A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems
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- Matthew O. Jackson & Sanjay Srivastava, 1992. "Characterizations of Game Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems," Discussion Papers 1004, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Ritesh Jain, 2019. "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
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- Priscilla Man & Shino Takayama, 2012. "A Unifying Impossibility Theorem," Discussion Papers Series 448, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003.
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- Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Discussion Papers 1332, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Shino Takayama & Akira Yokotani, 2014. "Serial Dictatorship with Infinitely Many Agents," Discussion Papers Series 503, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
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- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2004.
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- Ning Yu, 2015. "A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 533-548, March.
- Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium," Departmental Working Papers 2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics.
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