Content
January 1984, Volume 44, Issue 1
- 103-145 Theories of regulation and the deregulation movement
by Theodore Keeler - 147-191 The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
by Barry Weingast - 201-249 The political economy of Canadian constitution-making: the Canadian economic-union issue
by Thomas Courchene - 251-272 An analysis of constitutional change, Canada, 1980–82
by Albert Breton - 273-278 A comment on the papers by Thomas Courchene and Albert Breton
by Stanley Winer - 279-283 On the analysis of constitutional change in Canada
by Mark Sproule-Jones
January 1984, Volume 43, Issue 3
- 225-249 Economic justice and economic power: An inquiry into distributive justice and political stability
by Bengt-Arne Wickström - 251-285 Strategy-proofness of a class of Borda rules
by Manimay Sen - 287-291 Multi-candidate equilibria
by Donald Wittman - 293-305 An impossibility theorem for spatial models
by Kim Border - 307-327 Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies
by Larry Samuelson - 329-343 Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies
by Lloyd Shapley & Bernard Grofman
January 1984, Volume 43, Issue 2
- 113-149 Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations
by R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas - 151-171 An examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in OECD countries
by Peter Murrell - 173-186 Determinants of regulatory policies toward competition in the electric utility industry
by Walter Primeaux & John Filer & Robert Herren & Daniel Hollas - 187-194 Public opinion and regulatory behavior
by S. Anderson & A. Glazer - 195-202 Early projections and voter turnout in the 1980 presidential election
by John Carter - 203-209 Politicians and protection: Tariffs and elections in Australia
by John Conybeare - 211-215 On the mutuality of interest between bureaus and high demand review committees: The case of joint production
by Michael Munger - 217-223 Reviews
by Loren Lomasky & Robert McNown
January 1984, Volume 43, Issue 1
- 3-24 The free rider problem: Experimental evidence
by Oliver Kim & Mark Walker - 25-43 Public versus private economic activity: A new look at school bus transportation
by Robert McGuire & T. COTT - 45-64 Public protection against misperceived risks: Insights from positive political economy
by Mark Pauly & Howard Kunreuther & James Vaupel - 65-76 A theory of the bureaucratic value of Federal Reserve operating procedures
by Neil Skaggs - 77-82 Sequential referenda and bureaucratic man
by Kenneth Greene - 83-88 A note on centralized regulatory review
by James Miller & William Shughart & Robert Tollison - 89-94 Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking
by William Corcoran - 95-97 Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking: A comment
by Gordon Tullock - 99-100 The Electoral College and voter participation rates: A comment
by Anthony Ostrosky - 101-102 The Electoral College and voter participation rates: Reply
by Richard Cebula & Dennis Murphy - 103-112 Reviews
by Robert Tollison & William Mitchell & S. Roy
January 1984, Volume 42, Issue 3
- 225-234 Social choice and the status quo
by Jeffrey Richelson - 235-246 Arrow's theorem with social quasi-orderings
by John Weymark - 247-255 Utility function, group size, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good
by Koji Okuguchi - 257-272 Are qualified majority rules special?
by Shmuel Nitzan & Jacob Paroush - 273-285 The accuracy of group majority decisions in groups with added members
by Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman - 287-294 Maximizing models of legislative choice
by Ronald Warren - 295-310 Measuring state power in presidential elections
by Terrence Levesque - 311-325 To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting
by Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman
January 1984, Volume 42, Issue 2
- 113-131 Post election redistributive strategies of representatives: A partial theory of the politics of redistribution
by Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer - 133-145 Constitutional control of processes and their outcomes
by A. Hamlin - 147-160 Preference revelation and supply response in the arena of local government
by D. Kenyon - 161-174 Schumpeter and public choice, Part II Democracy and the demise of capitalism: The missing chapter in Schumpeter
by William Mitchell - 175-183 Public bureau budgets and jurisdiction size: An empirical note
by David Nellor - 185-192 Recurrent cost and performance comparisons within public administration: A method of generating efficiency-promoting competition
by Ernst Jonsson - 197-203 Is Tullock correct about Sunday closing laws?
by John Moorhouse - 205-211 Off-budget activities of local government: Comment
by Robert Blewett - 213-215 Off-budget activities of local government: Reply
by James Bennett & Thomas Dilorenzo - 217-224 Reviews
by Mark Toma & Martin Gaynor & Fred Glahe & John Goodman
January 1984, Volume 42, Issue 1
- 3-24 Demand-revealing processes and accounting standard-setting
by Steven Johnson - 25-37 Is there a relationship between economic conditions and political structure?
by David Laband - 39-54 Towards a neoaristotelean theory of politics: A positive account of ‘fairness’
by David Levy - 55-71 The social choice of alternative corrective devices
by Stuart Mestelman - 73-88 Schumpeter and public choice, Part I: Precursor to public choice?
by William Mitchell - 89-99 A (partial) rehabilitation of the public interest theory
by Gordon Tullock - 101-106 Socialism and the revenue maximizing Leviathan
by Adam Gifford & Roy Kenney - 107-112 Reviews
by John Stehle & Richard Bean
January 1983, Volume 41, Issue 3
- 351-369 Alternate rationales for severance pay compensation under airline deregulation
by Joseph Cordes & Robert Goldfarb - 371-386 From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods
by Jack Hirshleifer - 387-401 An experiment in the demand-revealing process
by T. Tideman - 403-418 Tests of a rational theory of the size of government
by Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard - 419-421 Further tests of a rational theory of the size of government
by Gordon Tullock - 423-426 Rejoinder to Gordon Tullock
by Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard - 427-434 Logrolling and high demand committee review
by Bruce Benson - 435-440 Privatization of public goods
by Robert Staaf - 441-448 Non-global social contracts: A note on inefficient social institutions
by Robert Blewett & Roger Congleton - 449-450 A note on voter participation rates in the United States
by Richard Cebula - 451-454 A limited defense of Pareto optimal redistribution: Comment
by E. Pasour - 455-460 Reviews
by Joseph Reid & Robert Sugden & Dwight Lee
January 1983, Volume 41, Issue 2
- 1-1 Editor's note
by Gordon Tullock - 241-250 An approach to empirical studies of voting paradoxes: An update and extension
by John Dobra - 251-260 On the stability of legislative outcomes
by Stephen Hoenack - 261-270 Why so much stability?: Another opinion
by Richard Niemi - 271-283 The voting behavior of bureaucrats: Some empirical evidence
by James Bennett & William Orzechowski - 285-293 The impact of tenure on the flow of federal benefits to SMSA's
by Lisa Kiel & Richard McKenzie - 295-306 Banking sector influence on the relationship of Congress to the Federal Reserve System
by Neil Skaggs & Cheryl Wasserkrug - 307-310 The Tiebout hypothesis in the United States: An analysis of black consumer-voters, 1970–75
by Richard Cebula & K. Avery - 311-314 Federal budget cuts: Bureaucrats trim the meat, not the fat
by David Laband - 315-319 On the Margolis ‘thought experiment,’ and the applicability of demand-revealing mechanisms to large-group decisions
by Earl Brubaker - 321-325 Reply to Brubaker and Tullock
by Howard Margolis - 325-325 Editorial note
by Gordon Tullock - 327-331 Conflicting analysis of a ‘Conflicting commons’: Comment
by Dwight Lee - 333-335 Conflicting analysis of a ‘Conflicting commons’: Reply
by Bruce Yandle - 337-349 Reviews
by Howard Dickman & William Mitchell & George Uhimchuk & John Dobra
January 1983, Volume 41, Issue 1
- 1-5 Introduction
by A. Meltzer & Peter Ordeshook & Thomas Romer - 7-53 A strategic calculus of voting
by Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal - 55-61 Models of voter turnout: a brief idiosyncratic review
by Bernard Grofman - 63-100 A spatial model with party activists: implications for electoral dynamics
by John Aldrich - 133-137 The objectives of private and public judges
by Paul Rubin - 139-143 The objectives of private and public judges
by Chester Spatt - 145-175 Control of conflicts of interest in class-action suits
by Lewis Kornhauser - 177-179 Control of conflicts of interest in class-action suits
by Chester Spatt - 181-222 The evolution of tax structures
by James Alt - 223-228 Is there a demand for progressivity?
by Gerald Kramer - 229-235 Implications of dynamic optimal taxation for the evolution of tax structures
by Finn Kydland
January 1983, Volume 40, Issue 3
- 237-247 Variation of the electorate: Veto and purge
by Roy Gardner - 249-261 Scoring rule sensitivity to weight selection
by William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn - 263-279 Winners, blockers, and the status quo: Simple collective decision games and the core
by James Laing & Sampei Nakabayashi & Benjamin Slotznick - 281-291 Some experimental results that fail to support the competitive solution
by Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook - 293-305 The power of the chairman
by Richard Niemi & Bo Bjurulf & Gordon Blewis - 307-316 A note on the paradox of voting: Anonymous preference profiles and May's formula
by Sven Berg & Bo Bjurulf - 317-321 On Plott's pairwise symmetry condition for majority rule equilibrium
by James Enelow & Melvin Hinisch - 323-328 An exegesis of Farquharson's Theory of Voting
by Richard Niemi - 329-336 On evaluating income distributions: Rank dominance, the Suppes-Sen grading principle of justice, and Pareto optimality
by Rubin Saposnik
January 1983, Volume 40, Issue 2
- 117-133 Philanthropic motives and contribution policy
by Uri Ben-Zion & Uriel Spiegel - 135-154 Demands for public spending: An attitudinal approach
by James Ferris - 155-164 Random timing of elections and the political business cycle
by Victor Ginsburgh & Philippe Michel - 165-174 On the distribution of federal taxes and expenditures, and the new war between the states
by Randall Holcombe & Asghar Zardkoohi - 175-186 Expenditure effects of metropolitan tax base sharing: A public choice analysis
by Dolores Martin & James Schmidt - 187-194 An analysis of support for tax limitation referenda
by Robert Stein & Keith Hamm & Patricia Freeman - 195-201 In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’
by Richard Cebula & Milton Kafoglis - 203-209 Economic competition and political competition: An empirical note
by Thomas Dilorenzo - 211-216 Institutional entropy, again
by Richard Auster - 217-225 A note on demand-revealing
by Howard Margolis - 227-230 A further consideration of coalitions under the demand-revealing process
by Melville McMillan - 231-232 Towards a theory of yes-no-voting: A comment
by Friedel Bolle
January 1983, Volume 40, Issue 1
- 5-5 Editorial
by Gordon Tullock - 7-19 Public choice in local judicial systems
by Josef Broder & A. Schmid - 21-39 Pre-meeting discussions and the possibility of coalition-breaking procedures in majority rule committees
by Elizabeth Hoffman & Charles Plott - 41-52 Political terrorism and the size of government: A positive institutional analysis of violent political activity
by Richard Kirk - 53-69 Presidential politics, budget deficits, and monetary policy in the United States; 1960–1976
by Leroy Laney & Thomas Willett - 71-87 The determination of local public expenditures and the principal and agent relation: A case study
by Sharon Megdal - 89-94 Recontracting, trustworthiness, and the stability of vote exchanges
by James Coleman - 95-99 Property rights in bureaucracies and bureaucratic efficiency
by John Dobra - 101-103 Addictive goods and the growth of government
by Franz Jessen - 105-109 Economic agents and the level of pollution control
by Bruce Yandle - 111-116 Review
by Gordon Tullock
January 1982, Volume 39, Issue 3
- 333-342 Off-budget activities of local government: The bane of the tax revolt
by James Bennett & Thomas Dilorenzo - 343-360 Beliefs and errors in voting choices: A restatement of the theory of fiscal illusion
by Richard Carter - 361-370 A decentralized mechanism for siting hazardous waste disposal facilities
by David Goetze - 371-386 The Section 8-Existing Housing program's administrative fee structure: A formal model of bureau behavior with empirical evidence
by Laura Langbein - 387-398 An econometric analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's certiorari decisions
by Jan Palmer - 399-414 A politico-financial model of local authority rents and rate fund contributions in the U.K
by Martin Ricketts - 415-420 Toward an informational dynamics of collective choice
by Pam Brown - 421-425 A model of asymmetric bureaucratic inertia and bias
by R. Congleton - 427-433 Pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting
by Peter Coughlin
January 1982, Volume 39, Issue 2
- 221-243 The growth of government in Italy: Evidence from 1861 to 1979
by Michele Fratianni & Franco Spinelli - 245-268 Centralized vote-trading
by Kenneth Koford - 269-276 In defense of the downtrodden: Usury laws?
by William Boyes - 277-282 A limited defense of Pareto optimal redistribution
by J. Giertz - 283-289 The median voter and his elasticity of substitution
by Kenneth Greene - 291-297 Peltzman on regulation and politics
by Victor Goldberg - 299-300 Peltzman on regulation and politics: Reply
by Sam Peltzman - 301-317 Bureaucratic productivity: The case of agricultural research revisited
by E. Pasour & Marc Johnson - 319-329 Bureaucratic productivity: The case of agricultural research revisited — A rejoinder
by Vernon Ruttan - 331-332 Review
by Gordon Tullock
January 1982, Volume 39, Issue 1
- 1-3 Introduction
by A. Meltzer & Peter Ordeshook & Thomas Romer - 5-27 The applied theory of regulation: Political economy at the Interstate Commerce Commission
by Marcus Alexis - 29-32 The applied theory of regulation: Political economy at the Interstate Commerce Commission
by Thomas Moore - 33-66 Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process?
by Morris Fiorina - 67-71 Legislative choice of regulatory forms
by Albert Nichols - 73-106 A political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments
by Richard Barke & William Riker - 107-111 A political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments
by Mancur Olson - 113-142 Representative voter or bureaucratic manipulation: An examination of public finances in California before and after Proposition 13
by Perry Shapiro & Jon Sonstelie - 143-145 Representative voter or bureaucratic manipulation: An examination of public finances in California before and after Proposition 13
by Allan Zelenitz - 147-169 The impacts of Proposition 13 upon the California political system: Re-regulating the intergovernmental system
by John Kirlin - 171-178 The impacts of Proposition 13 upon the California political system: Re-regulating the intergovernmental system What system? What changes?
by Patrick Larkey - 179-184 Proposition 13 and fiscal federalism
by Dieter Bös - 185-212 Equilibrium and efficiency under pure entitlement systems
by Edward Green - 213-219 Entitlement theory: Prospects and problems
by Thomas Schwartz
January 1982, Volume 38, Issue 3
- 225-241 Crisis of the tax state
by Dieter Bös - 243-252 Utility profits, fiscal illusion, and local public expenditures
by Thomas DiLorenzo - 253-262 How powerful are public bureaucrats as voters?
by Bruno Frey & Werner Pommerehne - 263-269 Senatorial responsiveness, the characteristics of the polity and the political cycle
by Kenneth Greene & Hadi Salavitabar - 271-280 Demand functions and the valuation of public goods
by Eli Noam - 281-303 Interest groups in democracies — How influential are they?
by Friedrich Schneider & Jörg Naumann - 305-316 Closeness counts in horseshoes and dancing ... and elections
by Fred Thompson - 317-327 Conflicting commons
by Bruce Yandle - 329-334 Review
by Thomas Willett
January 1982, Volume 38, Issue 2
- 113-128 Microdata estimation of school expenditure levels: An alternative to the median voter approach
by John Akin & Michael Lea - 129-138 A critique on the effectiveness of tax-expenditure limitations
by Dale Bails - 139-147 The impact of labor costs on municipal finances
by William Hunter - 149-165 Optimal voting rules under uncertainty
by Kenneth Koford - 167-170 More thought about demand revealing
by Gordon Tullock - 171-179 An economic analysis of crime rates, punishment, and the social consequences of crime
by Göran Skogh & Charles Stuart - 181-196 The overstated economy: Implications of positive public economics for national accounting
by Z. Spindler - 197-203 Unemployment rates and political outcomes: An incentive for manufacturing a political business cycle
by Ryan Amacher & William Boyes - 205-209 Does there exist a political business cycle: A Box-Tiao analysis
by Nathaniel Beck - 211-217 An alternate test of the Tiebout hypothesis
by Vincent Munley - 219-224 Book reviews
by Dwight Lee & Gordon Tullock & Robert Tollison
March 1982, Volume 38, Issue 1
- 3-19 Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking
by Kenneth Koford - 21-33 Improving the behavior of public officials: Changing the method of compensation and changing officials
by Charles Knoeber - 35-53 Comparative growth and comparative advantage: Tests of the effects of interest group behavior on foreign trade patterns
by Peter Murrell - 55-72 Taxes and residential choice
by Chi-Yuan Tsai - 73-85 Voluntary purchase of public goods
by Douglas Young - 87-91 A thought experiment on demand-revealing mechanisms
by Howard Margolis - 93-94 The Electoral College and voter participation rates: Comment
by Douglas Blair - 95-96 The Electoral College and voter participation rates: Reply
by Richard Cebula & Dennis Murphy - 97-112 Textbook public choice: A review essay
by William Mitchell
January 1981, Volume 37, Issue 3
- 389-402 Party policy and campaign costs in a multi-constituency model of electoral competition
by David Austen-Smith - 403-423 Voter preferences, simple electoral games, and equilibria in two-candidate contests
by Lee Dutter - 425-434 Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting
by Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams - 435-445 Instability in voluntary contributions based upon jointness in supply
by Ralph Frasca - 447-472 Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting
by Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver - 473-486 The firm's objective function as a collective choice problem
by Frank Milne - 487-501 The universal-instability theorem
by Thomas Schwartz - 503-519 Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
by Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast - 521-529 Political power and the market for governors
by Burton Abrams