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An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism : Imperfect Information without Common Priors

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  • Khanman, M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Perry, M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Reny, P.J.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Khanman, M. & Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1996. "An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism : Imperfect Information without Common Priors," Discussion Paper 1996-24, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:30a3eb2c-fb2f-4ed7-8aa4-d0c24993de5c
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-1442, November.
    2. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
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