Implementation via rights structures
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.009
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Saulle, Riccardo D., 2024.
"Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 77-102.
- Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Riccardo Saulle, 2022. "Designing Rotation Programs: Limits and Possibilities," Working Papers 202221, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
- repec:hal:journl:hal-04797842 is not listed on IDEAS
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2020.
"Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019. "Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions?," MPRA Paper 91474, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019.
"Implementation with foresighted agents,"
MPRA Paper
102496, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Hannu Vartiainen, 2021. "Implementation with farsighted agents," Discussion Papers 140, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- M. Remzi Sanver, 2022.
"Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 247-254, September.
- M. Remzi Sanver, 2022. "Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray," Post-Print hal-03767266, HAL.
- Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2022. "Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 635-649, December.
- Gonzalez, Stéphane & Lardon, Aymeric, 2021. "Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 28-38.
- Savva, Foivos, 2021. "Motives and implementation with rights structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Saptarshi Mukherjee & Hans Peters, 2022. "Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 1009-1028, November.
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2021. "Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 202-212.
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "Mechanism design with farsighted agents," MPRA Paper 94436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Michele Lombardi & Foivos Savva & Nikolas Zivanas, 2023. "Implementation in strong core by codes of rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 503-515, April.
- Aymeric Lardon & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2024. "Axiomatization and Implementation via Objections Structures," Working Papers 2418, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
- Mehmet Barlo & Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2022. "Computational implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 605-633, December.
- Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Behavioral implementation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Implementation; Rights structures; Nash equilibrium; Monotonicity; Social choice rule;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Statistics
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