Content
January 1981, Volume 37, Issue 3
- 531-546 Choice models and voting behaviour: The case of the Dutch electorate
by Fred Bronner & Robert Hoog - 547-558 Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance
by B. Dahlby - 559-568 An empirical assessment of the factor-supplier pressure group hypothesis
by Thomas Dilorenzo - 569-578 The expenditure effects of restricting competition in local public service industries: The case of special districts
by Thomas Dilorenzo - 579-584 Agenda control and budget size: An extension of the Romer-Rosenthal model
by Marilyn Flowers - 585-588 Legislative profits and the rate of change of money wages: A comment
by Chris Goodrich - 589-593 Legislative profits and the rate of change of money wages: A reply
by Manfred Gärtner - 595-601 Government as a super Becker-altruist: A comment
by R. Terrebonne - 603-606 Government as a super Becker-altruist: A reply
by Bruce Bolnick - 607-608 Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control: A comment
by Brian Beavis & Martin Walker - 609-609 Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control: A reply
by Gene Mumy - 611-620 Reviews
by James Buchanan & James Bennett & Carl Dahlman & William Niskanen & Gordon Tullock
January 1981, Volume 37, Issue 2
- 189-204 Why so much stability
by Gordon Tullock - 207-218 The determinants of voting by the National Labor Relations Board on unfair labor practice cases: 1955–1975
by Charles Delorme & R. Hill & Norman Wood - 219-230 Citations as an indicator of classic works and major contributors in social choice
by Paul Downing & Elizabeth Stafford - 231-245 Towards a theory of yes-no voting
by Roger Faith & James Buchanan - 247-260 Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war
by Michael Intriligator & Dagobert Brito - 261-274 The size of government
by James Kau & Paul Rubin - 275-285 Second best and monopoly: A cautionary tale
by Clarence Morrison - 287-305 An essay on the rationality of economic policy: The test-case of the electional cycle
by Martin Paldam - 307-320 Bureaucratic politics and the labor market
by William Peirce - 321-325 Voting with one's feet: A brief note on the case of public welfare and the American Indian
by Leonard Carlson & Richard Cebula - 327-330 A note on the determinants of AFDC policies
by Richard Cebula - 331-335 Conflict of interest and congressional voting: A note
by Henry Chappell - 337-342 Representation of high demand constituencies on review committees: A research note
by Susan Cowart - 343-348 A note on politics and franchise bidding
by Robert Ekelund & Richard Saba - 349-356 The impact of different government units in the regulation of the workplace environment
by Michael Marlow - 357-363 A theory of government enterprise: University Ph. D. production
by David Sisk - 365-370 Revenue sharing and monopoly government: A comment
by David Friedman & Michael Kurth - 371-374 Revenue sharing and monopoly government: A reply
by Richard McKenzie & Robert Staaf - 375-376 The Borda Game: A correction
by Roy Gardner - 377-388 Reviews
by Thomas Willett & D. Laband & Todd Sandler & David Davies & Douglass North
January 1981, Volume 37, Issue 1
- 5-31 The demand for military expenditures: An international comparison
by Leonard Dudley & Claude Montmarquette - 33-39 Comment: The demand for military expenditures: An international comparison
by Thomas Borcherding - 41-59 Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology
by Dagobert Brito & Michael Intriligator - 61-68 Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology
by Robert Mackay - 69-100 Regulation, redistribution, and public choice
by Peter Aranson & Peter Ordeshook - 101-105 Comments on Aranson & Ordeshook's regulation, redistribution, and public choice
by Thomas Moore - 107-132 Legislators, bureaucrats, and locational decisions
by R. Arnold - 133-140 Legislators, bureaucrats and locational decisions and beyond
by Joe Oppenheimer - 141-178 Municipal pension funding: A theory and some evidence
by Dennis Epple & Katherine Schipper - 179-187 "Municipal pension funding: A theory and some evidence" by Dennis Epple and Katherine Schipper
by Robert Inman
January 1981, Volume 36, Issue 3
- 391-412 California school finance: The 1970s decade
by W Stubblebine & David Kennard - 413-423 The post-Proposition 13 environment in California and its consequences for education
by Werner Hirsch - 425-439 Local authority education expenditure in England and Wales: Why standards differ and the impact of government grants
by Richard Jackman & John Papadachi - 449-474 On setting the agenda for Pennsylvania school finance reform: An exercise in giving policy advice
by Robert Inman - 481-507 Imperfect capital markets and the public provision of education
by P. Hare & D. Ulph - 515-532 An equity perspective on community college finance
by Susan Nelson & David Breneman - 537-550 The finance of recurrent education: Some theoretical considerations
by Maurice Peston - 551-571 The role of the state in financing recurrent education: Lessons from European experience
by Howard Glennerster - 573-577 Comments on M. Peston and H. Glennerster
by Mark Blaug - 585-612 The university department as a non-profit labor cooperative
by Estelle James & Egon Neuberger - 619-637 Extra-governmental powers in public schooling: The unions and the courts
by E. West & R. Staaf - 641-645 Comments on E. G. West and R. J. Staaf
by Ronald Ehrenberg - 647-650 Rejoinder
by E. West & R. Staaf
January 1981, Volume 36, Issue 2
- 209-234 Money and votes: A simultaneous equation model
by W. Welch - 235-252 The advantages of contingent valuation methods for benefit-cost analysis
by David Brookshire & Thomas Crocker - 253-271 Political and economic determinants of county government pay
by Bernard Lentz - 273-285 A median voter analysis of variations in the use of property taxes among local governments
by David Sjoquist - 301-312 Campaign contributions and voting on the cargo preference bill: A comparison of simultaneous models
by Henry Chappell - 313-322 Budget-maximizing governmental agencies: An empirical test
by Thomas McGuire - 323-328 Coalitions under demand revealing
by T. Tideman & Gordon Tullock - 329-336 The ‘crowding out’ effect of federal government outlay decisions: An empirical note
by Richard Cebula & Christopher Carlos & James Koch - 337-344 The construction of the demand for public goods and the theory of income redistribution
by Richard McKenzie - 345-349 Daylight Savings: An endogenous law
by James Adams - 351-371 Reviews
by Ulrich Lith & Morgan Reynolds & Joseph Reid & Geoffrey Brennan & Jürgen Backhaus & Gordon Tullock
January 1981, Volume 36, Issue 1
- 3-16 Some advantages of social control: An individualist defense
by Lester Hunt - 17-32 Utility-maximizing behavior in organized anarchies: An empirical investigation of the Breneman thesis
by Fred Thompson - 33-41 The Minister's memos: The re-election issue
by Gareth Locksley - 43-52 An analysis of factors affecting differential assessment legislation
by Rod Ziemer & Fred White & Ivery Clifton - 53-62 The expenditure effects of municipal annexation
by Stephen Mehay - 63-73 The economics of choice in the allocation of Federal grants: An empirical test
by John Gist & R. Hill - 75-87 Pareto optimality as a guide to income redistribution
by E. Pasour - 89-114 Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections
by Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams - 115-134 Strategic decisions under one-stage multi-candidate voting systems
by Samuel Merrill - 135-140 Voting as an act of contribution
by Melvin Hinich - 141-146 The inherent disadvantage of the presidential party in midterm congressional elections
by Randall Calvert & R. Isaac - 147-151 Rank-dominance in income distributions
by Rubin Saposnik - 153-158 A further characterization of Borda ranking method
by Shmuel Nitzan & Ariel Rubinstein - 159-164 Optimally allocating campaign expenditures
by Stuart Nagel - 165-169 Political participation under the unit rule: A research note
by William Collins - 171-177 Politics as a filter
by George Daly - 179-186 The Buchanan-Tullock model: Some extensions
by Milton Kafoglis & Richard Cebula - 187-192 The incentives of regulators: Evidence from banking
by Robert Michaels & Lionel Kalish - 193-194 An approach to empirical measures of voting paradoxes
by John Dobra & Gordon Tullock - 195-196 Mr. Friedman's strictures on Murder at the Margin
by Marshall Jevons - 197-208 Reviews
by Robert Tollison & James Buchanan & Barry Baysinger & Richard Carter & Gordon Tullock
January 1980, Volume 35, Issue 5
- 513-527 Agriculture in development: A coalitional analysis
by Robert Bates & William Rogerson - 529-547 Bureaucratic productivity: The case of agricultural research
by Vernon Ruttan - 549-564 The impact of rational participation models on voting attitudes
by Gregory Brunk - 565-574 The probability-choice perspective in voter decision making models
by Jerome Black - 575-585 Voter turnout and the benefits of voting
by John Filer & Lawrence Kenny - 587-606 A general theory of interpersonal exchange
by Jon Cauley & Todd Sandler - 607-622 Optimal fiscal illusion and the size of government
by E. West & Stanley Winer - 623-631 The influence of state-level economic conditions on presidential elections
by Burton Abrams - 633-635 Reviews
by Israel Kirzner & Gordon Tullock
January 1980, Volume 35, Issue 4
- 385-402 Ambiguity in spatial models of policy formation
by Richard McKelvey - 403-419 Social homogeneity and Condorcet's paradox
by Peter Fishburn & William Gehrlein - 421-436 Preference expression and misrepresentation in points voting schemes
by Shmuel Nitzan & Jacob Paroush & Shlomo Lampert - 437-455 On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
by H. Moulin - 457-468 Running off empty: Run-off point systems
by Jeffrey Richelson - 469-481 Liberal paradox, game equilibrium, and Gibbard optimum
by Friedrich Breyer & Roy Gardner - 483-491 The comparative likelihood of an equivocal outcome under the plurality, Condorcet, and Borda voting procedures
by Raphael Gillett - 493-501 The provision of a public good under Cournot behavior: Stability conditions
by Ralph Frasca - 503-509 Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules
by Allan Feldman - 511-512 Review
by James Bennett
January 1980, Volume 35, Issue 3
- 257-266 Some tests of the factor-supplier pressure group hypothesis
by F. Cummings & Wayne Ruhter - 267-275 The effect of tax elasticity on government spending
by Eleanor Craig & A. Heins - 277-286 Contractarian model of the decline in classical liberalism
by Randall Holcombe - 287-295 The economics of the women's movement
by Janet Hunt & Paul Rubin - 297-313 A bureaucratic theory of regulation
by Richard McKenzie & Hugh Macaulay - 315-331 On the economics of voter turnout in local school elections
by Daniel Rubinfeld & Randall Thomas - 333-348 Bureaucratic responses to tax limitation amendments
by Mark Toma & Eugenia Toma - 349-362 Voting behaviour in a system of concordant democracy
by Heinrich Ursprung - 379-382 Incentives in public decision-making
by Edward Clarke
January 1980, Volume 35, Issue 2
- 129-136 On the evaluation of corporate contributions
by Gerald Keim & Roger Meiners & Louis Frey - 137-143 Corporate contributions: Some additional considerations
by James Bennett & Manuel Johnson - 145-149 The evaluation of corporate contributions: A reply
by Ferdinand Levy & Gloria Shatto - 151-184 Vote trading: An experimental study
by Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook - 185-190 The Electoral College and voter participation rates: An exploratory note
by Richard Cebula & Dennis Murphy - 191-195 Monopolies, market interdependencies and the logic of collective action: some critical comments on Mancur Olson's group theory
by Hersch Fischler - 197-203 On the size of vote trades
by James Enelow - 205-218 Routes and paths of comparison and choice
by Murat Sertel & Alexander Bellen - 219-227 Impossibility results in the axiomatic theory of intertemporal choice
by Edward Packel - 229-239 An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games
by Edward Packel & John Deegan - 241-252 The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism
by Roy Gardner - 253-256 Reviews
by Gordon Tullock & Peter Hill
January 1980, Volume 35, Issue 1
- 3-15 Revenue sharing and local public spending: The Italian experience
by Giorgio Brosio & David Hyman & Walter Santagata - 17-26 Optimal jurisdictions and the economic theory of the state: Or, anarchy and one-world government are only corner solutions
by Laurence Moss - 27-36 Economic competition and political competition: A comment
by William Brown & Gary Santoni - 37-43 Externalities and zoning
by William Fischel - 45-57 Are public goods public goods?
by Jacob Meerman - 59-74 Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control
by Gene Mumy - 75-83 The market for special interest campaign funds: An exploratory approach
by Jonathan Silberman & Gilbert Yochum - 85-95 Efficiency and compensation of public officials
by Uri Ben-Zion & Menahem Spiegel - 97-120 The allocation of political monies: Economic interest groups
by W. Welch - 121-121 Public choice
by Peter Bernholz - 123-127 Reviews
by W. Eecke & Karen Vaughn
September 1979, Volume 34, Issue 3
- 255-269 Federal tax burdens and grant benefits to states: The impact of imperfect representation
by James Bennett & Eddie Mayberry - 271-284 The cost of voting: Its fiscal impact on government
by Robert McCormick & Richard McKenzie - 285-295 Property tax consciousness
by Peter Ordeshook - 297-315 Dynamic models of the voter's decision calculus: Incorporating retrospective considerations into rational-choice models of individual voting behavior
by Martin Zechman - 317-331 Local fiscal crises and intergovernmental grants: A suggested hypothesis
by Roger Faith - 333-357 Budget-maximizing agencies and efficiency in government
by Thomas McGuire & Michael Coiner & Larry Spancake - 359-363 Non-monetary competition for students within the university
by John Lewis & T. Cott - 365-380 Legislative profits and the rate of change of money wages: A graphical exposition
by Manfred Gärtner - 381-397 The expenditure effects of alternative public supply institutions
by Robert Deacon - 399-418 The electoral lottery: Decisions to run for Congress
by Linda Fowler - 419-434 Outcomes of logrolling in the bargaining set and democratic theory: Some conjectures
by Joe Oppenheimer - 435-461 Some aspects of the political economy of election campaign contribution laws
by Peter Aranson & Melvin Hinich - 463-466 A note on the optimal use of clearance procedures
by David Weimer - 467-471 Bureaucracy and grants-in-aid
by Joseph Magaddino & Roger Meiners - 473-479 Coupon rationing and rent-seeking bureaucrats
by Marilyn Flowers & Richard Stroup - 481-491 On the mutuality of interests between bureaus and high demand review committees: A perverse result
by Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver - 493-498 Complexity as a characteristic of policies in Albert Breton's economic theory of representative government
by Lawrence Bezeau - 499-504 Government as a super Becker-altruist
by Bruce Bolnick - 505-507 A further note on migration patterns and local government policy toward public education
by Anthony Ostrosky
June 1979, Volume 34, Issue 2
- 141-156 A simple direction model of electoral competition
by Steven Matthews - 157-175 Vote trading in a legislative context: An analysis of cooperative and noncooperative strategic voting
by James Enelow & David Koehler - 177-188 Nonmanipulable multi-valued social decision functions
by Allan Feldman - 189-200 Abstention in two-candidate and three-candidate elections when voters use mixed strategies
by Bernard Grofman - 201-215 Electoral College reform and the distribution of voting power
by Douglas Blair - 217-230 Proportional and progressive income taxation with utility-maximizing governments
by James Buchanan & Roger Congleton - 231-232 On the appeal (or is it repeal?) of minimum wage laws: A reply to Browning
by Frank Steindl - 233-254 Reviews
by David Friedman & Alan Waters & John Moore & Bernard Lentz & Gordon Tullock
March 1979, Volume 34, Issue 1
- 5-14 Rent-seeking competition in political parties
by Robert McCormick & Robert Tollison - 45-54 Public interest lobbies: membership and influence
by James Kau & Paul Rubin - 55-63 Public versus private provision of collective goods and services: garbage collection revisited
by James Bennett & Manuel Johnson - 69-85 The effect of electoral rules on voting behavior: the electoral college and shift voting
by Richard Bensel & M. Sanders - 87-97 Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous
by Ehud Kalai & Eitan Muller & Mark Satterthwaite - 99-116 Class conflict and fairness in “democratic capitalism”
by Yvo Dirickx & Murat Sertel - 117-122 The impact of institutional structures on city-country consolidation outcomes
by Mark Toma - 123-127 Pareto-optimality and gains-form-trade: a public choice interpretation
by Charles Rowley & Martin Walker - 129-130 Living costs, the Tiebout hypothesis, and welfare policy
by Richard Cebula
December 1978, Volume 33, Issue 4
- 5-26 Pigouvian policies in closed behavioral systems
by Peter Aranson & Terry Ferrar & Peter Sassone - 27-43 Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
by Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal - 45-65 Testing political economy’s ‘as if’ proposition: is the median income voter really decisive?
by Robert Inman - 67-83 The right to vote no: revising the voting system and resuscitating the F-Y voter
by Francisco Arcelus & Gary Mauser & Z. Spindler - 85-96 State tax structure and the supply of AFDC assistance
by Hugh Spall - 97-113 A collective goods model of pluralist political systems
by John Chamberlin - 115-130 Agency budgets and the use of eligibility rules
by Robin Walther & Jeffrey Chapman - 131-134 A note on nonwhite migration: welfare levels and the political process: a comment
by S. Jones-Hendrickson - 135-136 Nonwhite migration, welfare, and politics: a re-examination
by Richard Cebula
January 1978, Volume 33, Issue 3
- 5-13 Cycles in senatorial voting behavior: implications for the optimal frequency of elections
by Ryan Amacher & William Boyes - 15-26 An economic analysis of the voting on Michigan's tax and expenditure limitation amendment
by Steve Mariotti - 27-44 The rational voter: an analysis of two Atlanta referenda on rapid transit
by Larry Schroeder & David Sjoquist - 45-63 Constitutional guarantees and the distribution of power and wealth
by Jürgen Backhaus - 65-82 On the stability of logrolling outcomes in stochastic games
by Peter Bernholz - 83-92 Campaign spending and votes: a reconsideration
by R. Johnston - 93-97 Revenue sharing and monopoly government
by Richard McKenzie & Robert Staaf - 99-106 Election periods and state tax policy cycles
by John Mikesell - 107-111 Donor optimization and the food stamp program: comment
by Edgar Browning - 113-117 On the political economy of food stamps
by J. Giertz & Dennis Sullivan - 119-123 A note on providing public goods through voluntary contributions
by Clarence Morrison - 125-127 An alternative campaign finance reform: public “laundries” for secret cash contributions
by John Beck - 129-133 Reviews
by Robert Tollison & Barry Keating & James Buchanan
September 1978, Volume 33, Issue 2
- 5-16 A linear inequality method of establishing certain social choice conjectures
by J. Chamberlin & M. Cohen - 17-31 An economic approach to social choice — II
by Theodore Bergstrom & Trout Rader