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Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks

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  • Eugenia Toma
  • Mark Toma

Abstract

This paper applies the theory of bureaucracy to the internal operation of the Federal Reserve System. According to the bureaucratic model, the Board of Governors will use budget allocations to the individual Reserve Banks as a means of controlling their provision of information. By examining the research publications of Reserve Banks, we find two Banks which began providing ‘adverse publicity’ for the System in recent years. The empirical analysis reveals that the budgets of these Banks have decreased following the changes in research agendas. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

Suggested Citation

  • Eugenia Toma & Mark Toma, 1985. "Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 175-191, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:45:y:1985:i:2:p:175-191
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00215063
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Milton Friedman, 2013. "Homer Jones: A Personal Reminiscence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 451-454.
    2. Toma, Mark, 1982. "Inflationary bias of the Federal Reserve System : A bureaucratic perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 163-190.
    3. Breton, Albert & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1975. "The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(1), pages 195-207, February.
    4. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
    5. Acheson, Keith & Chant, John F, 1973. "Bureaucratic Theory and the Choice of Central Bank Goals," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 637-655, May.
    6. Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1983. "Preliminary Evidence on the Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 291-304, June.
    7. repec:bla:kyklos:v:26:y:1973:i:2:p:362-79 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. John Chant & Keith Acheson, 1972. "The choice of monetary instruments and the theory of bureaucracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 13-33, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eugenia Toma & Mark Toma, 1985. "Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks: Reply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 197-198, January.
    2. Alexander W. Salter & William J. Luther, 2019. "Adaptation and central banking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 243-256, September.
    3. Robert D. Auerbach, 1991. "Institutional Preservation At The Federal Reserve," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 9(3), pages 46-58, July.
    4. Salter, Alexander W. & Smith, Daniel J., 2019. "Political economists or political economists? The role of political environments in the formation of fed policy under burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-13.
    5. Edward J. Kane, 1982. "Selecting monetary targets in a changing financial environment," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 181-222.
    6. John Lott, 1987. "Externalities, agency structure, and the level of transfers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 285-287, January.

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