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Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

Author

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  • Fumiya Inoue

    (Tokyo Institute of Technology)

  • Hirofumi Yamamura

    (Komazawa University)

Abstract

In this study, we consider the problem of fairly allocating a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible resource among agents with single-dipped preferences. It is known that any efficient and strategy-proof rule violates several fairness requirements. We alternatively propose a simple and natural mechanism, in which each agent announces only whether he or she demands a resource and the resource is divided equally among the agents who demand it. We show that any Nash equilibrium allocation of our mechanism belongs to the equal-division core. In addition, we show that our mechanism is Cournot stable. In other words, from any message profile, any path of better-replies converges to a Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Fumiya Inoue & Hirofumi Yamamura, 2023. "Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 647-669, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:60:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-022-01427-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01427-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2023. "Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 230(C).
    2. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    3. Doudou Gong & Bas Dietzenbacher & Hans Peters, 2024. "Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(3), pages 789-813, November.
    4. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

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