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May 1989, Volume 61, Issue 2
- 101-113 A general probabilistic spatial theory of elections
by James Enelow & Melvin Hinich - 115-125 The median voter model in public choice theory
by Randall Holcombe - 127-140 Niskanen effects in the California Community Colleges
by Shirley Kress - 141-152 On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option
by Dwight Lee & Todd Sandler - 153-166 Rent-seeking behaviour of retaliating agents
by J. Smith & Shlomo Weber - 167-169 Nuclear consequences of the welfare state revisited: Danger in the data
by Robert Ayanian - 171-176 Welfare policies and migration of the poor in the United States: An empirical note
by Richard Cebula & James Koch - 177-181 The Tullock-Bastiat hypothesis and Rawlsian distribution strategies
by Lowell Gallaway & Richard Vedder - 183-186 Production costs and deregulation
by John Lott & Morgan Reynolds - 187-192 Constitutional order in a federal republic
by Richard Wagner
April 1989, Volume 61, Issue 1
- 1-13 The selection of public utility commissioners: A re-examination of the importance of institutional setting
by William Boyes & John McDowell - 15-27 A theory of leadership and deference in constitutional construction
by James Buchanan & Viktor Vanberg - 29-39 Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not
by Amihai Glazer & Bernard Grofman - 41-74 Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution
by Timur Kuran - 75-96 Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians
by John Lott & W. Reed - 97-98 Superdissipation
by Robert Tollison
March 1989, Volume 60, Issue 3
- 201-210 The Calculus of Consent: Enduring contributions to public choice and political science
by William Mitchell - 211-239 Disposable income, unemployment, inflation and state spending in a dynamic political-economic model
by F. Ploeg - 241-257 Putting the puzzle together: Why people join public interest groups
by Lawrence Rothenberg - 259-282 Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior
by Arthur Schram & Frans Winden - 283-291 Earmarking as a deterrent to rent-seeking
by Thomas Wyrick & Roger Arnold - 293-298 Reviews
by Vincent Ostrom & Viktor Vanberg & Robert Tollison
February 1989, Volume 60, Issue 2
- 101-111 A test for pure or apparent ideology in congressional voting
by Michael Davis & Philip Porter - 113-121 Rent-seeking in arts policy
by William Grampp - 123-132 The stability of stated preferences for public goods: Evidence from recent budget games
by Hans Groot & Evert Pommer - 133-144 Rent-seeking for budgetary allocation: Preliminary results for 20 countries
by Eliakim Katz & Jacob Rosenberg - 145-154 Representative versus direct democracy: Are there any expenditure differences?
by Rexford Santerre - 155-175 Plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates
by Stephen Wright & William Riker - 177-184 Equilibrium employment of inputs by a rent-seeking firm
by David Levy - 185-191 Constituencies, ideology, and the demand for abortion legislation
by Marshall Medoff - 193-199 Reviews
by Randall Holcombe & P. Hill & Randy Simmons
January 1989, Volume 60, Issue 1
- 3-29 The rationally uninformed electorate: Some experimental evidence
by Kenneth Collier & Peter Ordeshook & Kenneth Williams - 31-39 Conjectural variations and the nature of equilibrium in rent-seeking models
by Robert Michaels - 41-54 Public employees in political firms: Part B. Civil service and militancy
by Joseph Reid & Michael Kurth - 55-70 The paradox of politics and policy in redistributing income
by Gerald Scully & D. Slottje - 71-85 The public's indifference map between inflation and unemployment: Empirical evidence for the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan presidencies
by David Smyth & Pami Dua - 87-92 Budget deficits and interest rates in the United States
by Kanhaya Gupta - 93-97 More on budget deficits and interest rates in the United States
by Richard Cebula
December 1988, Volume 59, Issue 3
- 205-214 The use of inputs by the Federal Reserve System: An extended model
by Stuart Allen & Donald McCrickard & Phillip Cartwright & Charles Delorme - 215-224 Rent-seeking and second best economics
by Mahmudul Anam & Eliakim Katz - 225-238 Fiscal expansion and political instability in the Iberic-Latin region
by Alfred Cuzán & Stephanie Moussalli & Charles Bundrick - 239-252 Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making
by Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman - 253-262 Public employees in political firms: Part A. The patronage era
by Joseph Reid & Michael Kurth - 263-275 Antitrust actions and the budgeting process
by Bruce Yandle - 277-285 Expenditures and receipts in state and local government finances: Comment
by Abdur Chowdhury - 287-290 Expenditures and receipts in state and local government finances: Reply
by Michael Marlow & Neela Manage
November 1988, Volume 59, Issue 2
- 101-120 The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems
by Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen - 121-131 The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
by Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn & Samuel Merrill - 133-147 Is approval voting an ‘unmitigated evil’?: A response to Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill
by Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen - 151-165 Proportional representation: An empirical evaluation of single-stage, non-ranked voting procedures
by Amnon Rapoport & Dan Felsenthal & Zeev Maoz - 167-176 The Borda count in n-dimensional issue space
by Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman - 177-194 Is vote-selling desirable?
by Jeffrey Weiss - 195-202 The distribution of income, incomplete information and the rank and Pareto criteria
by Rubin Saposnik
October 1988, Volume 59, Issue 1
- 3-23 A public choice theory of the great contraction
by Gary Anderson & William Shughart & Robert Tollison - 25-36 Rent-seeking and optimal regulation in replenishable resource industries
by Eliakim Katz & J. Smith - 37-50 Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk
by Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman & Nicholas Miller - 51-66 Theory of competitive regulatory equilibrium
by John Goodman & Philip Porter - 67-82 Alterable electorates in the context of residential mobility
by Alain Mingat & Pierre Salmon - 83-87 The lemon principle, democratic politics, and Frank Knight's First Law of Talk
by William Kern - 89-94 Constitutional changes in the FASB: A note
by Timothy Sutton
September 1988, Volume 58, Issue 3
- 201-216 When votes are words not deeds: Some evidence from the Nuclear Freeze Referendum
by Susan Feigenbaum & Lynn Karoly & David Levy - 217-235 On the theory of political competition: Comparative statics from a general allocative perspective
by Paul Johnson - 237-245 Controlling leviathan through tax reduction
by Michael Marlow & William Orzechowski - 247-257 In search of efficacious executive veto authority
by David Schap - 259-268 Political parties, campaign contributions and discrimination
by Al Wilhite - 269-275 The social cost of rent-seeking: First estimates
by David Laband & John Sophocleus - 277-284 Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies: Comment
by Peter Saunders - 285-294 Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies: Reply
by Michael Marlow - 295-296 Reviews
by Gordon Tullock
August 1988, Volume 58, Issue 2
- 101-122 The Congress and fiscal policy
by Janet Pack - 123-141 The political economy of development: A cross-national causality test of development-democracy-growth hypothesis
by Abbas Pourgerami - 143-159 Who are the volunteers in the battle against budget deficits?
by Martin Prachowny - 161-167 Limitations of the spatial model
by Amihai Glazer & Bernard Grofman - 169-172 Tariff-revenue transfers to protectionist interests: Compensation for reduced protection or supplementary reward for successful lobbying?
by Arye Hillman - 173-185 Rent-seeking and market structure: Comment
by Russell Pittman - 187-191 Market structure and campaign contributions: Does concentration matter? A reply
by Asghar Zardkoohi - 193-200 Reviews
by Mark Sproule-Jones & Michael Crew & Richard Musgrave
July 1988, Volume 58, Issue 1
- 3-20 Budget makers as agents: A preliminar investigation of discretionary behavior under state-contingent rewards
by G. Choate & Fred Thompson - 21-34 Looking for leverage in PAC markets: Corporate and labor contributions considered
by Gerald Keim & Asghar Zardkoohi - 35-44 Estimating property tax base elasticity over time: Evidence on the revenue maximizing politician
by William Stine - 45-71 Political liberty and social development: An empirical investigation
by Frank Vorhies & Fred Glahe - 73-78 Televising legislatures: Some thoughts on whether politicians are search goods
by Gertrud Fremling & John Lott - 79-84 The impact of sunset review: A study of real estate licensing
by Mary Marvel - 85-90 The relative restrictiveness of tariffs and quotas: A reinterpretation from a rent-seeking perspective
by Richard McKenzie - 91-94 Crowding out, deficits, and interest rates: Comment
by Lee Spector & T. Cott - 95-97 Crowding out, deficits, and interest rates: Reply
by Richard Cebula - 99-100 Review
by L. Wade
June 1988, Volume 57, Issue 3
- 201-212 Municipal utilities and local public finance: A simultaneous model
by Kevin Deno & Stephen Mehay - 213-232 Explaining the growth of government in Sweden: A disequilibrium approach
by Magnus Henrekson & Johan Lybeck - 233-245 Tax structure and the size of government: An empirical analysis of the fiscal illusion and fiscal stress arguments
by Walter Misiolek & Harold Elder - 247-257 The place of political science in public choice
by William Riker - 259-274 Political instability and economic fluctuations in the Republic of Korea
by Byung Soh - 275-279 Understanding and cooperation in social dilemmas
by David Goetze & John Orbell - 281-286 Does ideology matter?: Anecdotal experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods
by Stuart Mestelman & David Feeny - 287-294 Symbol versus substance in legislative activity: The case of illegal immigration
by H. Moehring - 295-296 Review
by Mwangi Kimenyi
May 1988, Volume 57, Issue 2
- 101-113 The politicization of market failure
by James Buchanan & Viktor Vanberg - 115-126 X-efficiency, rent-seeking and social costs
by John Formby & James Keeler & Paul Thistle - 127-139 Voting for ‘Sin’ in Kansas
by Philip Hersch & Gerald McDougall - 141-154 Intergovernmental grants and successful tax limitation referenda
by Dennis Leyden - 155-173 Democracy, dictatorship and decision costs
by Karol Sołltan - 175-182 Monetary policy and presidential elections: A nonpartisan political cycle
by David Hakes - 183-186 Transactions costs and production in a legislative setting
by David Laband - 187-192 A rational choice model of citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral activities
by Barbara Norrander & Bernard Grofman
April 1988, Volume 57, Issue 1
- 3-14 Rent-seeking with non-identical players
by Richard Allard - 15-24 The costs of rent seeking: A metaphysical problem
by Gordon Tullock - 25-37 Public finance in autocratic process: An empirical note
by Gary Anderson - 39-47 Rational voting applied to choice of taxes
by J. Biegeleisen & David Sjoquist - 49-67 Toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation
by Michael Crew & Charles Rowley - 69-77 Buying misery with federal land
by Richard Stroup - 79-83 An empirical extension of the municipal monopoly model to provision of community infrastructure
by Chris Fawson & Gary Giroux - 85-88 The return of the Native: The supply elasticity of the American Indian population 1960–1980
by Bernard Grofman & Michael Migalski - 89-93 Transactions costs and the controversial good or service
by Robert Kohn
March 1988, Volume 56, Issue 3
- 201-212 Laissez-faire in campaign finance
by W. Crain & Robert Tollison & Donald Leavens - 213-231 The median voter, setters, and non-repeated construction bond issues
by Rodney Fort - 233-247 Are people who cooperate ‘rational altruists’?
by Alphons Kragt & Robyn Dawes & John Orbell - 249-258 Financing the unemployment insurance system and the interest group theory of government
by Michael Maloney & Rob McGregor - 259-269 Fiscal decentralization and government size
by Michael Marlow - 271-284 Bureaucracy and the ‘publicness’ of local public goods
by Paul Wyckoff - 285-294 The Tullock-Bastiat hypothesis, inequality-transfer curve and the natural distribution of income
by Richard Vedder & Lowell Gallaway & David Sollars - 295-298 On the political participation of the firm in the electoral process: An update
by Michael Munger
February 1988, Volume 56, Issue 2
- 101-119 Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science
by William Mitchell - 121-130 State government purchases in a federalist economy
by Steven Craig & Joel Sailors - 131-152 Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government
by Charlotte Twight - 153-166 The Calculus of consent: A Wicksellian retrospective
by Richard Wagner - 167-180 Regulators, legislators and budget manipulation
by Bruce Yandle - 181-184 Evaluating rent-seeking losses: Do the welfare gains of lobbyists count?
by Roger Congleton - 185-192 The economic model of voter participation: A further test
by Tikva Darvish & Jacob Rosenberg - 193-200 Government and economic growth: A non-linear relationship
by Philip Grossman
January 1988, Volume 56, Issue 1
- 3-16 Rent seekers who demand government production: Bureaucratic output and the price of complements
by Bruce Benson & Jean Mitchell - 17-29 The design of rent-seeking competitions
by Robert Michaels - 31-43 Is political rivalry an incentive to vote?
by Henri Capron & Jean-Louis Kruseman - 45-55 A forecasting model for state expenditures
by Jane Leuthold - 57-67 Political competition and the Roman Catholic schools: Ontario, Canada
by Michael McKee - 69-72 Representative versus direct democracy a Tiebout test of relative performance: Comment
by Steven Deller & David Chicoine - 73-76 Representative versus direct democracy a Tiebout test of relative performance: Reply
by Rexford Santerre - 89-96 Morals by agreement
by Frank Forman
October 1987, Volume 55, Issue 3
- 199-213 How (and why) Congress twists its own arm: The political economy of tax-funded politics
by James Bennett & Thomas Dilorenzo - 215-226 The fairness of discounting: A majority rule approach
by S. Brown - 227-244 On the pricing and benefit structure of a private club or public utility
by Winston Chang & Lawrence Southwick - 257-264 Institutional structure, finance, and race in higher education: Public-private sectoral differences
by G. Sav - 265-272 Bureaucracy and the divisibility of local public output: Further econometric evidence
by N. Vasudeva Murthy - 273-289 Auctions, experiments and contingent valuation
by Robin Gregory & Lita Furby - 291-297 Markets and the measurement of value
by Don Coursey
September 1987, Volume 55, Issue 1
- 1-3 Introduction
by Allan Meltzer & Keith Poole & Thomas Romer - 5-34 The lessons of 1787
by William Riker - 35-39 Comment on the Riker paper
by Douglass North - 41-73 Cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting
by Dennis Epple & Michael Riordan - 75-79 A comment on the Epple and Riordan paper
by Edward Green - 81-119 Reputation and legislative leadership
by Randall Calvert - 121-126 Comment on the Calvert paper
by Daniel Ingberman - 127-160 Bureaucratic corruption as a constraint on voter choice
by Leonard Dudley & Claude Montmarquette - 161-162 Comments on the Dudley and Montmarquette paper
by Edwin Mills - 163-187 A public and private-choice model of broadcasting
by Eli Noam - 189-198 The economics and political economy of broadcasting: challenges in developing an analytic foundation
by Steven Garber
August 1987, Volume 54, Issue 3
- 197-210 Rational, adaptive and learning behavior of voters: Evidence from disaggregated popularity functions for Sweden
by Lars Jonung & Eskil Wadensjö - 211-230 The determinants of the choice between public and private production of a publicly funded service
by Robert McGuire & Robert Ohsfeldt & T. Cott - 231-259 The political policy cycle: Presidential effort vs. presidential control
by Janet Pack - 261-276 The distribution of income in a despotic society
by D. Usher & M. Engineer - 277-281 Agency audits and congressional oversight: The impact of state tax burdens on GAO audit requests
by David Willison - 283-288 In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’: A comment
by Michael Brooks - 289-290 In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’: Reply
by Richard Cebula & Milton Kafoglis - 291-297 A theorem on the existence of zones of initiation and deterrence in Intriligator-Brito arms race models
by Murray Wolfson
January 1987, Volume 54, Issue 2
- 101-121 Your vote counts on account of the way it is counted: An institutional solution to the paradox of not voting
by Thomas Schwartz - 123-139 Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting
by David Austen-Smith - 141-169 A test of the revealed-preference phenomenon in congressional elections
by Larry Samuelson - 171-185 A theory of the spoils system
by Roy Gardner - 187-190 An extension of Black's theorem on voting orders to the successive procedure
by Richard Niemi & Bjørn Rasch - 191-193 A note on Nanson's rule
by Emerson Niou
January 1987, Volume 54, Issue 1
- 3-18 Government, special interest groups, and economic growth
by John McCallum & André Blais - 19-25 The textile bill of 1985: The determinants of congressional voting patterns
by Suzanne Tosini & Edward Tower - 27-39 The flypaper effect and competition in the local market for public goods
by Mark Schneider & Byung Ji - 41-62 Federal advisory commissions in an economic model of representative democracy
by William McEachern - 63-82 Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders
by Arye Hillman & Dov Samet - 85-87 Characterizing equilibrium rent-seeking behavior: A reply to Tullock
by Arye Hillman & Dov Samet - 89-96 The institutional arrangement of public education: The puzzle of exclusive territories
by John Lott
January 1987, Volume 53, Issue 3
- 201-219 Median voters, political systems and public policies: An empirical test
by George Boyne - 221-229 Voting and not voting at the same time
by W. Crain & Donald Leavens & Lynn Abbot - 231-242 The rational behavior theory of voting participation: Evidence from the 1970 and 1982 elections
by Garey Durden & Patricia Gaynor - 243-255 Expenditures and receipts: Testing for causality in state and local government finances
by Michael Marlow & Neela Manage - 257-265 A note on senatorial mass mailing expenditure and the quest for reelection
by John Mikesell - 267-276 Labor PAC contributions and labor legislation: A simultaneous logit approach
by Allen Wilhite & John Theilmann - 277-284 Distant friends and nearby enemies: The politics of legislative coalition formation
by Thomas Hammond & Gary Miller - 285-287 Externalities, agency structure, and the level of transfers
by John Lott - 289-296 Public employees' consumption of government goods: The case of education
by Eugenia Toma & James Long
January 1987, Volume 53, Issue 2
- 101-130 Retrospective voting: An experimental study
by Kenneth Collier & Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook & Kenneth Williams - 131-147 The optimal size of government
by Philip Grossman - 149-165 The tradeoff between equality and efficiency: Short-run politics and long-run realities
by Dwight Lee - 167-174 The growth of government: A protection explanation
by Michael Bordo & Daniel Landau - 181-186 Political accountability for price stability and unemployment in a multi-party system with coalition governments
by Paul Renaud & Frans Winden - 187-192 Altruism as a source of self-interested behavior
by Robert Schenk
January 1987, Volume 53, Issue 1
- 3-20 The cameralists: A public choice perspective
by Juergen Backhaus & Richard Wagner - 21-39 Legislative ratings as a metric of goal cohesion within interest groups: Business vs. labor
by C. Hetzner & Stu Westin - 41-51 Statutory changes in state income taxes: An indirect test of fiscal illusion
by William Hunter & Charles Scott - 53-78 Chameleon voters and public choice
by Timur Kuran - 79-95 Notes on the mass media as an economic institution
by Daniel Orr - 97-100 Federal deficits and the real rate of interest in the United States: A note
by Richard Cebula
January 1987, Volume 52, Issue 3
- 201-213 Explaining differences in state growth: Catching up versus Olson
by Clark Nardinelli & Myles Wallace & John Warner