The politics of race in higher education: Governing boards and constituents
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00179728
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- G. Sav, 1987. "Institutional structure, finance, and race in higher education: Public-private sectoral differences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 257-264, October.
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