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Why so much stability? The impact of agency determined stability

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  • Jeffrey Hill

Abstract

In this article, I have shown that institutionally induced stability models can be expanded to incorporate the role of implementing agencies acting in conjunction with the legislature. By so extending stability models, inferences can be made on agency behavior as well as on legislative behavior. In particular, the expanded model can be used to show how the two actors together determine the ultimate location of stable policies. Coalition building considerations, jurisdictional limitations, and the other customs and institutional considerations that restrict the legislature's policy space, make it possible for committees to produce a stable policy mandate. But, these stability inducing arrangements do not directly apply to agencies. The policy mandate constrains but does not completely restrict the area of the policy space open to the agency. Thus, legislative structures do not, in and of themselves, induce stable policy outcomes. Legislative policy mandates are changed and defined by the acts of the implementing agency in its role as a non-voting, decision making actor in the policy process. Endless cycling by the agency among possible implementation points is prevented by the agency's organizational goal of a stable environment. I suggest, then, that legislative arrangements acting in conjunction with an agency executive's need to create a certain, regular, and predictable environment, lead to the creation of an agency determined stability. While the model implies an agency has some latitude over policy decisions, it does not imply agencies dominate legislatures. Decision making is a function of both the legislature and the agency, with the legislature as a whole having authority over the agency. Indeed, policy latitude is possible only because agency executives are able to alter outcomes in a manner that increases individual legislator utility. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Hill, 1985. "Why so much stability? The impact of agency determined stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 275-287, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:46:y:1985:i:3:p:275-287
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124425
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    2. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    4. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dieter Schmidtchen & Bernard Steunenberg, "undated". "European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1040, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    2. John Brehm & Scott Gates, 1994. "When Supervision Fails to Induce Compliance," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 323-343, July.
    3. Emanuela Todeva, 2010. "Theoretical tensions between regulation, governance, and strategic behaviour in a federated world order," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 37(10), pages 784-801, August.
    4. Dennis C. Mueller, 2016. "Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 112-123, June.

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