Efficient rents 3 back to the bog
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00124423
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References listed on IDEAS
- William Corcoran, 1984. "Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 89-94, January.
- William Corcoran & Gordon Karels, 1985. "Efficient rents 1 rent-seeking behavior in the long-run," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 227-246, January.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
- Richard Allard, 1988. "Rent-seeking with non-identical players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 3-14, April.
- George Daly & Thomas Mayor, 1986. "Equity, efficiency and environmental quality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 141-159, January.
- Zhou, J., 2007.
"In Litigation : How Far do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead?,"
Discussion Paper
2007-002, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Zhou, J., 2007. "In Litigation : How Far do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead," Discussion Paper 2007-10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Zhou, J., 2010. "Access to justice : An economic approach," Other publications TiSEM 9d70f451-35c4-4878-92bf-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Douglas Davis & Robert Reilly, 1998.
"Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 89-115, April.
- Davis, Douglas D & Reilly, Robert J, 1998. "Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 89-115, April.
- Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Characterizing equilibrium rent-seeking behavior: A reply to Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 85-87, January.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989.
"Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers,"
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2005. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 411-422, September.
- Alice Guerra & Tatyana Zhuravleva, 2022. "Do women always behave as corruption cleaners?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 173-192, April.
- Edward Millner & Michael Pratt, 1989. "An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 139-151, August.
- Robert Michaels, 1989. "Conjectural variations and the nature of equilibrium in rent-seeking models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 31-39, January.
- Robert Michaels, 1988. "The design of rent-seeking competitions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 17-29, January.
- Dennis C. Mueller, 2016. "Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 112-123, June.
- Gibson, John & Kim, Bonggeun, 2019.
"Quality, quantity, and spatial variation of price: Back to the bog,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 66-77.
- John Gibson & Bonggeun Kim, 2016. "Quality, Quantity and Spatial Variation of Price: Back to the Bog," Working Papers in Economics 16/10, University of Waikato.
- J. Smith & Shlomo Weber, 1989. "Rent-seeking behaviour of retaliating agents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 153-166, May.
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