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Economic incentives under contract supply of local government services

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  • Stephen Mehay
  • Rodolfo Gonzalez

Abstract

It has been argued that organizations which are unable to directly appropriate any of the firm's residual earnings tend to experience various forms of wealth-taking by managers (Alchian and Kessel, 1962). This wealth-taking has been observed in privately-owned, regulated firms (Nelson, 1980) as well as in government-operated bureaus. The results in this paper suggest that the X-inefficiency associated with various forms of wealth-taking may be constrained when external, competitive pressures exist. Niskanen argued that one strategy for reducing the inefficiency associated with monopoly bureaus would be to set up two bureaus to compete for the sponsor's budget in order to generate better information on cost and production functions. At the local level, the Lakewood Plan, by generating information on actual production cost to purchasing cities and to unincorporated area residents, appears to create the desired effect. By generating this flow of information on cost, the Lakewood Plan eases the task of monitoring the performance of county departments. Second, the threat of entry posed by the city bureau, which can always produce services in-house, appears to effectively constrain the X-inefficiency of the county supplier bureaus. Combined with Deacon's (1979) results, this study suggests that the Lakewood Plan improves overall efficiency in the local government services market in several ways. First, it allows small cities to exploit scale economies by purchasing services from large scale producers. Second, it preserves local autonomy and avoids the welfare losses associated with centralized government (Barzel, 1969). Finally, it imposes some competitive pressure on the producing department ot eliminate managerial inefficiencies. In this era of tax and spending limitations, municipal governments are in dire need of alternative mechanisms for maintaining service levels without increasing service costs. The accumulating evidence suggests that contracting with larger governmental entisties may yield net benefits to both the governmental unit supplying the services (and its clients) as well as to the governmental unit purchasing the services. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Mehay & Rodolfo Gonzalez, 1985. "Economic incentives under contract supply of local government services," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 79-86, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:46:y:1985:i:1:p:79-86
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00150966
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    2. Robert Deacon, 1979. "The expenditure effects of alternative public supply institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 381-397, September.
    3. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1982. "Median Voters or Budget Maximizers: Evidence from School Expenditure Referenda," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(4), pages 556-578, October.
    4. Epple, Dennis & Zelenitz, Allan, 1981. "The Implications of Competition among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(6), pages 1197-1217, December.
    5. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "The elusive median voter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 143-170, October.
    6. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, January.
    7. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    8. Stephen L. Mehay, 1979. "Intergovernmental Contracting for Municipal Police Services: An Empirical Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 55(1), pages 59-72.
    9. Yoram Barzel, 1969. "Two propositions on the optimum level of producing collective goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 31-37, March.
    10. Nelson, Randy A, 1980. "Revenue Contributions and Efficiency in Municipal Utilities," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(3), pages 509-513, July.
    11. Primeaux, Walter J, Jr, 1977. "An Assessment of X-Efficiency Gained through Competition," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 59(1), pages 105-108, February.
    12. Walter Hettich, 1975. "Bureaucrats and public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 15-25, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Olivia S. Mitchell, 1998. "Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems," NBER Chapters, in: Privatizing Social Security, pages 403-456, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Miles Finney, 1997. "Scale Economies And Police Department Consolidation: Evidence From Los Angeles," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(1), pages 121-127, January.

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