Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments
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- Bergin, James & Sen, Arunava, 1997. "Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 273386, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Brusco, S., 1995. "Perfect Baysian Implementation in Economic Environments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 322.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Vartiainen, Hannu, 2007. "Subgame perfect implementation: A full characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 111-126, March.
- Eccles, Peter & Wegner, Nora, 2016. "Robustness of subgame perfect implementation," Bank of England working papers 601, Bank of England.
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- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Working Papers 2002-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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- Kentaro Tomoeda, 2018. "Efficient Investments in the Implementation Problem," Working Paper Series 54, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
"Implementation theory,"
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- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
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- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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"Implementation theory,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288
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- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
- Baliga, Sandeep, 1999. "Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 173-183, May.
- Brusco, Sandro, 1997. "Perfect bayseian implementation: one round of signaling is not enough," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 7026, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa de la Empresa.
- Kirneva Margarita & N'u~nez Mat'ias, 2023. "Legitimacy of collective decisions: a mechanism design approach," Papers 2302.09548, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
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- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
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