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Sharing Rules in Teams

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  • Nandeibam, Shasikanta

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  • Nandeibam, Shasikanta, 2002. "Sharing Rules in Teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 407-420, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:107:y:2002:i:2:p:407-420
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    3. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-367, June.
    4. Legros, Patrick & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Efficiency in partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 296-322, December.
    5. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 599-611.
    6. Mukesh Eswaran & Ashok Kotwal, 1984. "The Moral Hazard of Budget-Breaking," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 578-581, Winter.
    7. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007. "Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 922-935, July.
    2. Bag, Parimal K. & Wang, Peng, 2019. "Input, output or mixed monitoring in teams?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 471-492.
    3. Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2009. "Efficient tournaments within teams," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 103-119, March.
    4. O'Brien, Daniel P., 2017. "All-units discounts and double moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 1-28.
    5. Dennis Courtney & Thomas Marschak, 2009. "Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 7-43, April.

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