Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance," CARF F-Series CARF-F-459, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
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Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019.
"Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries,"
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1121, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CARF F-Series CARF-F-462, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
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More about this item
Keywords
Blockchain; Smart Contract; Cartelization; Economic Governance; Non- Judicial Mechanism; Implementation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
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