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Rent-seeking, distributional coalitions, taxes, relative prices and economic growth

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  • Richard Vedder
  • Lowell Gallaway

Abstract

The results clearly indicate that much of the considerable variation in the pace and pattern of economic growth between the various American states is explainable by institutional arrangements amenable to revisions through public policy. The findings suggest that long run economic growth would be best served by constraining distributional coalitions, be it through constitutional restraints (e.g., balanced budget amendments, the item veto), statutory changes (e.g., subjecting coalitions like labor unions to the antitrust laws), or some other means (e.g., labor and capital fleeing distributional coalitions, such as in the movement of workers and plants to nonunion areas). Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Vedder & Lowell Gallaway, 1986. "Rent-seeking, distributional coalitions, taxes, relative prices and economic growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 93-100, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:51:y:1986:i:1:p:93-100
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00141689
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Erich Weede, 1990. "Ideas, Institutions and Political Culture in Western Development," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 369-389, October.
    2. Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2014. "Interest Groups and the “Rise and Decline” of Growth," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 435-456, October.
    3. Caporale, Tony & Leirer, Jonathan, 2010. "Take the money and run: Political turnover, rent-seeking and economic growth," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 406-412, November.
    4. Richard Vedder & Lowell Gallaway & David Sollars, 1988. "The Tullock-Bastiat hypothesis, inequality-transfer curve and the natural distribution of income," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 285-294, March.
    5. Cole, Ismail M., 2014. "Short- and long-term growth effects of special interest groups in the U.S. states: A dynamic panel error-correction approach," MPRA Paper 54455, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Mar 2014.
    6. Joshua Hall & Jason E. Taylor, 2016. "Introduction: Unintended Consequences of Government Intervention," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 36(1), pages 1-6, Winter.
    7. Theresa Hager, 2020. "Special Interest Groups and Growth: A Meta-Analysis of Mancur Olsons Theory," ICAE Working Papers 116, Johannes Kepler University, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy.
    8. Ismail M. Cole, 2015. "Interest group activity and economic growth: some new evidence from the US states," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(10), pages 825-829, July.
    9. Boltho, Andrea & King, Robert, 1990. "Does high technology matter? An application to United States regional growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 547, The World Bank.
    10. Daniel L. Bennet, 2016. "Subnational Economic Freedom and Performance in the United States and Canada," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 36(1), pages 165-185, Winter.
    11. Jac C. Heckelman, 2007. "Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 Years," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 18-33, July.

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