From weakest-link to best-shot: Correction
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/BF00179743
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Attack-and-Defence Group Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 049, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Vicary, Simon & Sandler, Todd, 2002. "Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1501-1520, September.
- Katsuya Kobayashi, 2019. "Step-by-step group contests with group-specific public-good prizes," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 183-204, June.
- Ghislain Dutheil de la Rochère & Jean-Michel Josselin & Yvon Rocaboy, 2011.
"The role of aggregation technologies in the provision of supranational public goods: A reconsideration of NATO’s strategies,"
The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 85-103, March.
- Ghislain Dutheil de La Rochère & Jean-Michel Josselin & Yvon Rocaboy, 2010. "The role of aggregation technologies in the provision of supranational public goods: A reconsideration of NATO's strategies," Post-Print halshs-00559406, HAL.
- repec:elg:eechap:15325_3 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hubert Kempf & Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2010.
"Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 763-787, August.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Hubert KEMPF, 2008. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective," Working Papers 200817, CERDI.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Hubert Kempf, 2011. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective," Working Papers halshs-00556944, HAL.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Hubert Kempf, 2010. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective," Post-Print halshs-00517085, HAL.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Hubert Kempf, 2010. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00517085, HAL.
- Kempf, H. & Rota Graziosi, G., 2009. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective," Working papers 240, Banque de France.
- MIYAGIWA Kaz & SATO Yasuhiro, 2015.
"Illegal Immigration and Multiple Destinations,"
Discussion papers
15116, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
- MIYAGIWA, Kaz & SATO, Yasuhiro, 2015. "Illegal immigration and multiple destinations," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-10, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Sandler, Todd & Vicary, Simon, 2001. "Weakest-link public goods: giving in-kind or transferring money in a sequential game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 71-75, December.
- Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Lee, Dongryul & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013.
"Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 94-103.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2011. "Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 024, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes," Working Papers 13-12, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Chowdhury, Subhasish & Lee, Dongryul & Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes," MPRA Paper 46654, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stefano Barbieri, 2023. "Complementarity and information in collective action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(1), pages 167-206, January.
- TOSHIHIRO IHORI & MARTIN C. McGUIRE, 2007.
"Collective Risk Control and Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 231-263, April.
- Toshihiro Ihori & Martin C. McGuire, 2006. "Collective Risk Control And Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion," CARF F-Series CARF-F-060, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Toshihiro Ihori & Martin C. McGuire, 2006. "Collective Risk Control And Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-402, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg, 2014. "Group efforts when performance is determined by the “best shot”," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 333-373, June.
- Dulbecco, Philippe & Laporte, Bertrand, 2005.
"How can the security of international trade be financed in developing countries? A global public good Approach,"
World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1201-1214, August.
- Philippe Dulbecco & Bertrand Laporte, 2005. "How Can the Security of International Trade Be Financed in Developing Countries? A Global Public Good Approach," CAE Working Papers 33, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
- Kaz Miyagiwa & Yasuhiro Sato, 2019.
"Illegal immigration, unemployment, and multiple destinations,"
Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 118-144, January.
- Kaz Miyagiwa & Yasuhiro Sato, 2018. "Illegal Immigration, Unemployment, and Multiple Destinations," Working Papers 1804, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
- Philippe Dulbecco & Bertrand Laporte, 2005.
"Le financement de la sécurisation du commerce international pour les pays en développement. Une approche en termes de bien public mondial,"
Revue Tiers-Monde, Armand Colin, vol. 0(2), pages 427-447.
- Philippe Dulbecco & Bertrand Laporte, 2005. "Le financement de la sécurisation du commerce international pour les pays en développement. Une approche en termes de bien public mondial," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(182), pages 427-447.
- Philippe DULBECCO & Bertrand LAPORTE, 2003. "Le financement de la sécurisation du commerce international pour les pays en développement - une approche en termes de bien public mondial -," Working Papers 200312, CERDI.
- Van Long, Ngo, 2013. "The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 161-181.
- Anita Milman & Lisa Bunclark & Declan Conway & William Adger, 2013. "Assessment of institutional capacity to adapt to climate change in transboundary river basins," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 121(4), pages 755-770, December.
- Pies, Ingo & Hielscher, Stefan, 2007. "Das Problem der internationalen Arzneimittelversorgung: Eine wirtschaftsethische Perspektive," Discussion Papers 2007-1, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
- Ryoji Makino & Kenju Akai & Jun-ichi Takeshita & Takanori Kudo & Keiko Aoki, 2021. "Effect of disclosing the relation between effort and unit reliability on system reliability: An economic experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(4), pages 1-18, April.
- Lee, Dongryul, 2012. "Weakest-link contests with group-specific public good prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 238-248.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu & Na, Sunghyun, 2001. "Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 415-429, December.
- Sarkhel, Prasenjit, 2015. "Flood risk, land use and private participation in embankment maintenance in Indian Sundarbans," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 272-284.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2016. "The Attack-And-Defense Group Contests: Best Shot Versus Weakest Link," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(1), pages 548-557, January.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:46:y:1985:i:2:p:221-223. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.