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A general constitutional possibility theorem

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  • Peter Bernholz

Abstract

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem shows that there exist no transitive social preferences in nonoligarchic societies for all possible profiles of individual preference orderings. Similarly, a generalization of Sen's Theorem of the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal implies under the same conditions that non-Pareto-optimal outcomes may be present in the resulting cyclical preference relations. This essay changes the customary perspective. It demonstrates that, for any profile of individual preferences, we can always find a nonoligarchic assignment of rights to different subsets of society, to decide between pairs of outcomes, together with adequate decision rules, which escapes these problems. This assignment of rights can be a purely liberal one even for each profile, but not one in which everybody participates in all decisions and which uses simple or qualified-majority voting (Total Direct Democracy). The adequate purely liberal constitution, on the other hand, may imply an oligarchy if too few outcomes are present. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Bernholz, 1986. "A general constitutional possibility theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 249-265, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:51:y:1986:i:3:p:249-265
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00128876
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    1. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
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    4. Peter Bernholz, 1982. "Externalities as a Necessary Condition for Cyclical Social Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(4), pages 699-705.
    5. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    6. Thomas Schwartz, 1981. "The universal-instability theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 487-501, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vladimir Gligorov, 1997. "Benjamin Constant and Carl Schmitt Go to Russia," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 271-282, December.
    2. Stéphane Gonzalez & Alain Marciano, 2017. "De nouveaux éclairages sur le théorème de Coase et la vacuité du cœur," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 579-600.
    3. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 499-501, December.
    4. James M. Buchanan, 1995. "Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(2), pages 141-150, April.
    5. Bernholz, Peter, 1997. "Property rights, contracts, cyclical social preferences and the Coase theorem: A synthesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 419-442, September.
    6. Congleton, Roger D. & Tollison, Robert D., 1999. "The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 193-205, June.
    7. Peter Bernholz, 2012. "From The Calculus of Consent to extended logrolling, negative externalities, and the Coase theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 265-271, September.

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