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Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising

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  • Roger Congleton

Abstract

Political contests have all the usual characteristics of rent-seeking games characterized in the recent volume edited by Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980). That is to say, resources are committed to a distributive contest where the social pie is not necessarily enlarged but rather divided up (a policy enacted) via a ‘winner take all’ apportioning. Since political advertising is one method of influencing electoral outcomes, we might expect competitive political advertising to exhibit rent-seeking losses of the usual sort. The extent of the rent-seeking losses associated with political advertising depends upon the extent to which advertising affects voter perceptions of the relative merits of electoral alternatives. Political proponents may well completely dissipate any electoral rents at stake through their advertising efforts, yet still increase social welfare if political advertisments provide sufficiently valuable information to the electorate. On the other hand, if advertising has no effect on voter perceptions or provides information of dubious value then rent dissipating advertising may generate substantial rent-seeking losses.
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Suggested Citation

  • Roger Congleton, 1986. "Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 249-263, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:49:y:1986:i:3:p:249-263
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00127342
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    1. Nelson, Phillip, 1976. "Political Information," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 315-336, August.
    2. William Corcoran, 1984. "Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 89-94, January.
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    1. Castanheira, Micael & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes & Schotter, Andrew, 2023. "How Trump triumphed: Multi-candidate primaries with buffoons," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    2. Wu, Jiabin, 2016. "Political Institutions and Preference Evolution," MPRA Paper 69597, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2016. "Contested Persuasion," Working Papers 161704, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    4. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the rent seekers?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
    5. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 772-804, September.
    6. Nelson, Arthur B, 2020. "Deterrence in sequential contests: An experimental study," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    7. Wu, Jiabin, 2017. "Political institutions and the evolution of character traits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 260-276.
    8. Roger D. Congleton & Alberto Batinti & Rinaldo Pietratonio, 2017. "The Electoral Politics and the Evolution of Complex Healthcare Systems," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 483-510, November.
    9. Roberto Dell’Anno & Majid Maddah, 2022. "Natural resources, rent seeking and economic development. An analysis of the resource curse hypothesis for Iran," Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 47-65, January.
    10. Anthony Evans, 2014. "A subjectivist’s solution to the limits of public choice," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 23-44, March.
    11. Menezes, Flavio M. & Quiggin, John, 2010. "Markets for influence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 307-310, May.
    12. Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "A model of cultural transmission, voting and political ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 5-29, March.
    13. Roger Congleton, 1989. "Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 101-118, August.
    14. Roger Congleton, 2001. "Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 35-64, April.
    15. Alice Guerra & Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2019. "Productive and unproductive competition: a unified framework," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(3), pages 785-804, October.
    16. Frank Bohn, 2019. "Political budget cycles, incumbency advantage, and propaganda," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 43-70, March.
    17. Michael M. Tansey, 1998. "How Delegating Authority Biases Social Choices," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 16(4), pages 511-518, October.
    18. Bräuer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Electoral Competition under Media Influence," ZEW Discussion Papers 98-19, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    19. Guillaume Cheikbossian & Houda Hafidi, 2022. "Lobbying, Public Persuasion, and Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition," Post-Print hal-04516743, HAL.
    20. Leibbrandt, Andreas & Sääksvuori, Lauri, 2012. "Communication in intergroup conflicts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1136-1147.
    21. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    22. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2010. "Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 1-7, February.
    23. Gersbach, Hans, 1998. "Communication skills and competition for donors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-18, February.

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