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Cabrales, Antonio, 1999. "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 159-184, June.
- Antonio Cabrales, 1996. "Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information," Economics Working Papers 179, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Romstad, Eirik, 2003. "Team approaches in reducing nonpoint source pollution," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 71-78, November.
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- Yi-Chun Chen & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Siyang Xiong, 2021.
"Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima,"
Papers
2110.06551, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2022. "Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
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- Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008.
"Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-301, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Jul 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Process manipulation in unique implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 883-893, October.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-870, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ichiishi, Tatsuro & 市石, 達郎 & Yamazaki, Akira & 山崎, 昭, 2002. "Preliminary Results for Cooperative Extensions of the Bayesian Game," Discussion Papers 2001-09, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
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"Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments,"
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- Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015.
"Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
- Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012.
"Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1846, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," Working Papers 1378, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 319-324, May.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000427, David K. Levine.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005.
"Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions,"
Working Papers
2005-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," Working Papers 2007-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2005. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we057238, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Robedrto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Discussion Papers 05-18, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Harry Pei & Bruno Strulovici, 2021. "Robust Implementation with Costly Information," Papers 2112.06032, arXiv.org.
- Tianjiao Dai & Juuso Toikka, 2022. "Robust Incentives for Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1583-1613, July.
- Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2019. "Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms: Complete information," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory ( The further revision was subsequently published in "Economics Letters". )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-112, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Mathevet, Laurent & Taneva, Ina, 2013. "Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 327-349.
- Dunia López-Pintado & Giovanni Ponti, 2003.
"Solomon'S Dilemma: An Experimental Study On Dynamic Implementation,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
2003-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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- Samuel Kapon & Lucia Del Carpio & Sylvain Chassang, 2024. "Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve Tax Collection," Working Papers 335, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007.
"Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2018.
"Strictly strategy-proof auctions,"
Papers
1807.11864, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
- Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2020. "Strictly strategy-proof auctions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 13-16.
- Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Sen, Arunava, 2024. "Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998.
"Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games,"
Economic theory and game theory
006, Nir Dagan.
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1997. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Working Papers 217, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January.
- Rosemarie Nagel & Christoph Bühren & Björn Frank, 2016.
"Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game,"
Economics Working Papers
1539, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2016.
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010.
"Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-208, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma With Small Fines: The Penance Contract," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 333-347, September.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-720, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Sylvain Chassang & Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon, 2022. "Using Divide and Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Theory and Laboratory Evidence," Working Papers 299, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Matías Núñez & Marcus Pivato, 2016.
"Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ,"
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hal-01340317, HAL.
- Núñez, Matías & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 285-305.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003.
"The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules,"
Economics Working Papers
0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Jean-François Laslier & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013.
"An incentive-compatible Condorcet jury theorem,"
Post-Print
hal-04302528, HAL.
- Jean‐François Laslier & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "An Incentive‐Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(1), pages 84-108, January.
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- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012.
"Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations,"
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
hal-00812781, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Post-Print hal-00812781, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
- Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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"Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation,"
Levine's Bibliography
843644000000000149, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Strategic Distinguishability with an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1609, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Marcelo Caffera & Juan Dubra & Nicolás Figueroa, 2016.
"Mechanism Design when players´ preferences and information coincide,"
Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers
1603, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
- Dubra, Juan & Caffera, Marcelo & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2016. "Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide," MPRA Paper 75721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Caffera, Marcelo & Dubra, Juan & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2018. "Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 56-61.
- Sylvain Chassang & Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon, 2020. "Making the Most of Limited Government Capacity: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 2020-7, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-523, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005.
"Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000116, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1519, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022.
"Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation,"
CSEF Working Papers
660, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," Working Papers 202317, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
- R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2022. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," Working Papers 202228, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
"Implementation theory,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288,
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- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Bochet, O.L.A., 2005.
"Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms,"
Research Memorandum
038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 111-125, January.
- BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011.
"Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1818, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 1, pages 1-48, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000187, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Working Papers 1332, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Burkart, Olivier, 1993. "Renegotiation -and coalition- proof virtual Nash implementation," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9322, CEPREMAP.
- Jonathan Hamilton & Steven Slutsky, 2003.
"Nonlinear Price Discrimination with a Finite Number of Consumers and Constrained Recontracting,"
Levine's Bibliography
234936000000000074, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Hamilton, Jonathan & Slutsky, Steven, 2004. "Nonlinear price discrimination with a finite number of consumers and constrained recontracting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 737-757, June.
- Ghosh, Sambuddha & Han, Seungjin, 2012.
"Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets,"
Microeconomics.ca working papers
seungjin_han-2012-12, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 May 2013.
- Sambuddha Ghosh & Seungjin Han, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-03, McMaster University, revised May 2013.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Full implementation in backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-76.
- Marcus Pivato, 2014.
"Statistical utilitarianism,"
THEMA Working Papers
2014-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Statistical Utilitarianism," Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 187-204, Springer.
- Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Statistical utilitarianism," Post-Print hal-02980108, HAL.
- Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Statistical utilitarianism," MPRA Paper 49561, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kunimoto, Takashi, 2020. "Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 62-73.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-519, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 134-151, July.
- Ortner, Juan, 2015.
"Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
- Juan M. Ortner, 2010. "Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals," Working Papers 1289, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-149, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Katok, Elena & Sefton, Martin & Yavas, Abdullah, 2002. "Implementation by Iterative Dominance and Backward Induction: An Experimental Comparison," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 89-103, May.
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2020.
"Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions,"
Economics and Statistics Working Papers
21-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Working Papers 2020-23, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Bond, Philip & Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Coordinating development: Can income-based incentive schemes eliminate Pareto inferior equilibria?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 368-391, July.
- Crawford, Vincent P., 2002. "Introduction to Experimental Game Theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 1-15, May.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-050, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012.
"Implementation with partial provability,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
- Barton L. Lipman & Elchanan Ben-Porath, 2010. "Implementation with Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-018, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994.
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Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
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- Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism," Working Papers 754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio, 2012. "Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1300-1312.
- Barry O'Neill, 2006. "Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1560, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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- Guoqiang Tian, 1999. "Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(1), pages 99-119.
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019.
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MPRA Paper
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- Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1998. "Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 194-218, November.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Role of Honesty in Full Implementation,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-518, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions (Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-453, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge," CARF F-Series CARF-F-500, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
- Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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- Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1998.
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Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1353-1388, November.
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- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies ( Revised version of CARF-F-007(2004) and CARF-F-062(2005); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal ," CARF F-Series CARF-F-110, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2021.
"Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 181-197.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2020. "Rationalizable Implementation in Finite Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 5-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
- Ohashi Yoshihiro, 2015. "On Run-preventing Contract Design," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 63-72, January.
- George F. N. Shoukry, 2019. "Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(3), pages 497-526, March.
- Yavas, Abdullah, 2002. "Endogenous outside options in coordination games: experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 221-236, February.
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- Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022. "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
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- Coggins, Jay S., 1994. "Implementing Agricultural Policy Virtually: The Case of Set-Aside," Staff Papers 200579, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
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Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 218-232, May.
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- Baliga, Sandeep, 1999. "Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 173-183, May.
- Kobbi Nissim & Rann Smorodinsky & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2018. "Segmentation, Incentives, and Privacy," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 1252-1268, November.
- Arya, Anil & Glover, Jonathan & Rajan, Uday, 2000.
"Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 87-109, July.
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- Schummer, James, 2004. "Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 154-170, July.
- Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2000. "Interference, Contracts and Authority with Insecure Communication," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0650, Econometric Society.
- Jing Chen & Silvio Micali, 2016. "Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-19, October.
- Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen, 2022. "Implementation with Uncertain Evidence," Papers 2209.10741, arXiv.org.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1999. "On the Impossibility of Implementation under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 99-10, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised 1999.
- Yamashita, Takuro, 2014. "Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation," TSE Working Papers 14-514, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Michele Lombardi & Foivos Savva & Nikolas Zivanas, 2023. "Implementation in strong core by codes of rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 503-515, April.
- Koray, Semih & Yildiz, Kemal, 2018. "Implementation via rights structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 479-502.
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- Eric Maskin, 2008. "Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design," Economics Working Papers 0086, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Fernando Tohmé, 2002. "Negotiation and Defeasible Decision Making," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 289-311, December.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-148, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hirofumi Yamamura & Ryo Kawasaki, 2013. "Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 815-832, March.
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- Michele Lombardi & Ritesh Jain & Antonio Penta, 2024. "Strategically Robust Implementation," Working Papers 1461, Barcelona School of Economics.
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"Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization,"
IEAS Working Paper : academic research
22-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
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- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009.
"Rationalizable Implementation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Legros, Patrick & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991.
"Efficiency in partnerships,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 296-322, December.
See citations under working paper version above.
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- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991.
"On the theory of repeated games with private information : Part I: anti-folk theorem without communication,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 253-256, March.
Cited by:
- Ichiro Obara, "undated".
"The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case,"
CARESS Working Papres
99-13, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated". "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case," Penn CARESS Working Papers ba7f35f1c50de4503e241d127, Penn Economics Department.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2000.
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Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0661, Econometric Society.
- George Mailath & Stephen Morris, "undated". ""Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''," CARESS Working Papres 99-09, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," CARESS Working Papres almost-pub, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, revised 01 Sep 2000.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1236, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January.
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000257, www.najecon.org.
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000257, David K. Levine.
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2107, David K. Levine.
- George Mailath & Stephen Morris, "undated". "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6bf0f633ff55148107994e092, Penn Economics Department.
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Other publications TiSEM
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- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January.
- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM 432fc615-feb9-4c90-8a14-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Discussion Paper 1997-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2023.
"The analogical foundations of cooperation,"
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
halshs-04331552, HAL.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Samuelson, Larry, 2023. "The analogical foundations of cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2022. "The Analogical Foundations of Cooperation," PSE Working Papers halshs-03754101, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2023. "The analogical foundations of cooperation," Post-Print halshs-04331552, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2022. "The Analogical Foundations of Cooperation," Working Papers halshs-03754101, HAL.
- Jeffrey Ely, 2000.
"A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0210, Econometric Society.
- Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105, January.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Discussion Papers 1264, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002.
"Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January.
- V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department.
- V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1330, Econometric Society.
- Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2023. "When (not) to publicize inspection results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
- Jiawei Li & Graham Kendall, 2015. "On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(8), pages 1-9, August.
- Stanley Reiter, 1999. "Coordination of Economic Activity: An Example," Discussion Papers 1263, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama, 2013.
"Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-879, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama, 2013. "Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CARF F-Series CARF-F-309, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi, 2011.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
Working Papers
1325, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013. "Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1891-1928.
- George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring,"
Discussion Papers
1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 174-192, January.
- George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 1997. "Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 345-361, October.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013.
"Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-875, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2014. "Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 116-121, March.
- Heller, Yuval, 2017.
"Instability of belief-free equilibria,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 261-286.
- Yuval Heller, 2017. "Instability of Belief-free Equilibria," Working Papers 2017-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1265, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated".
"The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case,"
CARESS Working Papres
99-13, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991.
"Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 371-375, December.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-010, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991.
"On the theory of repeated games with private information : Part II: revelation through communication,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 257-261, March.
Cited by:
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2000.
"Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0661, Econometric Society.
- George Mailath & Stephen Morris, "undated". ""Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''," CARESS Working Papres 99-09, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," CARESS Working Papres almost-pub, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, revised 01 Sep 2000.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1236, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January.
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000257, www.najecon.org.
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000257, David K. Levine.
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2107, David K. Levine.
- George Mailath & Stephen Morris, "undated". "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6bf0f633ff55148107994e092, Penn Economics Department.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997.
"Moral hazard and private monitoring,"
Other publications TiSEM
fcc97407-becb-465c-9856-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January.
- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM 432fc615-feb9-4c90-8a14-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Discussion Paper 1997-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2007.
"The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs,"
2007 Meeting Papers
751, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
- Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," KIER Working Papers 597, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004.
"The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000030, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1961, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2007. "The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Scholarly Articles 3203772, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 15, pages 331-343, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2023.
"The analogical foundations of cooperation,"
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
halshs-04331552, HAL.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Samuelson, Larry, 2023. "The analogical foundations of cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2022. "The Analogical Foundations of Cooperation," PSE Working Papers halshs-03754101, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2023. "The analogical foundations of cooperation," Post-Print halshs-04331552, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2022. "The Analogical Foundations of Cooperation," Working Papers halshs-03754101, HAL.
- Fabian Dvorak & Sebastian Fehrler, 2018.
"Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions,"
TWI Research Paper Series
112, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- Dvorak, Fabian & Fehrler, Sebastian, 2018. "Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions," IZA Discussion Papers 11897, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Fabian Dvorak & Sebastian Fehrler, 2024. "Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 232-258, August.
- Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2023. "When (not) to publicize inspection results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
- Jiawei Li & Graham Kendall, 2015. "On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(8), pages 1-9, August.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama, 2013.
"Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-879, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama, 2013. "Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CARF F-Series CARF-F-309, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001.
"Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013.
"Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-875, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2014. "Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 116-121, March.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January.
- Heller, Yuval, 2017.
"Instability of belief-free equilibria,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 261-286.
- Yuval Heller, 2017. "Instability of Belief-free Equilibria," Working Papers 2017-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Jee-Hyeong Park, 2000. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1036, Econometric Society.
- Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1265, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-84, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, David K. Levine.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2000.
"Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0661, Econometric Society.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991.
"Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 198-203, June.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-010, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Chung, Kim-Sau, 1999. "A Note on Matsushima's Regularity Condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 429-433, August.
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & CRÉMER, Jacques & GÉRARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2002.
"Balanced Bayesian mechanisms,"
LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE
2002048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Cremer, Jacques & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 2004. "Balanced Bayesian mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 385-396, April.
- D'ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2004. "Balanced Bayesian mechanisms," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1690, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Crémer, Jacques & D'Aspremont, Claude & Gérard-Varet, Louis-André, 2003. "Balanced Bayesian Mechanisms," IDEI Working Papers 196, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Beth Allen, 1996. "Implementation theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 226, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Sergei Severinov & Grigory Kosenok, 2004. "Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanisms and the," 2004 Meeting Papers 633, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Battaglini, Marco, 2006.
"Joint production in teams,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September.
- Battaglini, Marco, 2004. "Joint Production in Teams," CEPR Discussion Papers 4702, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi & Miyazaki, Koichi & Yagi, Nobuyuki, 2010.
"Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2241-2259, November.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CARF F-Series CARF-F-209, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-721, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-401, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Claude d'Aspremont & Jacques Crémer & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2003.
"Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 281-310, October.
- d ASPREMONT, Claude & CRÉMER, Jacques & GÉRARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007.
"Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Johnson, Scott & Miller, Nolan & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003. "Efficient Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types, and Interdependent Valuations," Working Paper Series rwp03-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 1998. "Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 142-151, March.
- Kosenok, Grigory & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 126-161, May.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-050, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Miller, Nolan H. & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Johnson, Scott, 2007.
"Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 476-496, September.
- Miller, Nolan & Pratt, John H. & Zeckhauser, Richard & Johnson, Scott, 2006. "Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations," Working Paper Series rwp06-028, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Guo, Huiyi, 2019. "Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: An analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 76-105.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Unique Information Elicitation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-496, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information ( Revised as CARF-F-209(2010) )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-059, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushina, Hitoshi, 1990.
"Long-term partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 245-248, November.
Cited by:
- Luciana Cecilia Moscoso Boedo, 2009. "Labels for Misbehavior in a Population with Short-Run Players," Working Papers DTE 468, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Furusawa, Taiji & Kawakami, Toshikazu, 2008. "Gradual cooperation in the existence of outside options," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 378-389, November.
- Robert Finger & Anna Borer, 2013. "Cooperative Management of a Traditional Irrigation System in the Swiss Alps," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-19, January.
- Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 1999.
"Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1225, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ramey, Garey & Watson, Joel, 2000. "Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt5zd216tw, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Moller, Marc, 2005. "Optimal partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 13-19, July.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1990.
"Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 109-112, October.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-010, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007.
"Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 1998. "Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 142-151, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-050, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021.
"Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Miller, Nolan H. & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Johnson, Scott, 2007.
"Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 476-496, September.
- Miller, Nolan & Pratt, John H. & Zeckhauser, Richard & Johnson, Scott, 2006. "Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations," Working Paper Series rwp06-028, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Unique Information Elicitation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-496, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1989.
"Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 428-442, August.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2019. "Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments (Revised version of F415 )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-464, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Paul R. Milgrom, 1988.
"Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
875, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dilip Abreu & Paul Milgrom & David Pearce, 1997. "Information and timing in repeated partnerships," Levine's Working Paper Archive 636, David K. Levine.
- Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David, 1991. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1713-1733, November.
- David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 920, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Takizawa, Shinichiro, 2008. "The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 165-168, August.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2016.
"Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-386, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2016. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1015, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2017. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1057, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2019.
"Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1124, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi & Noda, Shunya, 2023. "Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
- Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2016.
"Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 311-323.
- Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001.
"Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2017. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG (Revised version of F-386)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-415, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
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"Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview,"
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-84, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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"A new approach to the implementation problem,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
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"Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization,"
Discussion Paper Series
682, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2018. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Working Papers SDES-2018-13, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2018.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2017. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Discussion Paper Series 662, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Working Papers SDES-2017-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2020. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 871-904, October.
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- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series 590, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization," CCES Discussion Paper Series 49, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards," Discussion Paper Series 633, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Honesty-Proof Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-178, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009.
"Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
902, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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- Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2012. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1146, The University of Melbourne.
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"A solution to the two-person implementation problem,"
Post-Print
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- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M Remzi Sanver, 2020. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Working Papers halshs-02173504, HAL.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020.
"Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement,"
KIER Working Papers
1027, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1145, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," DSSR Discussion Papers 111, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," CARF F-Series CARF-F-474, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004.
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality,"
CIRJE F-Series
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "On Detail‐Free Mechanism Design And Rationality," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, March.
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018.
"Implementation without Expected Utility: Ex-Post Verifiability,"
CARF F-Series
CARF-F-443, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
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"The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions,"
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"Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms,"
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"Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1116, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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"Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 431-458, August.
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017.
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