Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
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- Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomomi Tanaka & Tomohisa Toyama, 2013. "Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-879, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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Cited by:
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016.
"Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-1004, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," CARF F-Series CARF-F-381, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- KAYABA, Yutaka & 萱場, 豊 & MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi & TOYAMA, Tomohisa, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-23, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1056, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Kono, Hisaki, 2014. "Microcredit games with noisy signals: Contagion and free-riding," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 96-113.
- Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020.
"Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2018. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CARF F-Series CARF-F-433, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Kayaba Yutaka & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1125, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2018.
"Observations on Cooperation,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2253-2282.
- Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2017. "Observations on Cooperation," Working Papers 2017-12, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2020. "Observations on Cooperation," Papers 2006.15310, arXiv.org.
- Heller, Yuval, 2017.
"Instability of belief-free equilibria,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 261-286.
- Yuval Heller, 2017. "Instability of Belief-free Equilibria," Working Papers 2017-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (Revised version of F-381)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-414, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-466, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2013-03-23 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2013-03-23 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-EVO-2013-03-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2013-03-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-03-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-03-23 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
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