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UCLA Department of Economics

Theory workshop papers

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Series handle: RePEc:cla:uclatw

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Content

2006

815595000000000009 Dynamic Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information and Participation Costs
by Art Shneyerov
815595000000000006 Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication (joint with Roger Myerson)
by Dino Gerardi
815595000000000005 Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlation? (joint with Adam Brandenburger)
by Amanda Friedenberg
815595000000000004 Statistical Game Theory
by Michael Chwe

2005

658612000000000098 Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions
by Susan Athey

2004

658612000000000086 Is Bigger Better? Investing in Reputation
by Rafael Rob
658612000000000085 Mind Changes in the Design of Reporting Protocols
by Wei Li
658612000000000084 An Efficiency Rational for Bundling of Public Goods
by Peter Norman
658612000000000083 Electoral Competition with Imperfectly Informed Voters
by Wolfgang Pesendorfer
658612000000000081 Collusion and Price Rigidity
by Kyle Bagwell
658612000000000080 Demography and the Stock Market
by Michael Magill
658612000000000076 Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions
by In-Koo Cho
658612000000000072 Safety in Markets: An Impossibility Theorem for Dutch Books
by Leeat Yariv
658612000000000067 On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting
by Alessandro Pavan
121473000000000021 Multidimensional Private Value Auctions
by Hanming Fang
121473000000000010 Ratings, certifications and grades: dynamic signaling and market breakdown
by Andrzej Skrzypacz
121473000000000001 Mechanism Design under Non-Commitment
by Vasiliki Skreta

2003

658612000000000064 Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
by Jeff Ely
658612000000000063 Rent Seeking and Innovation
by Michele Boldrin
658612000000000047 Creating competition out of thin air: Market thickening and right-to-choose auctions
by Kfir Eliaz
658612000000000044 What to Maximize if You Must
by Chris Shannon
658612000000000032 The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality
by Matt Jackson
505798000000000098 Efficient Sorting in a Dynamic Adverse Selection Model
by Alessandro Lizzeri
505798000000000091 The First Property Rights Revolution
by Samuel Bowles
505798000000000076 The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
by Eric Maskin
505798000000000049 Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games
by Vincent Crawford
505798000000000048 Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers
by Marco Battaglini
505798000000000046 Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture
by Preston McAfee
505798000000000043 Optimal (apparently) Contradictory Contracts
by Francesco Squintani
505798000000000042 Excess Payoff Dynamics, Potential Dynamics, and Stable Games
by Bill Sandholm
505798000000000030 Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
by Larry Samuelson
505798000000000029 Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates
by John Duggan
505798000000000028 Price Discrimination in Matching Markets
by Hao Li
505798000000000027 Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments
by Tatsuyoshi Saijo
505798000000000026 Knowledge Exchange, Matching, and Agglomeration
by Marcus Berliant

2002

505798000000000006 Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
by Joel Watson
505798000000000003 Walrasian Bargaining
by Muhamet Yildiz
505798000000000002 A Theory of Partnerships
by Jonathan Levin
357966000000000096 Optimal Dynamic Choice of Durbale and Perishable Goods (joint with Peter Bank)
by Frank Riedel
357966000000000095 Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics (joint with Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Legros) Note the special time
by Steven Matthews
357966000000000094 Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games (joint with Dilip Abreu)
by David Pearce
357966000000000093 Optimal Repeated Auction with Tacit Collusion (joint with Atila Abdulkadiroglu)
by Kim-Sau Chung
357966000000000092 Eliciting Information from an Expert: The Art of Conversation (joint with John Morgan)
by Vijay Krishna
357966000000000091 Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions
by Estelle Cantillon
357966000000000090 Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Voting Schemes joint with Dipjyoti Majumdar
by Arunava Sen
357966000000000089 Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private Value Auctions
by Thomas Palfrey
357966000000000088 Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu)
by Aner Sela
357966000000000087 Relational Team Incentives and Ownership
by Luis Rayo

2001

357966000000000085 Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle
by Jean-Jacques Laffont
357966000000000036 Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation
by Bentley MacLeod
357966000000000030 Tacit Collusion under Interest Rate Fluctuations
by Pedro Dal Bó
357966000000000025 Mexican treasury securities primary auctions
by Sara Castellanos
339 Giving According to GARP
by James Andreoni

1999

168 Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game
by Phil Johnson

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