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Multi-candidate equilibria

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  • Donald Wittman

Abstract

We demonstrate the existence of an electoral equilibrium in a model with three or more candidates. We use the same kinds of assumptions that have previously been used to establish existence in two-candidate models and have not had to make special assumptions regarding dimensionality (e.g., that there is only one dimension) or distribution of voter preferences (e.g., symmetry). Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Suggested Citation

  • Donald Wittman, 1984. "Multi-candidate equilibria," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 287-291, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:43:y:1984:i:3:p:287-291
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00118937
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Melvin Hinich & Peter Ordeshook, 1971. "Social welfare and electoral competition in democratic societies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 73-87, September.
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    5. Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1970. "Plurality Maximization vs Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 772-791, September.
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    7. David Austen-Smith, 1981. "Party policy and campaign costs in a multi-constituency model of electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 389-402, January.
    8. Hinich, Melvin J. & Ledyard, John O. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1972. "Nonvoting and the existence of equilibrium under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 144-153, April.
    9. Bernard Grofman, 1979. "Abstention in two-candidate and three-candidate elections when voters use mixed strategies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 189-200, June.
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