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Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time

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  • Daniel Ingberman

Abstract

Stylized institutions for direct democracy referenda are examined in a dynamic full information environment with myopic voters. Competitive-agenda (median-voter) processes are contrasted with monopolistic (controlled-agenda) processes by extending existing static analyses to a class of dynamic institutions not previously characterized, the status quo reversion rule. This highlights the dependence of the progression of real equilibrium allocations over time on institutional structure. By delineating the restrictions implied by each institutional form the model explains some persistent empirical regularities. In particular, a strict ceteris paribus ordering of the magnitudes of budgets by institutional form is derived for a wide portion of the parameter space. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

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  • Daniel Ingberman, 1985. "Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 19-43, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:46:y:1985:i:1:p:19-43
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00150961
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    Cited by:

    1. Barseghyan, Levon & Coate, Stephen, 2014. "Bureaucrats, voters, and public investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 35-48.
    2. Simon Hug, 2004. "Occurrence and Policy Consequences of Referendums," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(3), pages 321-356, July.
    3. Dennis Epple & Michael Riordan, 1987. "Cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 41-73, September.
    4. Wills, Douglas T., 1995. "Further implications of the reversion level in agenda-setter models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 435-440, October.
    5. Hülya Eraslan & Kirill S. Evdokimov & Jan Zápal, 2022. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining," Springer Books, in: Emin Karagözoğlu & Kyle B. Hyndman (ed.), Bargaining, chapter 0, pages 151-175, Springer.
    6. Feld, Lars P. & Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of economic policy: a report on the Swiss experience," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 287-306, June.
    7. Chen, Jidong, 2023. "Sequential agenda setting with strategic and informative voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    8. Balsdon, Ed & Brunner, Eric J. & Rueben, Kim, 2003. "Private demands for public capital: evidence from school bond referenda," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 610-638, November.
    9. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, 1996. "Using Computational Methods To Perform Counterfactual Analyses Of Formal Theories," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(3), pages 295-323, August.
    10. Justin Fox, 2006. "Legislative Cooperation among Impatient Legislators," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(1), pages 68-97, January.
    11. Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2001. "Order-restricted preferences and strategy-proof social choices rules," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 191, Universidad del CEMA.
    12. Daniel E. Ingberman & Robert P. Inman, 1987. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy," NBER Working Papers 2405, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Hensher, David A. & Li, Zheng, 2013. "Referendum voting in road pricing reform: A review of the evidence," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 186-197.

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