All-units discounts and double moral hazard
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.001
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More about this item
Keywords
All-units discounts; Retroactive rebates; Double marginalization; Double moral hazard; Partnerships; Teams;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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