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The politics of race in higher education: Governing boards and constituents

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  • G. Sav

Abstract

Recent theoretical and empirical contributions suggest that patterns of employment discrimination in the public sector can be interpreted as a consequence of political and structural factors in viewing the government as a vote-maximizing entity. According to the analysis presented in this paper, extensions of the discrimating vote-maximizing hypothesis to the higher education industry are also useful in explaining interstate differences in the relative ability of blacks to capture a more equitable share of publicly produced education. The basic empirical finding is that blacks' relative access to and success in public higher education, as measured by relative black enrollments and conferred degrees, is significantly improved by increased black political participation and representation in elected offices. Furthermore, the analysis implies that the organizational structure of higher education also matters. Governing boards enjoying longer terms of office appear to have a negative effect on black equality in public higher education. Although the evidence on this point was weak, further tests would be required before it could be completely dismissed. Finally, the empirical results indicate that the recent structural trend toward fewer governing boards and greater concentration of board power have the likely effect of decreasing blacks' access to and success in higher education. Overall, these findings lend additional support to the present extensions of the vote-maximizing hypothesis in explaining patterns of discrimination in the public sector. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Suggested Citation

  • G. Sav, 1986. "The politics of race in higher education: Governing boards and constituents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 147-155, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:48:y:1986:i:2:p:147-155
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00179728
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Toma, Eugenia Froedge, 1983. "Institutional Structures, Regulation, and Producer Gains in the Education Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 103-116, April.
    2. Huey Perry, 1983. "The impact of black political participation on public sector employment and representation on municipal boards and commissions," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 203-217, December.
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    1. G. Sav, 1987. "Institutional structure, finance, and race in higher education: Public-private sectoral differences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 257-264, October.

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