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The specification of models of campaign finance

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  • James Kau
  • Paul Rubin

Abstract

Simultaneous models exist in the literature with specifications preferable to those used in either of these papers. The more complete models are of course still subject to improvement. The measure of ideology used by Poole and Romer would probably be such an improvement. Identification of a variable which would remove the anomalous result discussed by Jacobson would also greatly improve our understanding of the political process. It may be that a radically new approach to estimation will supplant these models. However, as long as scholars continue to perform estimations of equations such as those presented in (1a) - (1c) above, it is incumbent upon them to use the most complete specification available in the literature; using less complete specifications may sometimes enable us to answer specific, relatively narrow questions, but such specifications will not advance our fundamental understanding of the political process. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

Suggested Citation

  • James Kau & Paul Rubin, 1985. "The specification of models of campaign finance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 113-119, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:47:y:1985:i:1:p:113-119
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00119354
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James B. Kau & Donald Keenan & Paul H. Rubin, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(2), pages 271-293.
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