Content
January 1987, Volume 52, Issue 3
- 215-222 A note on Pryor's criticism of Olson's rise and decline of nations
by Erich Weede - 227-244 Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibrium
by John Carter & David Schap - 245-255 Municipal annexation and local monopoly power
by Rodolfo Gonzalez & Stephen Mehay - 257-272 Budgetgames and the private and social demand for mixed public goods
by Hans Groot & Evert Pommer - 273-297 Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
by Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull
January 1987, Volume 52, Issue 2
- 125-142 A median-voter model of economic regulation
by Burton Abrams & Kenneth Lewis - 143-168 Inflation and political instability in eight Latin American countries 1946-83
by Martin Paldam - 169-186 Political cheating
by John Lott - 187-192 An instrumental-variables approach to income redistribution
by T. Tideman & R. Coats - 193-199 Capital intensity and the federal sector: Some further evidence
by Gabriel Obermann
January 1987, Volume 52, Issue 1
- 3-14 Presidential address Fourteen years of European Public Choice Society research
by Charles Blankart - 15-33 The Downsian model of electoral participation: Formal theory and empirical analysis of the constituency size effect
by Stephen Hansen & Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal - 35-55 Scale economies and rent-seeking in legislative parties
by Kenneth Koford - 57-73 Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament
by Bjørn Rasch - 75-100 The rise and evolution of public pension systems
by H. Verbon
January 1986, Volume 51, Issue 3
- 249-265 A general constitutional possibility theorem
by Peter Bernholz - 267-284 Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule
by Norman Schofield - 285-294 The stability of logrolling: An expectations approach
by James Enelow - 295-313 Discovering manipulated social choices: The coincidence of cycles and manipulated outcomes
by John Chamberlin - 315-331 Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games
by Barton Lipman - 333-343 Truth-telling, dominant strategies, and iterative Groves mechanisms
by Susan Cohen
January 1986, Volume 51, Issue 2
- 117-128 The politico-economic behavior of authoritarian governments
by Peter Bloch - 129-140 Persuading Caesar: A new interpretation of Farquharson's problem
by J. Budziszewski - 141-159 Equity, efficiency and environmental quality
by George Daly & Thomas Mayor - 161-172 The political economy of restriction of choice
by S. Littlechild & J. Wiseman - 173-190 The congressional foundations of agency performance
by Mathew McCubbins & Talbot Page - 209-219 The political economy of state level welfare benefits
by William Sander & J. Giertz - 221-239 Money and politics in a small open economy
by Stanley Winer
January 1986, Volume 51, Issue 1
- 3-23 Rational egoism versus adaptive egoism as fundamental postulate for a descriptive theory of human behavior
by Dennis Mueller - 25-38 The political economy of swarming in honeybees: Voting-with-the-wings, decision-making costs, and the unanimity rule
by Janet Landa - 39-57 A public choice approach to international organization
by Roland Vaubel - 59-70 Regulating the function, not the industry
by Bruce Yandle & Elizabeth Young - 71-80 Research note Partial single-peakedness: An extension and clarification
by Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman - 81-86 Optimal quantity of a controversial good or service
by Robert Kohn - 87-92 Brand names and barriers to entry in political markets
by John Lott - 93-100 Rent-seeking, distributional coalitions, taxes, relative prices and economic growth
by Richard Vedder & Lowell Gallaway - 101-107 Is democracy regressive? A comment on political participation
by Philip Jones & John Cullis - 109-115 Reviews
by Charles Rowley & William Dougan & Dwight Lee
January 1986, Volume 50, Issue 1
- 5-25 Incumbent performance and electoral control
by John Ferejohn - 27-91 Elections and income redistribution
by Peter Coughlin - 93-99 Elections and reputations
by John Ledyard - 135-178 The positive theory of legislative institutions: an enrichment of social choice and spatial models
by Kenneth Shepsle - 179-183 Discussion of "The positive theory of legislative institutions"
by Melvin Hinich - 185-210 Legislative coalitions and electoral equilibrium
by David Austen-Smith - 211-219 Comments on the papers by Austen-Smith and Shepsle
by Thomas Palfrey - 221-242 Tariffs, quotas and domestic-content protection: some political economy considerations
by Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz
January 1986, Volume 49, Issue 3
- 201-222 Nuclear consequences of the welfare state
by Robert Ayanian - 223-234 The public interest hypothesis revisited: A new test of Peltzman's theory of regulation
by Gilbert Becker - 235-247 Taxes, welfare costs, and public consumption: The case of the unwitting monopsonist
by Cecil Bohanon & James McClure - 249-263 Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising
by Roger Congleton - 265-282 The public choice of differing degrees of tax progressivity
by Kenneth Greene - 283-294 An empirical analysis of state and local tax structure in the context of the Leviathan model of government
by Michael Nelson
January 1986, Volume 49, Issue 2
- 101-116 The effects of constitutional restraints on governmental spending
by Burton Abrams & William Dougan - 117-125 The private interest in public redistribution: A public choice view of the geographic distribution of federal funds
by David Laband - 127-141 Tax deductions and credits, direct subsidies, and efficiency in public expenditure
by Thomas McCaleb - 143-154 Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies
by Michael Marlow - 155-163 State university boards of trustees: A principal-agent perspective
by Eugenia Toma - 165-178 Optimism and pessimism in political and market institutions
by Thomas Zorn & Dolores Martin - 179-182 Pufendorf on collective decisions
by Eerik Lagerspetz - 183-190 Why so much stability? On the single membership constituency and the law of large numbers: A note
by Uzi Segal & Avia Spivak - 191-194 A note on the role of knowledge in direct voting on milk price decontrol
by Clifford Thies - 195-200 Reviews
by William Mitchell & Roger Faith & Robert Tollison
January 1986, Volume 49, Issue 1
- 3-15 Vote buying in a stylized setting
by James Buchanan & Dwight Lee - 17-28 Factors affecting property tax reliance: Additional evidence
by David Chicoine & Norman Walzer - 29-45 The relative efficiency of private and public transfers
by Joseph Cordes & Robert Goldfarb & Harry Watson - 47-68 The application of laboratory experimental economics to the contingent valuation of public goods
by Don Coursey & William Schulze - 69-77 Why do corporations contribute to the Nature Conservancy?
by James Griffith & Charles Knoeber - 79-97 Property taxes, tax-cost illusion and desired education expenditures
by R. Lankford - 99-100 Review
by Randall Holcombe
January 1986, Volume 48, Issue 3
- 201-215 The political process and the use of debt financing by state governments
by William Baber & Pradyot Sen - 217-227 Efficient allocation and unanimous consent with incomplete demand disclosures?
by R. Brubaker - 229-244 Non-optimal unanimous agreement
by Randall Holcombe - 245-253 Determinants of the political participation of women
by Marshall Medoff - 255-263 Fragmentation and the growth of local government
by Mark Schneider - 265-270 Rentless rent-seeking and abnormal returns
by Bruce Yandle - 273-290 Optimal majorities for decisions of varying importance
by Bengt-Arne Wickström - 291-294 Comment
by Gordon Tullock - 295-298 Comment on a comment
by Bengt-Arne Wickström
January 1986, Volume 48, Issue 2
- 101-112 Economic value of an in-house editorship
by John McDowell & Ryan Amacher - 113-124 Reinterpreting the role of inflation in politico-economic models
by Robert Michaels - 125-145 Interest groups and the size of government
by Dennis Mueller & Peter Murrell - 147-155 The politics of race in higher education: Governing boards and constituents
by G. Sav - 157-174 Endogenous supranational policy decisions: The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community
by Harald Witzke - 175-181 Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking
by Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz - 183-187 On the voting participation of public bureaucrats
by Bert Jaarsma & Arthur Schram & Frans Winden - 189-194 Tax/compensation schemes: Misleading advice in a rent-seeking society
by Richard McKenzie - 195-199 Reviews
by William Mitchell & W. Smith
January 1986, Volume 48, Issue 1
- 3-25 An agenda for the study of institutions
by Elinor Ostrom - 27-35 Municipal residency laws and local public budgets
by Stephen Mehay & Kenneth Seiden - 37-48 On the inefficient extraction of rents by dictators
by Wayne Brough & Mwangi Kimenyi - 49-54 Religion as DUP activity
by Jagdish Bhagwati & T. Srinivasan - 55-63 Representative versus direct democracy: A Tiebout test of relative performance
by Rexford Santerre - 65-69 A note on the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis: The period 1975–1980
by Richard Cebula & Milton Kafoglis - 71-79 A note on the importance of cost structures for the behavior of Political Action Committees
by Daniel Richards - 81-87 On nationalizing private property and the present value of dictators
by John Lott & David Reiffen - 89-91 On nationalizing private property and the present value of dictators: Reply
by Adam Gifford & Roy Kenney - 93-99 Review article
by Charles Rowley
January 1985, Volume 47, Issue 3
- 425-436 The limits of the equity-efficiency tradeoff
by Donald Keenan & Paul Rubin - 437-457 Distribution of jointly owned private goods by the demand-revealing process: Applications to divorce settlements and estate administration
by Charles Laine - 459-477 Government expenditure and economic growth in the developed countries: 1952–76
by Daniel Landau - 479-490 The experimental search for free riders: Some reflections and observations
by Thomas McCaleb & Richard Wagner - 491-508 Tocqueville and public choice
by L. Wade - 509-517 Politics, deficits, and the Laffer curve
by Roger Waud - 519-525 Voter power and electricity prices
by Walter Primeaux & Patrick Mann - 527-529 The public interest and rent seeking
by E. Pasour - 531-534 Reviews
by James Buchanan & Frank Forman
January 1985, Volume 47, Issue 2
- 313-335 On the design of optimal mechanisms for the Arrow-Hahn-McKenzie economy
by Clark Robinson & Gerry Suchanek - 337-347 Can donations reduce a donor's welfare?
by Jeffrey Weiss - 349-370 The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation
by Shmuel Nitzan - 371-376 A precise restatement and extension of Black's theorem on voting orders
by Richard Niemi & Rodney Gretlein - 377-387 Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity
by Sven Berg - 389-403 A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions
by Samuel Merrill - 405-424 An application of the multicandidate calculus of voting to the 1972 and 1976 German federal elections
by Lee Dutter
January 1985, Volume 47, Issue 1
- 7-62 Money and votes reconsidered: congressional elections, 1972–1982
by Gary Jacobson - 63-111 Patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the United States House of Representatives
by Keith Poole & Thomas Romer - 113-119 The specification of models of campaign finance
by James Kau & Paul Rubin - 121-162 Demographic factors affecting constitutional decisions: the case of municipal charters
by Steven Maser - 163-181 Progressive reform as induced institutional preferences
by Gary Miller - 183-217 Constitutional change and agenda control
by Arthur Denzau - 231-265 A positive theory of in-kind transfers and the negative income tax
by Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard - 267-303 A taxonomy of public provision
by Russell Roberts
January 1985, Volume 46, Issue 3
- 227-246 Efficient rents 1 rent-seeking behavior in the long-run
by William Corcoran & Gordon Karels - 247-258 Efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking
by Richard Higgins & William Shughart & Robert Tollison - 259-263 Efficient rents 3 back to the bog
by Gordon Tullock - 265-274 The by-product theory of revolution: Some empirical evidence
by Phillip Cartwright & Charles Delorme & Norman Wood - 275-287 Why so much stability? The impact of agency determined stability
by Jeffrey Hill - 289-304 The effectiveness of savings and loan political action committees
by Linda Johnson - 305-309 New evidence on financial crowding out
by Richard Cebula - 311-315 Legislator specialization and the size of government
by W. Crain & Robert Tollison & Brian Goff & Diek Carlson - 317-324 Revealed preference for economics journals: Citations as dollar votes
by David Laband & John Sophocleus - 325-332 On private charity and altruism
by Oded Stark
January 1985, Volume 46, Issue 2
- 113-123 A precise method for evaluating election schemes
by Robert Bordley - 125-140 The political viability of rule-based monetary policy
by Henry Chappell & William Keech - 141-161 State and prospect of public choice: A European view
by Bruno Frey - 163-172 How elections matter: A study of U.S. senators
by A. Glazer & M. Robbins - 173-186 Majority voting and Pareto optimality
by John Goodman & Philip Porter - 187-195 The political economy of constitutional federalism
by A. Hamlin - 197-205 Tax shares and government spending in a median voter model
by Randall Holcombe & Steven Caudill - 207-214 Interstate migration, income and public school expenditures: An update of an experiment
by Garland Hadley - 215-220 The political timing of errors in inflation forecasts
by John Hill & Scott Smith - 221-223 From weakest-link to best-shot: Correction
by J. Hirshleifer
January 1985, Volume 46, Issue 1
- 3-17 A model of majority voting and growth in government expenditure
by Allan Feldman - 19-43 Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time
by Daniel Ingberman - 45-60 The politics of flatland
by Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz - 61-70 The real costs of tuition tax credits
by Edwin West - 71-78 Prison overcrowding
by J. Giertz & Peter Nardulli - 79-86 Economic incentives under contract supply of local government services
by Stephen Mehay & Rodolfo Gonzalez - 87-94 Rent-seeking over time: The continuity of capture
by Wm. Mounts & Clifford Sowell & James Lindley - 95-102 Rent-seeking, noncompensated transfers, and laws of succession: A property rights view
by David Sisk - 103-106 Remorse, elation, and the paradox of voting
by T. Tideman - 107-112 Reviews
by Morgan Reynolds
January 1985, Volume 45, Issue 3
- 241-255 Public choice and three ethical properties of politics
by Joe Oppenheimer - 257-268 Using factions to estimate preference intensity: Improving upon one person/one vote
by Robert Bordley - 269-278 The effects of voter mobility on agenda controllers
by Gary Pecquet - 279-289 Reverse revenue sharing: A modest proposal
by Dwight Lee - 291-302 A local regulator's rewards for conformity in policy
by Eli Noam - 313-331 Ceilings on campaign spending: Hypothesis and partial test with Canadian data
by K. Palda & Kristian Palda
January 1985, Volume 45, Issue 2
- 113-137 On the role of social norms in a market economy
by Gordon Bergsten - 139-153 Interrelationships among public spending preferences: A micro analysis
by James Ferris - 155-173 Causality testing of the popularity function: An empirical investigation for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1971–1982
by Gebhard Kirchgässner - 175-191 Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks
by Eugenia Toma & Mark Toma - 193-195 Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks: Comment
by Arthur Rolnick - 197-198 Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks: Reply
by Eugenia Toma & Mark Toma - 199-206 Some simple geometry of the welfare loss from competitive monopolies
by David Colander - 207-213 Marginal lobbying cost and the optimal amount of rent seeking
by Dwight Lee - 215-219 Federal budget cuts: Bureaucrats trim the meat, not the fat: Comment
by Michael Marlow - 221-222 Federal budget cuts: Rejoinder
by David Laband - 223-224 Review
by Michael Kurth
January 1985, Volume 45, Issue 1
- 3-17 Congressional rationality and spatial voting
by Gregory Brunk - 19-34 Expenditures and votes: In search of downward-sloping curves in the United States and Great Britain
by Alfred Cuzán & Richard Heggen - 35-47 Tax systems and tax shares
by Arthur Denzau & Robert Mackay - 49-71 ‘Putting one over on the boss’: The political economy of strategic behavior in organizations
by Thomas Hammond & Jeffrey Horn - 73-87 Monopoly rent seeking under conditions of uncertainty
by Joseph Jadlow - 89-101 Bureaucracy and the divisibility of local public output
by Rodolfo Gonzalez & Stephen Mehay - 103-103 Follow-up on the review of E.S. Savas' book, Privatizing the public sector: How to shrink government, by L.E. Lomasky (1984), Public Choice 43(2): 217–219
by Dwight Lee - 104-104 The basic facts
by E. Savas - 105-106 Response to E.S. Savas
by Loren Lomasky - 107-111 Reviews
by Philip Coelho & Gordon Tullcok & Gordon Tullock
January 1984, Volume 44, Issue 3
- 397-410 Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences
by Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams - 411-430 The political business cycle under rational voting behavior
by Ulrich Lächler - 431-441 Voting competitions with interested politicians: Platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter
by Ingemar Hansson & Charles Stuart - 443-451 Electoral equilibrium in double member districts
by Gary Cox - 453-456 Can a party represent its constituency?
by Amoz Kats - 457-480 The Canadian constitutional amending formula: Bargaining in the past and the future
by D. Kilgour & Terrence Levesque - 481-500 The spatial distribution of public services: A structural model of voting, educational production, and the government's allocation of educational inputs
by Donald Haurin & H. Gill - 501-505 Philantropic motives and contribution policy: A note
by Joseph Deutsch
January 1984, Volume 44, Issue 2
- 285-296 The economics of choice in the allocation of intergovernmental grants to local authories
by Gershon Alperovich - 297-305 Railway abandonments, cross-subsidies, and the theory of regulation
by William Dougan - 307-337 An economic theory of governability: Choosing policy and optimizing performance
by Mark Lichbach - 339-348 The effect of governmental structure on special district expenditures
by Stephen Mehay - 349-366 Democracy, creeping socialism, and ideological socialism in rent-seeking societies
by Erich Weede - 367-373 Are charities efficient ‘firms’? A preliminary test of the UK charitable sector
by John Cullis & Philip Jones & Constantine Thanassoulas - 375-383 Determinants of local school spending: Some consistent estimates
by Arthur Denzau & Kevin Grier - 385-388 Economic and ideological factors in congressional voting: The 1980 election
by James Kau & Paul Rubin
January 1984, Volume 44, Issue 1
- 1-1 Introduction to the series
by Allan Meltzer & Tomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal - 7-41 The pure theory of large two-candidate elections
by John Ledyard - 49-59 Expectations about voter choices
by Peter Coughlin - 61-102 Rational expectations in elections: some experimental results based on a multidimensional model
by Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook