Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.021
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Ronen Gradwohl, 2018. "Privacy in implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(3), pages 547-580, March.
- Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Kleinberg, Robert & Tardos, Éva, 2015. "Introduction to computer science and economic theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 1-13.
- Jing Chen & Silvio Micali, 2016. "Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-19, October.
- Jaeok Park & Doo Hyung Yun, 2023. "Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 205-228, August.
- Guarino, Pierfrancesco & Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 559-585.
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More about this item
Keywords
Incomplete information; Single-good auctions; First-order beliefs; Conservative beliefs;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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