The effects of voter mobility on agenda controllers

This paper has examined the effects of resident voter mobility upon the behavior of budget maximizing agenda controllers. From the restrictive model that was developed, the Pareto benefits of the migratory option have been discussed. They appear to be unambiguously positive. Agenda controllers, however, can increase their budgets with collusive, joint budget maximizing behavior. This is where the political constraints which involve the voter approval or agenda requirement becomes crucially important. The most restrictive constraint determines the equilibrium level for all communities. This politically feasible set, however, can also be altered by constitutional tax and/or spending limitations. These constitutional measures may also provide a method by which the public can control or regulate the excesses of agenda manipulation even in the migratory version of the model. Moreover, since a tax or spending referendum imposed upon the community with the most binding agenda constraint tends to force down the budgetary levels of all colluding communities; the case for further political subdivision and federalism might be strengthened. The features of public sector collusion among agenda controllers, the effects of tax and spending limits upon their behavior, and the implications of these factors upon the argument for federalism all deserve further study and analysis. This task will require a different formulation of the model. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985