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The stability of logrolling: An expectations approach

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  • James Enelow

Abstract

This essay provides an explanation for the existence of stable logrolling arrangements. The model presented assumes that issues are voted on one at a time, that people are risk averse, and that each person forecasts future issue decisions with a random variable whose mean is linear in the alternatives of the present issue. We show that under this model, the expectation that logrolling will take place stabilizes the logrolling process. For this expectation to be stable, it must be symmetric, which means that revoting of issues must be possible. Since revoting is possible in institutions such as Congress, we conclude that an important set of real world voting bodies satisfies the conditions for stable logrolling. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Suggested Citation

  • James Enelow, 1986. "The stability of logrolling: An expectations approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 285-294, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:51:y:1986:i:3:p:285-294
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00128878
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Enelow, James M. & Hinich, Melvin J., 1983. "Voting One Issue at a Time: The Question of Voter Forecasts," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 435-445, June.
    2. Peter Bernholz, 1974. "Logrolling, Arrow‐Paradox And Decision Rules ‐A Generalization ," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 49-62, January.
    3. Schwartz, Thomas, 1977. "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 999-1010, September.
    4. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    5. Joseph Kadane, 1972. "On division of the question," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-54, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mario Gilli & Yuan Li & Jiwei Qian, 2018. "Logrolling under fragmented authoritarianism: theory and evidence from China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 197-214, April.
    2. Emily Chamlee-Wright & Virgil Storr, 2010. "Expectations of government’s response to disaster," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 253-274, July.
    3. Josep M. Colomer & Florencio Martínez, 1995. "The Paradox of Coalition Trading," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(1), pages 41-63, January.

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