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Implementation with socially responsible agents

Author

Listed:
  • Makoto Hagiwara

    (Tokyo Institute of Technology)

  • Hirofumi Yamamura

    (Hokusei Gakuen University)

  • Takehiko Yamato

    (Tokyo Institute of Technology)

Abstract

We consider the implementation problem with socially responsible agents who want to report a socially desirable outcome to a mechanism designer. We design a simple and natural mechanism in which each agent reports an outcome. We show that if there are at least two socially responsible agents, then the mechanism implements any unanimous social choice correspondence in Nash equilibria with at least three agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Makoto Hagiwara & Hirofumi Yamamura & Takehiko Yamato, 2018. "Implementation with socially responsible agents," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(1), pages 55-62, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:6:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-017-0123-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-017-0123-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
    2. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
    3. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1015-1036, November.
    4. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    5. Luis Corchón & Carmen Herrero, 2004. "A decent proposal," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 107-125, July.
    6. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hagiwara, Makoto, 2018. "A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 51-53.
    2. Hagiwara, Makoto, 2019. "Double implementation without no-veto-power," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 124-130.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social responsibility; Nash implementation; Outcome mechanism; Common knowledge;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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