Content
October 1988, Volume 59, Issue 1
- 67-82 Alterable electorates in the context of residential mobility
by Alain Mingat & Pierre Salmon - 83-87 The lemon principle, democratic politics, and Frank Knight's First Law of Talk
by William Kern - 89-94 Constitutional changes in the FASB: A note
by Timothy Sutton
September 1988, Volume 58, Issue 3
- 201-216 When votes are words not deeds: Some evidence from the Nuclear Freeze Referendum
by Susan Feigenbaum & Lynn Karoly & David Levy - 217-235 On the theory of political competition: Comparative statics from a general allocative perspective
by Paul Johnson - 237-245 Controlling leviathan through tax reduction
by Michael Marlow & William Orzechowski - 247-257 In search of efficacious executive veto authority
by David Schap - 259-268 Political parties, campaign contributions and discrimination
by Al Wilhite - 269-275 The social cost of rent-seeking: First estimates
by David Laband & John Sophocleus - 277-284 Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies: Comment
by Peter Saunders - 285-294 Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies: Reply
by Michael Marlow - 295-296 Reviews
by Gordon Tullock
August 1988, Volume 58, Issue 2
- 101-122 The Congress and fiscal policy
by Janet Pack - 123-141 The political economy of development: A cross-national causality test of development-democracy-growth hypothesis
by Abbas Pourgerami - 143-159 Who are the volunteers in the battle against budget deficits?
by Martin Prachowny - 161-167 Limitations of the spatial model
by Amihai Glazer & Bernard Grofman - 169-172 Tariff-revenue transfers to protectionist interests: Compensation for reduced protection or supplementary reward for successful lobbying?
by Arye Hillman - 173-185 Rent-seeking and market structure: Comment
by Russell Pittman - 187-191 Market structure and campaign contributions: Does concentration matter? A reply
by Asghar Zardkoohi - 193-200 Reviews
by Mark Sproule-Jones & Michael Crew & Richard Musgrave
July 1988, Volume 58, Issue 1
- 3-20 Budget makers as agents: A preliminar investigation of discretionary behavior under state-contingent rewards
by G. Choate & Fred Thompson - 21-34 Looking for leverage in PAC markets: Corporate and labor contributions considered
by Gerald Keim & Asghar Zardkoohi - 35-44 Estimating property tax base elasticity over time: Evidence on the revenue maximizing politician
by William Stine - 45-71 Political liberty and social development: An empirical investigation
by Frank Vorhies & Fred Glahe - 73-78 Televising legislatures: Some thoughts on whether politicians are search goods
by Gertrud Fremling & John Lott - 79-84 The impact of sunset review: A study of real estate licensing
by Mary Marvel - 85-90 The relative restrictiveness of tariffs and quotas: A reinterpretation from a rent-seeking perspective
by Richard McKenzie - 91-94 Crowding out, deficits, and interest rates: Comment
by Lee Spector & T. Cott - 95-97 Crowding out, deficits, and interest rates: Reply
by Richard Cebula - 99-100 Review
by L. Wade
June 1988, Volume 57, Issue 3
- 201-212 Municipal utilities and local public finance: A simultaneous model
by Kevin Deno & Stephen Mehay - 213-232 Explaining the growth of government in Sweden: A disequilibrium approach
by Magnus Henrekson & Johan Lybeck - 233-245 Tax structure and the size of government: An empirical analysis of the fiscal illusion and fiscal stress arguments
by Walter Misiolek & Harold Elder - 247-257 The place of political science in public choice
by William Riker - 259-274 Political instability and economic fluctuations in the Republic of Korea
by Byung Soh - 275-279 Understanding and cooperation in social dilemmas
by David Goetze & John Orbell - 281-286 Does ideology matter?: Anecdotal experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods
by Stuart Mestelman & David Feeny - 287-294 Symbol versus substance in legislative activity: The case of illegal immigration
by H. Moehring - 295-296 Review
by Mwangi Kimenyi
May 1988, Volume 57, Issue 2
- 101-113 The politicization of market failure
by James Buchanan & Viktor Vanberg - 115-126 X-efficiency, rent-seeking and social costs
by John Formby & James Keeler & Paul Thistle - 127-139 Voting for ‘Sin’ in Kansas
by Philip Hersch & Gerald McDougall - 141-154 Intergovernmental grants and successful tax limitation referenda
by Dennis Leyden - 155-173 Democracy, dictatorship and decision costs
by Karol Sołltan - 175-182 Monetary policy and presidential elections: A nonpartisan political cycle
by David Hakes - 183-186 Transactions costs and production in a legislative setting
by David Laband - 187-192 A rational choice model of citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral activities
by Barbara Norrander & Bernard Grofman
April 1988, Volume 57, Issue 1
- 3-14 Rent-seeking with non-identical players
by Richard Allard - 15-24 The costs of rent seeking: A metaphysical problem
by Gordon Tullock - 25-37 Public finance in autocratic process: An empirical note
by Gary Anderson - 39-47 Rational voting applied to choice of taxes
by J. Biegeleisen & David Sjoquist - 49-67 Toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation
by Michael Crew & Charles Rowley - 69-77 Buying misery with federal land
by Richard Stroup - 79-83 An empirical extension of the municipal monopoly model to provision of community infrastructure
by Chris Fawson & Gary Giroux - 85-88 The return of the Native: The supply elasticity of the American Indian population 1960–1980
by Bernard Grofman & Michael Migalski - 89-93 Transactions costs and the controversial good or service
by Robert Kohn
March 1988, Volume 56, Issue 3
- 201-212 Laissez-faire in campaign finance
by W. Crain & Robert Tollison & Donald Leavens - 213-231 The median voter, setters, and non-repeated construction bond issues
by Rodney Fort - 233-247 Are people who cooperate ‘rational altruists’?
by Alphons Kragt & Robyn Dawes & John Orbell - 249-258 Financing the unemployment insurance system and the interest group theory of government
by Michael Maloney & Rob McGregor - 259-269 Fiscal decentralization and government size
by Michael Marlow - 271-284 Bureaucracy and the ‘publicness’ of local public goods
by Paul Wyckoff - 285-294 The Tullock-Bastiat hypothesis, inequality-transfer curve and the natural distribution of income
by Richard Vedder & Lowell Gallaway & David Sollars - 295-298 On the political participation of the firm in the electoral process: An update
by Michael Munger
February 1988, Volume 56, Issue 2
- 101-119 Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science
by William Mitchell - 121-130 State government purchases in a federalist economy
by Steven Craig & Joel Sailors - 131-152 Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government
by Charlotte Twight - 153-166 The Calculus of consent: A Wicksellian retrospective
by Richard Wagner - 167-180 Regulators, legislators and budget manipulation
by Bruce Yandle - 181-184 Evaluating rent-seeking losses: Do the welfare gains of lobbyists count?
by Roger Congleton - 185-192 The economic model of voter participation: A further test
by Tikva Darvish & Jacob Rosenberg - 193-200 Government and economic growth: A non-linear relationship
by Philip Grossman
January 1988, Volume 56, Issue 1
- 3-16 Rent seekers who demand government production: Bureaucratic output and the price of complements
by Bruce Benson & Jean Mitchell - 17-29 The design of rent-seeking competitions
by Robert Michaels - 31-43 Is political rivalry an incentive to vote?
by Henri Capron & Jean-Louis Kruseman - 45-55 A forecasting model for state expenditures
by Jane Leuthold - 57-67 Political competition and the Roman Catholic schools: Ontario, Canada
by Michael McKee - 69-72 Representative versus direct democracy a Tiebout test of relative performance: Comment
by Steven Deller & David Chicoine - 73-76 Representative versus direct democracy a Tiebout test of relative performance: Reply
by Rexford Santerre - 89-96 Morals by agreement
by Frank Forman
October 1987, Volume 55, Issue 3
- 199-213 How (and why) Congress twists its own arm: The political economy of tax-funded politics
by James Bennett & Thomas Dilorenzo - 215-226 The fairness of discounting: A majority rule approach
by S. Brown - 227-244 On the pricing and benefit structure of a private club or public utility
by Winston Chang & Lawrence Southwick - 257-264 Institutional structure, finance, and race in higher education: Public-private sectoral differences
by G. Sav - 265-272 Bureaucracy and the divisibility of local public output: Further econometric evidence
by N. Vasudeva Murthy - 273-289 Auctions, experiments and contingent valuation
by Robin Gregory & Lita Furby - 291-297 Markets and the measurement of value
by Don Coursey
September 1987, Volume 55, Issue 1
- 1-3 Introduction
by Allan Meltzer & Keith Poole & Thomas Romer - 5-34 The lessons of 1787
by William Riker - 35-39 Comment on the Riker paper
by Douglass North - 41-73 Cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting
by Dennis Epple & Michael Riordan - 75-79 A comment on the Epple and Riordan paper
by Edward Green - 81-119 Reputation and legislative leadership
by Randall Calvert - 121-126 Comment on the Calvert paper
by Daniel Ingberman - 127-160 Bureaucratic corruption as a constraint on voter choice
by Leonard Dudley & Claude Montmarquette - 161-162 Comments on the Dudley and Montmarquette paper
by Edwin Mills - 163-187 A public and private-choice model of broadcasting
by Eli Noam - 189-198 The economics and political economy of broadcasting: challenges in developing an analytic foundation
by Steven Garber
August 1987, Volume 54, Issue 3
- 197-210 Rational, adaptive and learning behavior of voters: Evidence from disaggregated popularity functions for Sweden
by Lars Jonung & Eskil Wadensjö - 211-230 The determinants of the choice between public and private production of a publicly funded service
by Robert McGuire & Robert Ohsfeldt & T. Cott - 231-259 The political policy cycle: Presidential effort vs. presidential control
by Janet Pack - 261-276 The distribution of income in a despotic society
by D. Usher & M. Engineer - 277-281 Agency audits and congressional oversight: The impact of state tax burdens on GAO audit requests
by David Willison - 283-288 In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’: A comment
by Michael Brooks - 289-290 In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’: Reply
by Richard Cebula & Milton Kafoglis - 291-297 A theorem on the existence of zones of initiation and deterrence in Intriligator-Brito arms race models
by Murray Wolfson
January 1987, Volume 54, Issue 2
- 101-121 Your vote counts on account of the way it is counted: An institutional solution to the paradox of not voting
by Thomas Schwartz - 123-139 Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting
by David Austen-Smith - 141-169 A test of the revealed-preference phenomenon in congressional elections
by Larry Samuelson - 171-185 A theory of the spoils system
by Roy Gardner - 187-190 An extension of Black's theorem on voting orders to the successive procedure
by Richard Niemi & Bjørn Rasch - 191-193 A note on Nanson's rule
by Emerson Niou
January 1987, Volume 54, Issue 1
- 3-18 Government, special interest groups, and economic growth
by John McCallum & André Blais - 19-25 The textile bill of 1985: The determinants of congressional voting patterns
by Suzanne Tosini & Edward Tower - 27-39 The flypaper effect and competition in the local market for public goods
by Mark Schneider & Byung Ji - 41-62 Federal advisory commissions in an economic model of representative democracy
by William McEachern - 63-82 Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders
by Arye Hillman & Dov Samet - 85-87 Characterizing equilibrium rent-seeking behavior: A reply to Tullock
by Arye Hillman & Dov Samet - 89-96 The institutional arrangement of public education: The puzzle of exclusive territories
by John Lott
January 1987, Volume 53, Issue 3
- 201-219 Median voters, political systems and public policies: An empirical test
by George Boyne - 221-229 Voting and not voting at the same time
by W. Crain & Donald Leavens & Lynn Abbot - 231-242 The rational behavior theory of voting participation: Evidence from the 1970 and 1982 elections
by Garey Durden & Patricia Gaynor - 243-255 Expenditures and receipts: Testing for causality in state and local government finances
by Michael Marlow & Neela Manage - 257-265 A note on senatorial mass mailing expenditure and the quest for reelection
by John Mikesell - 267-276 Labor PAC contributions and labor legislation: A simultaneous logit approach
by Allen Wilhite & John Theilmann - 277-284 Distant friends and nearby enemies: The politics of legislative coalition formation
by Thomas Hammond & Gary Miller - 285-287 Externalities, agency structure, and the level of transfers
by John Lott - 289-296 Public employees' consumption of government goods: The case of education
by Eugenia Toma & James Long
January 1987, Volume 53, Issue 2
- 101-130 Retrospective voting: An experimental study
by Kenneth Collier & Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook & Kenneth Williams - 131-147 The optimal size of government
by Philip Grossman - 149-165 The tradeoff between equality and efficiency: Short-run politics and long-run realities
by Dwight Lee - 167-174 The growth of government: A protection explanation
by Michael Bordo & Daniel Landau - 181-186 Political accountability for price stability and unemployment in a multi-party system with coalition governments
by Paul Renaud & Frans Winden - 187-192 Altruism as a source of self-interested behavior
by Robert Schenk
January 1987, Volume 53, Issue 1
- 3-20 The cameralists: A public choice perspective
by Juergen Backhaus & Richard Wagner - 21-39 Legislative ratings as a metric of goal cohesion within interest groups: Business vs. labor
by C. Hetzner & Stu Westin - 41-51 Statutory changes in state income taxes: An indirect test of fiscal illusion
by William Hunter & Charles Scott - 53-78 Chameleon voters and public choice
by Timur Kuran - 79-95 Notes on the mass media as an economic institution
by Daniel Orr - 97-100 Federal deficits and the real rate of interest in the United States: A note
by Richard Cebula
January 1987, Volume 52, Issue 3
- 201-213 Explaining differences in state growth: Catching up versus Olson
by Clark Nardinelli & Myles Wallace & John Warner - 215-222 A note on Pryor's criticism of Olson's rise and decline of nations
by Erich Weede - 227-244 Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibrium
by John Carter & David Schap - 245-255 Municipal annexation and local monopoly power
by Rodolfo Gonzalez & Stephen Mehay - 257-272 Budgetgames and the private and social demand for mixed public goods
by Hans Groot & Evert Pommer - 273-297 Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
by Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull
January 1987, Volume 52, Issue 2
- 125-142 A median-voter model of economic regulation
by Burton Abrams & Kenneth Lewis - 143-168 Inflation and political instability in eight Latin American countries 1946-83
by Martin Paldam - 169-186 Political cheating
by John Lott - 187-192 An instrumental-variables approach to income redistribution
by T. Tideman & R. Coats - 193-199 Capital intensity and the federal sector: Some further evidence
by Gabriel Obermann
January 1987, Volume 52, Issue 1
- 3-14 Presidential address Fourteen years of European Public Choice Society research
by Charles Blankart - 15-33 The Downsian model of electoral participation: Formal theory and empirical analysis of the constituency size effect
by Stephen Hansen & Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal - 35-55 Scale economies and rent-seeking in legislative parties
by Kenneth Koford - 57-73 Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament
by Bjørn Rasch - 75-100 The rise and evolution of public pension systems
by H. Verbon
January 1986, Volume 51, Issue 3
- 249-265 A general constitutional possibility theorem
by Peter Bernholz - 267-284 Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule
by Norman Schofield - 285-294 The stability of logrolling: An expectations approach
by James Enelow - 295-313 Discovering manipulated social choices: The coincidence of cycles and manipulated outcomes
by John Chamberlin - 315-331 Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games
by Barton Lipman - 333-343 Truth-telling, dominant strategies, and iterative Groves mechanisms
by Susan Cohen
January 1986, Volume 51, Issue 2
- 117-128 The politico-economic behavior of authoritarian governments
by Peter Bloch - 129-140 Persuading Caesar: A new interpretation of Farquharson's problem
by J. Budziszewski - 141-159 Equity, efficiency and environmental quality
by George Daly & Thomas Mayor - 161-172 The political economy of restriction of choice
by S. Littlechild & J. Wiseman - 173-190 The congressional foundations of agency performance
by Mathew McCubbins & Talbot Page - 209-219 The political economy of state level welfare benefits
by William Sander & J. Giertz - 221-239 Money and politics in a small open economy
by Stanley Winer
January 1986, Volume 51, Issue 1
- 3-23 Rational egoism versus adaptive egoism as fundamental postulate for a descriptive theory of human behavior
by Dennis Mueller - 25-38 The political economy of swarming in honeybees: Voting-with-the-wings, decision-making costs, and the unanimity rule
by Janet Landa - 39-57 A public choice approach to international organization
by Roland Vaubel - 59-70 Regulating the function, not the industry
by Bruce Yandle & Elizabeth Young - 71-80 Research note Partial single-peakedness: An extension and clarification
by Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman - 81-86 Optimal quantity of a controversial good or service
by Robert Kohn - 87-92 Brand names and barriers to entry in political markets
by John Lott - 93-100 Rent-seeking, distributional coalitions, taxes, relative prices and economic growth
by Richard Vedder & Lowell Gallaway - 101-107 Is democracy regressive? A comment on political participation
by Philip Jones & John Cullis - 109-115 Reviews
by Charles Rowley & William Dougan & Dwight Lee
January 1986, Volume 50, Issue 1
- 5-25 Incumbent performance and electoral control
by John Ferejohn - 27-91 Elections and income redistribution
by Peter Coughlin - 93-99 Elections and reputations
by John Ledyard - 135-178 The positive theory of legislative institutions: an enrichment of social choice and spatial models
by Kenneth Shepsle - 179-183 Discussion of "The positive theory of legislative institutions"
by Melvin Hinich - 185-210 Legislative coalitions and electoral equilibrium
by David Austen-Smith - 211-219 Comments on the papers by Austen-Smith and Shepsle
by Thomas Palfrey - 221-242 Tariffs, quotas and domestic-content protection: some political economy considerations
by Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz
January 1986, Volume 49, Issue 3
- 201-222 Nuclear consequences of the welfare state
by Robert Ayanian - 223-234 The public interest hypothesis revisited: A new test of Peltzman's theory of regulation
by Gilbert Becker - 235-247 Taxes, welfare costs, and public consumption: The case of the unwitting monopsonist
by Cecil Bohanon & James McClure - 249-263 Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising
by Roger Congleton - 265-282 The public choice of differing degrees of tax progressivity
by Kenneth Greene - 283-294 An empirical analysis of state and local tax structure in the context of the Leviathan model of government
by Michael Nelson
January 1986, Volume 49, Issue 2
- 101-116 The effects of constitutional restraints on governmental spending
by Burton Abrams & William Dougan - 117-125 The private interest in public redistribution: A public choice view of the geographic distribution of federal funds
by David Laband - 127-141 Tax deductions and credits, direct subsidies, and efficiency in public expenditure
by Thomas McCaleb - 143-154 Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies
by Michael Marlow - 155-163 State university boards of trustees: A principal-agent perspective
by Eugenia Toma